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


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


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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The following pages have been prepared rather hurriedly and without an attempt at completeness, believing that books for study should be rather suggestive than exhaustive.

The main endeavor of the author has been so to arrange the topics and sub-topics of the book that the student or reader may have the SUBJECTS of the book exposed to his view as they exist in the nature of things, rather than that the opinions of the author should constitute the text.

In this way the student's own conclusions may be drawn, and, from the topics arranged and partially developed, he may construct a system of morality in harmony with his own belief; for it must be conceded, that while we have a body of incontestable truth, constituting the basis of all morality, still the opinions of men upon minor points are so diverse as to make a uniform belief in dogmatical principles impossible.

The author maintains that moral truths and moral conduct may be reached from different routes or sources; all converging, it is true, to the same point: and that it savors somewhat of illiberality to insist upon a uniform belief in the means or doctrines whereby we are to arrive at a perfect knowledge of the truth, in a human sense.

Reason demands, and the age in which we live demands, that all opinions, all doctrines, all dogmatic philosophy be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, especially when

these opinions, etc., affect men's lives and conduct. Therefore he claims from an indulgent and scrutinizing public only what he grants, viz., *freedom to think, and freedom to express the truth as he understands it.*

He has also studiously avoided the use of text-books and treatises on morals, moral philosophy, and doctrinal ethics, and whatsoever would in the least prejudice the expression of independent thought. The propositions, definitions, opinions and arguments may, therefore, appear a little crude; but he covets the TRUTH and honest criticism, rather than great renown.

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INTRODUCTION.

In order to determine the true province of moral culture, or the best methods for teaching morals in the public schools and other institutions of learning, it is necessary to state clearly the ground to be occupied, and the principles and methods to be pursued. This necessity will be conceded by all

But thoroughly to instruct children and youth in the purest principles of morality, without inculcating religious doctrines and beliefs, requires not only a careful statement of principles and methods, but a still more guarded distinction between those principles and practices designed both for instruction and inculcation and the regulation of human conduct, or morality, and those on the other hand, that relate to what is generally regarded religious doctrine.

Indeed, religion, in its most comprehensive sense, and as understood by most people, or as a system of broad culture affecting human conduct, may be said to include all that is claimed for morality, since it presumes to cultivate all those sentiments of honor, purity and truthfulness that enter so largely into a system of pure morality. And while this may not be true of all religions, it is safe to claim thus much at least, for the best systems of religion that have been established in the earth. Hence, the question to be decided here is "*Can pure morality be taught without inculcating religious doctrines, as these are usually interpreted and understood?*"

If religion is defined loyalty to the truth and the right, the cultivation of the best faculties of man, spiritual, ethical and physical, and the exponent of all that is true and lofty in human character and life—which is certainly a liberal and comprehensive view of it—we answer no. But if it is defined to be a system of worship founded upon a popular belief in doctrines more or less miraculous in their origin and infallible in their merits, we answer, yes, since, however plausible this claim may be, absolute truth is unaffected by man's belief or unbelief.

Principles may be regarded as eternal in their origin and efficacy, and unalterable in their nature; *i. e.* right is right as a principle from the beginning and under all circumstances; and wrong is wrong. Truth is truth and falsehood is falsehood; and all these exist in the very nature of things, and independent of all religions, at least as last defined. Indeed, no religion and no religious belief can alter them without altering the nature and order of things. And these principles existed doubtless anterior to all known systems of religion and all beliefs and all mere doctrines. And they may be said to be independent of them; yet they do not, in the least, interfere with or prevent the teaching of the purest and best religion, as mere doctrine and belief of men, or modes of worship; but, on the contrary, true morality properly taught is the best possible preparation for the best system of religion. The two can not be antagonistic, neither can the one take the place of or supplant the other.

These universal principles of morals lie within the scope and comprehension of man's understanding, and therefore they may be taught and enforced, as a system of ethics, in connection with and as a part of the ordinary duties of family and school life. And this places morality both as a system of rules for the regulation of human con-

duct, and also as a body of doctrine, clearly within the range of possibility.

This being the case, a fair statement of these principles, and of the means of delivering them and enforcing them so as suitably to affect human conduct, becomes the immediate object of inquiry.

Among the means to be employed, the METHODS OF INSTRUCTION hold an important place. For instance, they should be adapted to the capacity of the young, at the various stages of growth; and still as a system of ethics, not widely different from those employed in the ordinary school work.

Again, books of instruction and competent teachers will certainly be required; but greater stress should be placed upon the actual practice of those things that are expected to appear in the lives and characters of those thus instructed. Books should therefore be used as mere guides, both for the instructor and the instructed, but not as the final authority.

As to the general character of such books, and all books, we may be permitted to say that books of instruction, whether in physics or metaphysics, mathematics or morals, *should always be scientific*—scientific, not only in the matter of principles and facts, but scientific in the arrangement of these: *i. e.*, they should embody principles founded on truth, logically developed, and properly adjusted to the capacity and the natural order of development of mind and body, as well as scientific in the subject matter treated.

This is especially true of books for children and youth; so that they themselves become both truthful and truth-loving as well as scientific, while in the pursuit of science or truth; since truth-telling always begins with thinking the truth, studying the truth in a truthful way, and imbuing one's mind with the principles and practice of

truth. Like produces like here, as in all other departments of growth.

Again, many people *suppose* (they can hardly be said to believe, since they seldom take the trouble to *think*), that books and lessons for children, and especially for young children, need not be scientific, should rather be made very easy and simple, should be so diluted that the effort to master them shall be reduced to the minimum. This is a great mistake. There is, perhaps, no greater in this connection. Children do not naturally fancy the most diluted nourishment. And if there is any one age of the child in which his knowledge should be scientific, and scientifically arranged, it is when he first approaches his study or work.

Children should also early learn to think, not so much the thoughts of others as their *own thoughts*, struck into existence, it may be, by the perusal of the thoughts of others. They should be taught to think vigorously and methodically. It is their natural and inalienable right; for the moment a healthy thought dawns in the mind of a child it affords him a species of joy, sometimes even delight; and these constitute the natural stimuli to moral sentiments and moral growth.

It is of consequence, therefore, *what* children think; as much so, certainly, as what they eat, or what they do, as determining their moral character. The characteristics of the mind are built up from the materials that enter into its activities, as essentially and as truly as the body is; or as the strength and beauty of the house are dependent upon the character of the materials that enter into its walls and towers, its floors and doors, and all its ornamentation.

Children, therefore, should early learn to think, and to think the truth,—and the sooner the better—since if once the habit is established of coming directly to the truth, to the fountain and source of all scientific knowledge, and of

investigating the truth in its better forms, its purity, its simplicity the sooner the life will conform to the same laws of truth and order. This, therefore, is a moral force.

There is nothing dangerous or audacious about this, but exactly the reverse. Children often hunger and thirst and sometimes starve for those forms of scientific truth, which we ignorantly suppose to be beyond their capacity or power to understand. The natural condition of children, both as to ordinary environment and their natural inclinations, is altogether favorable for a vigorous and somewhat exhaustive investigation of some of the most important problems of life, as witness their many questions on these subjects. It is true, books for the instruction of the young should be simple and elementary, but not silly and sedimentary, as is apt to be the case. But science is simple. It is simplicity itself when rightly adjusted to mental capacity; sometimes it is even sublime in its simplicity. It is nescience that usually constitutes the complexity of a subject of thought or investigation. The supposed complexity and abstruseness of scientific subjects often arise from the unscientific arrangement, and the wrong adjustment of principles and elements. This begets the confusion and perplexity among the young, which often accompany the pursuit of science.

Scientific subjects, rightly unfolded to the youthful mind, become not only inviting and invigorating, but reveal such a wealth of beauty that they become even captivating. And then these elements have that in them that addresses itself to the feeblest intellect, awakening the interest and attention, invigorating and directing the powers of investigation, strengthening and improving the understanding and judgment, and bringing all the latent powers of the will to bear upon some of the best problems of life. And because these subjects are thus elementary

and simple, they are none the less scientific and practical ; but, on the contrary, the more nearly they are reduced to their elementary forms, the more scientific they become, and the more nearly they are adjusted to the individual wants of childhood, the more practical they become, since they thereby fulfil the scientific conditions of learning. And the moral effects hence arising are two-fold.

But in all cases of instruction, whether scientific or moral (and the distinctions generically are scarcely discernible), it is necessary that we recognize the following facts and conditions.

1. *A capacity* in man for such culture and growth: *i. e.*, a basis upon which to erect a superstructure, either of scientific knowledge, or of moral character.

2. *A pre-existent plan or pattern* by which to be guided in the work, both as to *what* we teach, and *how* we teach; and

3. *A standard or criterion* by which to judge or measure moral actions, and to determine the just proportions of this superstructure, when once erected and completed. All this will require care, and a rigid classification of principles, and a close application of them in a course of instruction and practice, which we now proceed to give.

CHAPTER I.

PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN.

The following propositions may therefore prove helpful, both in planning and prosecuting this work.

Proposition I.—Man has inherently a moral nature, an innate moral sense or capacity. This is necessary to moral culture, since, without the nature or capacity, its cultivation were impossible.

Remark 1. This proposition might seem almost like an assumption; but it is warranted both by the best literary authority and by the common consent of the race.

Remark 2. This moral nature or capacity is what we call *Moral Sense*.^{*} It is the basis of conscience. It exists in man inherently, and, when enlightened, cultivated and improved, it becomes the active conscience itself.

Remark 3. *Conscience*,[†] therefore, is moral sense plus intelligence. It may be true or false, dependent upon judgment and belief, *i. e.*, the character of the intelligence or information may determine the character of the conscience. At the same time, this *moral sense* naturally inclines to right, as the eye inclines to light and as the ear to sounds; and it as naturally rebels against the wrong as founded in the nature of things, until warped and perverted by wrong treatment.

Proposition II.—The moral sense is an intuitive sense which develops into moral sentiments and moral obligations, under right treatment.

1. It is to the moral man what perception, intuition and consciousness are to the other intellectual faculties, or to

^{*} See Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiology*, pp. 212, 243, 245, and context.

[†] See Webster's unabridged—second definition.

the intellectual man. It furnishes the basis or the elements for the moral sentiments* and conscience, much in the same manner in which the cognitive faculties furnish the data or elements for thought and reasoning.

2. It is not a sixth sense, but it is to the moral sentiments what touch is to the other senses, a base upon which they all are built or founded; a soil into which they are planted and from which they grow; or it is the medium through which all the moral sentiments act and reveal their several qualities.

3. All the moral sentiments, therefore, are but the concrete modifications of the moral sense, or the applications of it, in a developed form, to the ordinary duties of life, as a sense of justice, of right and wrong, of obligation, duty, gratitude, love, etc., just as seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling are but modified forms of feeling or touch, the basis of all the senses. And, as judicious exercise improves and enlarges all these senses, so the exercise of the moral sentiments and qualities improves the moral sense, whereby this moral sense develops into conscience.

4. The moral sense, therefore, when thus developed, becomes the criterion by which to judge of right and wrong, when the understanding is duly exercised and when the judgment approves. Without such a sense, no just judgment could be formed or decisions rendered in matters where absolute right and absolute wrong are at issue, since there would be no tribunal whereby impartial justice could be determined and rendered.

5. Conscience, therefore, is largely a matter of education. It is founded upon the basis, moral sense, or that necessary sense of right and wrong, felt in the moral nature and revealed in the judgment after the understanding has moved upon it as an informer.

* See Ethical Attributes, Chapter VI, p. 48.

6. This moral sense exists in every one, but varies in degrees of energy and perfectness according to the constitution and circumstances of the individual.

7. It may also be perverted by wrong treatment and false notions engendered through ignorance, fear or superstition. Therefore, the character of its promptings depends largely upon the character and extent of the information furnished through the intellect.

8. If this information is truthful, pure and rightly presented, and accepted, the conscience becomes a safe guide in matters of conduct; if perverted, impure and wrongly presented and received or applied, it is not a safe guide.

9. The perceptions must be clear and well defined, the judgment sound and the reasoning correct, so that the decisions of the will may be justly influenced by the promptings arising from this intuitive moral sense.

(a.) Morals have reference to the manners and customs of a people. In a more restricted sense they refer to those *acts* in the lives and conduct of men that either conform to or antagonize the recognized standard of right and wrong.

(b.) In order to instruct the young in a system of pure morality it is necessary to determine as nearly as possible this uniform standard, and that this be, so far as absolute right and wrong are concerned, without exception.

(c.) There can be no middle ground between these two extremes; neither can there be any change of one to the other, nor compromise with mere policy, the enemy of truth. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire what constitutes a moral act.

Proposition III. — A moral act is a worthy act, prompted by a moral motive, and executed voluntarily; or, more fully, a moral act is one prompted, from within, by an impulse arising from the moral sense, and, from without, by some corresponding worthy object or incentive, whose appeals are commended by the judgment and sanctioned by conscience, duly informed.

All may be formulated into moral obligation. This latter makes the act voluntary on the part of the doer, and justifies it in the eyes of the *law of obedience*, which will be considered further on. It also fortifies the act against any selfish or unworthy motive, and lifts it into the plane of pure morality.

Corollary 1. The quality of human actions, is determined by the motives prompting them, since no other primitive elements can enter, either to vitiate or exalt them, except those ruled by motive.

Corollary 2. Human actions, therefore, lose their moral qualities in proportion as they are performed merely to conform them to a recognized human standard; since an act, to be pure and good, must be free from any purely selfish or unworthy motive. Therefore

Corollary 3. The higher and purer the motive, the more exalted the act, since its moral qualities are determined and measured by the motive, plus the incentives [see definition of conscience, page 13]; or the more benevolent the motive the better the quality of the act; and vice versa [see moral sentiments, chapter VI, and moral incentives, chapter VIII].

Corollary 4. There must, therefore, be a standard by which to judge and determine the merits or demerits of human conduct, since without such standard there can be neither certainty nor satisfaction. What shall that standard be?

Proposition IV.—A standard for human conduct, to be effective and reliable, must be good, or wisely chosen, and both uniform and universal, *i. e.*, it must be derived from a confessedly pure source, unvarying in its applications, and recognized and accepted by all.

Corollary 1. That standard must conform, in its essential features, to the natural promptings of the moral

sense, since said moral sense, when duly enlightened and informed, embodies the force and promptings of conscience.

Corollary 2. This moral sense must be re-enforced by clear perceptions of the truth presented, sound judgment in determining its merits, and correct reasoning in forming conclusions, and in its applications to human conduct.

Corollary 3. This standard must have sufficient virtue and dignity to command respect and obedience to its requirements; otherwise it is of no binding force. This gives it the character of LAW. Further propositions may aid us here.

Proposition V.—When man's ideas of right and wrong are duly formulated, recognized and accepted, they constitute what we denominate MORAL LAW. *

Corollary 1. This moral law now becomes a standard by which to determine the quality of human actions, and a moral obligation demanding obedience to its mandates. The truth of this proposition needs no further confirmation.

WHAT, THEREFORE, IS MORAL LAW?

Proposition VI.—(*Defining Moral Law.*)—*Moral law* is a rule of conduct; or a human code embodying the principles and precepts governing human conduct, sanctioning and permitting what may be done and condemning and forbidding what may not be done. This law, of course, may be either obeyed or broken. Its appeals are to the will.

Corollary 1. *Moral law* is, therefore, both rational and empirical, subjective and objective. *Subjectively* considered, it is that which claims an intuitive recognition of

* Law, however, is not a force, not even an active agent. It is only a rule marking the limits of force, or a channel through which active agencies may operate.

moral obligation in man, arising as from an impulse in his nature, to respect and love that which is true, right, good and noble, and to despise and shun that which is false, wrong, evil and mean. It is, therefore, rational intuition applied to problems and principles of right and wrong, which right and wrong must first be distinguished by the understanding and judgment. Hence the necessity for instruction and culture. It is a revelation, and, as it were, the incarnation of the moral sense, as we find it implanted in human nature, however perverted that nature may be. It is closely allied to personality and the possession of property, since it naturally resists encroachments and resents indignities offered to the first, and clings to the possession of that which it recognizes as its own. It is the intuitional principle applied to man's individuality, and is therefore rational. It is the "ego" and the "non ego" in another form, the "meum and the tuum" of human nature, and should be respected accordingly. Under proper treatment or education, it coincides with conscience, the sovereign monitor of all our acts.

Objectively considered, moral law is the recognized standard of conduct among men, derived both from the experience and the precepts of mankind in all their most enlightened stages. It is, therefore, empirical also, and adapts itself to human needs.

Both the foregoing features of this law, viz., the subjective and objective, or the rational and empirical, must repose upon the moral sense; and they are interpreted in the just acts of human life.

This law must also have character, or binding force, in order that it may be obeyed and that it may become infrangible, *i. e.*, may not be disobeyed without incurring penalties. It must have dignity, probity and potentiality.

Whence, then, does it derive its sanctions and binding force?

Proposition VII.—A law, to have binding force, must be hedged about by the strongest and highest incentives to obedience. These incentives arise chiefly from three distinct sources, all having their origin in man's original nature, or at least as far back as we are permitted to trace it.

1. From a simple desire to do right out of respect for right, or for the general good. This is the highest incentive inhering in man for man's sake.

2. From the hope of reward of some kind, inhering in the act either for the act's sake, or for the sake of that which awakened and called forth the desire. This ranks second in the scale of excellence.

3. From a corresponding fear of punishment, or loss of some kind connected with the non-performance of duty; and this ranks last in the scale of potential excellence.

But all of these may be blended in the one great incentive to volitional acts, viz.: the voluntary acceptance of the conditions imposed by obligation to do or not to do, as directed or impelled by conscience. These sub-incentives, rewards and punishments, may be so evenly balanced and so blended in their influence, that the evils that might arise from the excess of either would scarcely be perceptible or possible.

The first of these incentives, a love of right, has two principal sources, whence it derives its sanctions and binding force.

1. *Subjectively*, from the moral sense, or that innate sense of right and wrong that resides in every human soul, which, when duly informed and educated, becomes conscience.

2. *Objectively*, from an innate respect for authority,

which we find co-extensive with the feelings of obligation. This arises both from the moral sense as a basis, and from a regard to the consentaneous wisdom and experience of mankind in all the ages of the world; also from the acknowledged good results that arise from conforming human conduct to these laws.

3. These two moral forces combined, viz., the moral sense, duly enlightened and led, and the wisdom and experience of mankind, go to make up what we term a moral obligation of binding force; and the course of conduct derived therefrom and formulated into a rule or code for the guidance of subsequent acts becomes what we recognize as *Moral Law of Binding Force*, a recognized standard of right and wrong, founded upon purely moral principles. But when these are weakened, obstructed or hindered in any way, they may be reinforced or strengthened by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment. [See incentives to obedience, Chapter VIII, p. 79.]

It now remains to show how man's moral conduct and nature may be affected by the recognition of the claims of this law; for there is such a thing as an intellectual recognition of the claims of this law, and an acknowledgment of the binding force thereof, and still a personal neglect of these claims and a departure from their precepts and ordinances; and this gives rise to, and an occasion for, the fear of punishment, since, when man errs knowingly, it is against his better judgment. How could it be otherwise?

The following propositions may aid in determining these points, and the means of enforcing the claims of moral law.

Proposition VIII.—Man's *ideal* standard of right and wrong *should* determine, in a high degree, the quality of his conduct between himself and his fellow-man. But does this recognized standard so affect him and his con-

duct? Let us examine the subsidiary propositions to determine how far man is governed by this recognized higher law of moral obligation.

Corollary 1.—Objectively considered man's highest ideals of the true, the beautiful and the good are embodied and conserved in his conceptions of the perfect in form, in color, and in number or proportion; and subjectively considered, in thought, in will or purpose, and in power and goodness.

Corollary 2. These conceptions exist in the concrete as well as in the abstract; whereby they are maintained in a more substantial and practical form, or condition. Otherwise they might fade into "unsubstantial being."

Corollary 3. These ideals of perfection are what we call the *absolute*, the *infinite* in goodness, power, duration. And they may exist in man in a continually augmenting state, *i. e.*, they may constantly approach the absolute or infinite without the possibility of ever reaching it.

Corollary 4. The absolute—the unlimited—admits of neither increase nor diminution. Nothing can be added thereto, or subtracted therefrom. It admits of no possible change. It is *infinite* in all possible perfections; and the finite can not reach the infinite, not even in conception, fully. And it is doubtful whether or not a true, high moral sense could even exist except in an undeveloped state, without some such approximate conceptions; for without them the ideals or conceptions must forever be fluctuating, vague, uncertain and evanescent.

Proposition IX.—The more perfect man's conceptions of the absolute in all perfections, the higher and more binding the force of moral obligation. In other words, the higher man's standard of moral perfections, the purer and more exalted his conduct, other things being equal, since

this gives more exalted views of life and expands, refines and sublimates his faculties.

Corollary 1. Man's conduct, as before stated, is relative as to its quality and value. It is patterned more or less after his ideals of moral purity and perfections. After the infinite in all perfections, which is usually embodied in our ideas of God, the Creator, the Upholder of all things, the Giver of all good. Under proper degrees of pressure or stimulus the latent good in man, or capacity for good, is constantly coming to the surface, and when developed, adds so much more to the sum total of stored-up energy to affect future generations.

Corollary 2. The absolute is actually unattainable, yet ever deepening, widening and improving in man's conscious conceptions, while in a state of progress or growth; and this state of things may always continue under proper culture.

Corollary 3. Hence the idea of rewards and punishments, present or prospective, personal or relative, are always present as mild incentives in the mind of the doer of good deeds. Even an obligation reluctantly discharged bears with itself the rewards of satisfaction and moral growth. But these ideas of rewards and punishments, by no means, vitiate the quality of the act influenced or educed by them.

Corollary 4. These considerations make it possible for man to be continually improving in his moral nature through his conceptions of the true, the beautiful and the good, aided by education and the precepts and common experience of mankind, formulated into a code of morals.

But, in addition to all this, the moral force, resident in science itself and every branch thereof, when properly brought to bear upon man's higher nature, which facts we are about to consider, together with whatever other

helps are vouchsafed to man, are considerations of the first importance. All these things combined, with the much that is to follow by way of applications, and we shall have a system—a moral lever, so to speak—by which to lift man into a higher plane of thinking and living.

CHAPTER II.

THE GENESIS AND PURPOSES OF SCIENCE.

Among the many questions to be considered in this connection, the following may be selected as *typical*, at least. About these, many others will arrange themselves for the consideration of the thoughtful student.

1. What is the origin of all knowledge and all science?
2. What are the general and the specific purposes of each department thereof? And assuming that such purpose or purposes are benevolent, and promotive of morality, which we shall consider further on, we may ask as a more practical question,
3. What studies in the schools as now organized are most conducive to the cultivation of high moral principles and purity of conduct? [See proposition XIII and remarks 6.]

This last, of course, admits of conditional answers. Both the nature and the habits of the pupil, together with the peculiar circumstances by which he may be surrounded, must be taken into the account; for what would suit the tastes and natural inclinations, and the purposes of the one class, might be as distasteful and inappropriate to another; and the different times and tendencies of the age would also affect the general conclusion. The same with slight allowances is true of individuals. Chil-

dren differ widely in their environment, and in their prospective employments. Each one of these peculiarities, and perhaps many more, all demand a slightly different treatment.

It will be proper at this point, in answer to the first question, and as a preliminary to answering the last, more fully to inquire into the origin or sources of all knowledge and science as means of man's intellectual and moral elevation, in order also to determine the approximate educational value of each department, as applied to the several grades of school life.

The following propositions or statements may aid in arriving at just conclusions:

Proposition X.—All knowledge and all science—which latter is only a logically classified condition of the former—bear evidences of having the same objective source. Evidently all spring from the same order of things, and have a unity of plan and a unity of purpose. To assume the contrary of this proposition involves a condition of things not only more difficult of explanation, but contradictory to known facts and plain reasoning.

Remark 1. Science in its subjective characteristics and sources is the product of mind itself, of thought, and therefore has its origin *in* the human mind.

Remark 2. Science in its objective characteristics and sources, has its origin in Ontology or Being, which furnishes the occasion for thought and inquiry, whereby knowledge is acquired and science wrought out and formulated into its present diversified conditions for the use of mankind.

Remark 3. Its adaptations to the various purposes of life are the result of long experience and patient study.

Proposition XI.—There are two great departments of Ontology or Being, that furnish the just occasions for all

thought and study, and are, therefore, the joint origin of science, considered in an objective sense, viz , PHYSICS and METAPHYSICS.

Remark 1. Physics, as the name implies, must represent here, and as subsequently considered, all forms and relations of matter in the universe endowed with latent force and resistance, or any of the qualities attributed to matter.

Remark 2. Metaphysics, as the name also implies, must represent all forms and conditions of immaterial substances in the universe as thought, emotion, will, etc., and is that which endows matter with force and resistance, and any and all other properties, so that we have material substances*, and immaterial substances in nature, both furnishing the occasions and conditions of thought; and these substances with their conditions and relations logically classified and judiciously arranged, in these two great fields of exploration, constitute our two grand representative sciences, viz., *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.

To the first belong all those sciences which have, in any manner, to deal with matter in the concrete, or in any of its forms, arranging it and its properties under generic and specific heads; or that deal with, or are in any way dependent upon, what are known as physical laws, as natural philosophy (called physics), chemistry, physiology, zoology, geology, botany, geography, and so much of astronomy as relates to matter and its movements in masses, in large spaces. Other cognate branches might be named.

To the second or metaphysics, belong all those sciences that relate in any way to phenomena and causation, the laws of thought and reason, and all those hidden forces that are the prime movers in all phenomena of nature, as growth and decay, life and death, strength and weakness cause and effect, with all their multifarious applications.

* Substance, that which has existence.

This class may also include mental and moral philosophy, or psychology, and all those sciences bearing upon the laws of thought, emotion and volition; the moral obligations growing out of man's relations to his fellow, as sociology, political economy, law and jurisprudence.

Proposition XII.—These two great families or sources of science, viz., Physics and Metaphysics, occupy the two opposite extremes or poles of nature; and between them lies a vast plane of thought, occupied by two other representative families or groups of subordinate sciences, viz., Mathematics, and Language or Literature.

1. Mathematics is the great instrument for delving into physics or nature, and developing the laws of form, number, mechanics, and all computations of quantity and values. It also includes so much of astronomy as relates to the laws of gravitation and motion.

2. Mathematics has also a metaphysical side, lying as it does between the two poles of nature—physics and metaphysics—by which this branch of science is related to pure reason on the one hand, as in the case of pure mathematics, logic and the principles of geometry; and on the other, to the laws of mechanics and physical astronomy, and all material computation. It is one of the links joining the two extremes or opposite poles of nature, entering into both physics and metaphysics, and interpreting the laws of both.

3. *Language, or Literature*, as a comprehensive branch of learning, may be regarded both as a means of communication and as a record of man's thoughts, acts and emotions; and therefore includes history, biography, law and medical jurisprudence; in fact, a record of all that has been thought, said or done, so far, at least, as these have been expressed.

4. Like mathematics, it has also its physical and metaphysical sides, facing each way, bordering in its names and qualities of matter upon the material world, on the one hand, and in its record of thought and reasoning, and its power of expression, on the other, opening directly upon the immaterial world. It is, therefore, the other link binding the two opposite extremes of nature, and meanwhile recording its phenomena. Thus the two worlds are linked and correlated and made meet for thought and expression.

As to the characteristics of these groups, and the individual sciences from which we are to derive their values, intellectual, physical and moral, we may add, in a general way by

Proposition XIII.—All sciences have about them, both in their individual and associated capacity, the elements of human growth, whereby they become either helpful or hurtful, determined by the manner in which they are developed and applied. This nourishment is not to be found elsewhere; and both the character and extent of growth are determined by proper use.

Corollary 1. We infer, therefore, that man was made for scientific investigation and discovery, and that science thus discovered and developed becomes a powerful means of his intellectual and moral growth. In this pursuit of science he finds his greatest pleasure and broadest culture.

Corollary 2. That the true mission of these sciences, individual and associated, is the harmonious development of man's best faculties, in all their lawful relations, and therefore his moral faculties, since these are inseparably associated with man's intellectual and physical nature. The truth of this corollary will appear further on.

Corollary 3. That while these sciences are growing and maturing under the fostering hand of man, through experiment and study, his faculties are also undergoing a

corresponding change, are developing and strengthening in a corresponding ratio, keeping pace in their strength and capacity with the general progress of human knowledge and events; and that thus the illimitable improvement of the human race is made not only possible, but morally certain. [See Props. VII and VIII, and Cors.]

In a more specific sense the characteristics of these groups may be stated as follows: [See Perceptive Knowledge, etc., pp. 28-29.] And whatever characteristics appear in the groups themselves may be relied upon for developing corresponding traits in human character and life. Thus the study of mathematics is noted for the development of exact reasoning; the study of language and literature, for comprehensive views and ideas of human nature; and all this is quite reasonable, since the first of these sciences is an aggregation of abstract truths and their relations, appealing directly to the reasoning powers, though not in the broadest and most comprehensive way; while the second is exclusively a human production, involving the very use of the human elements they so richly cultivate. Similar deductions may be made from the study of the other two groups, physics and metaphysics.

The specific characteristics of these groups may be stated as follows:

1. *Perceptive knowledge*, or that derived from the observation of and experiment with matter, with or without a view of determining its properties and uses; or exclusively from common observation and use: also, that knowledge derived from the consideration of the relation of things, and from a comprehension of abstract truths, or apperception.

This implies a two-fold character of perception, both the objective and the subjective, the external and the internal operation of it, the first sometimes called sense perception,

the second rational perception, the latter corresponding with the apprehension, necessary to good understanding.

This class of knowledge, especially the first, is that which is so well adapted to youthful minds. It is usually the first, or that which arises from impressions from without. It is also the nourishment upon which the youthful mind feeds, until sufficient strength is acquired by practice or use to enable it to grapple with the more abstract and difficult forms of knowledge.

2. *Intuitive knowledge*, or that obtained through intuition, or that power the mind has to grasp all forms of necessary (not in the sense of needful) and axiomatic truths, to be conscious of personal identity, the succession of events, and the necessary conditions of cause and effect, etc.

3. *Rational knowledge*, or that derived from the processes of investigation and reasoning, which latter, when reduced to the syllogistic formula, employs the well-established axiomatic truths, from which to deduce other dependent truths. This is the highest form of knowledge and may be used even in analogical and inductive processes.

Remark 1. Of course, all the powers of the mind are brought into active operation in the judicious pursuit of all these specific kinds of knowledge. But it must not be forgotten that those faculties of the mind most active in the pursuit of the particular knowledge alluded to are those that give character to it, and by which it acquires the greatest strength and discipline, giving character to the faculties themselves — thus, perceptive knowledge improves perception, because perception is principally used in its acquisition. And the same is true of intuition, imagination, judgment and reason, etc.

4. To this list there might still be added the Descriptive, the Didactic, the Discursive, and even the Polemic and Dramatic, all partaking more or less of the properties of the foregoing. And it may be further stated,

Remark 5. That there is resident in each one of these sciences above named, and in each department of knowledge, *a force*, or nourishment every way suited and evidently intended, through its proper acquisition, to develop all the powers of the human mind, even to their best estate. It matters not so much, therefore, *what* we study as *how* we study; and further,

6. *There is a moral force resident therein*, essential and inseparable from the intellectual characteristics, which, when skillfully managed, is perhaps the strongest, safest and *best* means of inculcating moral sentiment.

This is surely the intent of all knowledge, science, all study, all labor. The knowledge or acquisition that leaves its possessor in the same moral condition in which it found him, has surely and sadly *failed* in its mission. Indeed, this is impossible, viz., to leave him as it finds him. The only question is: Shall it improve him morally or degrade him? It may do either. It can not do both.

Our next inquiry, therefore, should be: How can we secure it against loss on the one hand, and injury on the other?

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATIONS AND USES OF KNOWLEDGE.

The foregoing facts lead us to consider, in the next place, the applications and uses of knowledge as designed to administer to human needs, and as a means of moral elevation.

All the forms and classes of knowledge and science, alluded to in the preceding chapter, are supposed to have grown up under the fostering hand of man, in order to meet his growing necessities, as he advanced in the scale of civilization and intelligence—sometimes to administer to his pleasure, sometimes as a matter of gain, and sometimes through the exercise of those higher benevolences which have ever characterized his career under the higher forms of civilization and refinement. Hence the following classification may aid us in determining these uses:

1. *The Selfish and Domestic Uses*, or those administering to man's personal wants, as in the cultivation of the earth, and gathering food supplies, the manufacture of clothing, the building of suitable habitations, and the various means employed for communication, and for protection against his enemies, both man and beast. These cover a vast field.

This selfish use of knowledge must not be confounded with those baser uses, whereby man perverts the knowledge he acquires for purposes of merely selfish or sensual gratification, or for promoting unworthy objects of any kind. Selfishness here must be understood to refer to self-protection, and that enlightened self-interest that makes the individual good the public good; that will not take advantage of the innocent and the unprotected.

In the course of time, and when these cruder forms of knowledge had served their purposes in the human family, they were usually superseded by higher forms, and those that looked more to a community of interests. People felt more and more the necessity of associated effort, as their wants multiplied and their views enlarged. Hence other forms and uses grew up and were cultivated. These we may call

2. *The Semi-Selfish and Social Uses*, or those forms of

knowledge that have been brought to bear upon man's dependence and intercourse with his fellow-man, out of which grow up all social, commercial and political relations, and the laws regulating them (see chapter XV).

It is perhaps needless to more than merely *state* that man is naturally a social, commercial and political being; that is, his best estate is always reached in the exercise of those qualities and duties that ally him to his fellow-man: that his moral nature is necessarily and unalterably associated with these, and finds its chief delight in the exercise of the social and commercial intercourse thus made possible and necessary. Therefore man finds his greatest pleasure and interest in the exercise of those sentiments and qualities that yield the greatest benefit, and whereby his moral nature is cultivated, strengthened and refined in the highest degree. Hence, the best, safest and most reliable methods for moral culture seem to be associated with his ordinary employment and education. And this is as it should be. No other means seem necessary where these have free and unobstructed play.

There is still another well-defined use to which knowledge may be and really is applied, which lifts it into the highest plain of moral excellence, and hence makes it still more forceful, and a still more powerful instrument in man's moral elevation. I mean

3. *The Purely Benevolent and Philanthropic Uses*, as in the intelligent provisions made for sanitary and charitable institutions, schools, colleges, public libraries, etc., in fact, all public enterprises that look to the improvement of the people of all nations, countries and climes.

The benevolent uses of knowledge are often associated with enterprises not strictly benevolent in their intent, but still highly beneficial; and this would include all general improvement. Its political uses, however, are more

intimately associated with man's social nature, since his political relations arise chiefly from his social nature and circumstances in life. [*See Political Obligations and Duties, Chapter XV, p. 184.*]

Hence it will be seen that knowledge or science, which is the chief instrument of man's elevation and refinement, may not only be classified as to its origin, characteristics and uses, but may become a means through these uses for his intellectual and moral elevation. And it will be further seen, as we pass to the more immediate acquisition of this knowledge, through well-appointed study and practice, that it imparts its own moral force to those in pursuit of it, at every stage of advancement, much in the ratio of honest endeavor, and a stern purpose to make its acquisition a measure of moral as well as intellectual growth. This last is too frequently overlooked. Every fresh acquisition of truth and every step in intellectual advancement requires a corresponding advancement in moral growth, otherwise it fails in its best purposes. This is education in its truest and highest sense. All else is more or less faulty. And because this feature of constant moral growth is not insisted upon, nor yet fully provided for, scientifically and patiently pursued, is the chief reason it is not secured to a greater extent. Both our plans for educating and our practices, therefore, may need, and probably do need, careful revision.

Indeed, it is doubtful whether or not morals can be successfully taught in any other way than that alluded to in the foregoing, and which will be still more fully illustrated as we proceed. It is doubtful, also, whether or not they can be so taught that the moral nature and habits shall be suitably affected by this teaching in the ratio of the knowledge acquired—taught, so that the conduct of the pupil shall in all respects conform to the teaching—by merely

teaching morals as a separate branch of study, or in a set course of moral lectures or lessons. At least, judging from the results of this perfunctory teaching of morals, by means of text-books in Moral Philosophy, or by any merely theoretical system of morals as such, it does not seem to affect the lives and habits of students in this ratio.

Two principal causes may be assigned for this seeming failure: First, the period of life favorable to deep and lasting impressions is usually past before such teaching or instruction (and there is a radical difference) is usually begun; second, it is usually taught more through precept than by example or practice. It is the latter that tells with most marked effect. Morals, like mathematics and language, *must be practiced* in order to make perfect. This is more than all precepts and all philosophies.

One has aptly said, in speaking on this point: "Sow an act, and you reap a habit; sow a habit and you reap character; sow character and you reap destiny." And so it would seem. The act, the habit, the character gather up all, or nearly all, the moral forces and project them forcibly into the future, there to work their destiny.

Therefore we conclude:

1. That morals, like any other practical subject, can be taught and enforced so as to affect character.
2. That morals should be taught largely in connection with the ordinary branches of study, they affording just opportunity.
3. That they should be taught by actual practice rather than by precept and philosophy alone.
4. That morals should be taught in early childhood, and continued throughout the entire educational career.
5. That to attempt to force down a dose of morals after teaching the sciences themselves, properly, is too much

like taking a dose of physic after breakfast in order to promote digestion.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TRUE ORDER OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT A MEANS OF PROMOTING MORAL CULTURE.

Our next inquiry, therefore, must be *what order* shall be observed in the schools, or in teaching these sciences, and adjusting their elements to corresponding grades of mind and body, in childhood and youth, in order that the greatest amount of effective moral influence shall be obtained from them?

This is the great question in teaching. All others are dependent upon this one, to a great extent, since its proper solution involves a course of study that shall harmonize the many conflicting opinions that have been and are still entertained as to the *Order of Studies*; and upon its proper solution also depends the success of the whole scheme as here planned.

Let it be granted, therefore, and we think the matter will not be questioned. [See Chapter II.]

1. That physics and metaphysics* are the two great sources of scientific research and knowledge; and that they occupy respectively the extremes, or opposite poles, in the realm of nature;

2. That mathematics and language (including literature), as representative sciences, border upon each of these two extremes or sources, touching both and occupying the great plane of thought intervening; and as a necessary condition:

* Used here in their comprehensive sense.

3. That these four departments or representative sciences contain all the elements or materials, so to speak, upon which the mind of man was made to act, there being no other domain accessible to it, or to mortals; and,

4. That these elements of nature, material and immaterial (for they all belong to nature), may, through the action of mind upon them, in accordance with the evident intention and plan, be wrought out and formulated, according to certain fixed principles, into science; and,

5. That these sciences, thus disposed, have departments or grades in them exactly suited to corresponding departments or grades in mental and moral development; and,

6. That these two entities, mind and science, mutually aid each other in their growth and development, when properly adjusted, and duly acted upon; it follows, therefore,

1. That mind and science should be so adjusted by the educator, that there shall be mutual attraction and mutual accommodation at every point, and at every stage of growth;

2. That science, however elementary or however advanced, should be pursued by the learner in such a way that every step in advance shall be regarded in the light of a *discovery by the child or learner*.

3. That this spirit of discovery be so managed by the instructor, as to continually excite the learner to additional research wisely directed; and

4. That his moral sentiments,* etc., that entwine themselves about all human interests and every purpose in life be called into continual exercise, and made the principal promptors to duty and fidelity.

* [See Chapter V, Sentiments, Qualities and Habits.]

5. That only such helps* should be rendered the pupil or learner as shall stimulate him to self-help, self-activity and original research and discovery.

6. That all sciences have elementary principles, root-lets, so to speak, reaching down from their exalted heights, to the very substratum of human hearts and human understanding, and that their mission to exalt every faculty of mind and body is hereby revealed and verified;

7. That these sciences, rightly interpreted and rightly taught, become helpful in the moral development exactly in the ratio of thoroughly well-understood principles and scientifically applied uses;

8. That these sciences and their just application to human needs, so far from interfering with sound religious† or soul culture, only promote it in its truest sense;

9. That these elements of science and of all sciences, are represented and exemplified in the ordinary environment of the child, even in the nursery and the home. His first knowledge, therefore, begins with a conquest of this environment, which is the beginning and the prophecy of his future career; and with proper treatment continues much in this same order to the end.

Self-activity, therefore, is a necessity to development; and it remains with the teacher, be it mother, kindergarten or school teacher, whether this native activity be utilized in the pursuit of useful knowledge and experience or wasted upon inanity and mischief. The

*The author believes that "the *easy methods*" devised by thoughtless teachers and authors, whereby children are relieved from hard thinking; and also the excessive explanations, and super teaching whereby they are so rapidly advanced in learning, (?) to be one of the most fruitful sources of mental debauchery and laziness, and consequent immorality, now existing. The unoccupied mind, or one overburdened with indigestible knowledge, is weakened thereby, and falls an easy prey to temptation and evil.

†Religion must be understood here in the light of the first definition. See Introduction, p. 7.

character of the school and the teacher may hence be inferred.

The child is a kind of perpetual motion—the only one, indeed, that has ever been discovered (not invented)—and a perpetual annoyance, or at least, source of annoyance to all who do not thoroughly understand him. The self-adjustment of environment seems to be the great secret. And this self-adjustment must be made possible by wise provision. If this motion and self-activity can be directed to discovery and to the utilization of the elements of environment, which is really scientific discovery, not only the chances for annoyance are very much diminished, but the prospects for pleasure and profitable employment and corresponding improvement will be greatly enhanced.

The child, therefore, becomes both an explorer, which is a natural trait—as all may testify—and a real discoverer, unless, indeed, he is hindered in the one by overconfinement, and in the other by overteaching. The one is as bad as the other. What he needs most of all is *to be wisely let alone*; alone that he may struggle and exert all his little strength—which is natural again—with his little problems wisely adjusted to his wants by his teacher, that he *may conquer for himself*. The moral courage and confidence both in his own powers and in his science or discovery are more valuable to him than all the moral precepts in the world.

The child is confronted at every step, in his true treatment and advancement, by things *new and strange*, with employment and acquisition, with labor and capital, with government and institutions, all in embryo to be sure, but none the less real and important, and if “wisely let alone” (and this is a masterful wisdom) he will soon come to a proper understanding both of himself and his surroundings. Things and their properties and their relations

will soon become a school of inquiry and experiment to him, that will start more questions as to time, place, manner, distance, direction, resemblances and contrasts, meaning and use, cause and effect, than can ordinarily be answered in a lifetime. This taxes the best patience, the soundest learning, the profoundest wisdom of the race.

Here we also have not only the elements of scientific knowledge presented to the child in such a way as to excite his curiosity, but so arranged as to contribute to his stock of useful knowledge of things and of his language, at a period when most needed. It constitutes the opening chapter to his subsequent researches and the natural stimulant to thought.

The natural inclination of the child is to see, to hear, to feel or examine, to experiment, accumulate and formulate, all of which develop both thought and language when duly indulged. This is the favorable period in which to introduce the child to the study of the physics of things, as form, motion, color, number, language, etc.; and, as a healthy and strong bodily organization is acquired mainly by judicious diet and daily and hourly exercise, so the minds and morals of childhood and youth should be daily and hourly fed and exercised in those things and studies and employments most congenial to natural taste and most conducive to mental and moral growth and strength.

A careful study of the child want will show that the physical sciences stand first in the order of learning, and that these, when properly formulated and adjusted to the child want, as revealed in his natural inclinations, and pursued in the light of "discovery," give ample exercise in language, form and number, and afford also ample opportunity for bodily activity and growth. And these are all represented and included in the ordinary environ-

ment of the child, and in which he finds his greatest delight. This is the natural order of science growth, moral growth and mind growth; since these sciences have about them those elements that are necessary both to the child's existence and his best culture; and they are equally attractive in their nature. They bring into exercise all those useful powers, physical, intellectual and moral, that are so apt, if left unemployed, untrained, to waste in inanity or develop into mischief and vice.

These physical sciences, when thus adjusted to human wants, become, as to their constituent elements, a kind of natural bridge to span the chasm that sometimes yawns between the known and the unrelated unknown. They lift the mind readily from the concrete to the abstract. And then they are a complete antidote for the evils of that period of idleness that is so apt to supervene the period of early thought and the ordinary school life. They constitute a ladder reaching from the lowlier things earthly to the region of the higher departments of learning upon which the thoughts, like angels, are continually ascending and descending in the realm of discovery. They constitute a convenient passage from the known to the unknown, from the tangible to the intangible, between observation and investigation, between physics and metaphysics, between perception and pure reasoning. Hence the order of study may be formulated, in a general way, in accordance with the following well-accepted principles:

1. From the known of environment in infancy, or material things and surroundings, through observation and experiment, to the unknown in thought and scientific formulæ.

2. From the simple and concrete in science, through study and investigation, to the more complex and abstract in form number and language or expression.

3. From the physics, or natural sciences, through the

higher mathematics and literature, to the metaphysics and pure reasoning.

This natural order in the study of the sciences, when duly enlarged and made specific in its application, is as essential to the orderly growth of mind and habits as is the observance of the requirements of the natural law in the cultivation and the growth of plants and animals. Indeed, the higher the organization in the subject of the growth, the more necessary and apparent the law. And if we ever expect a high state of moral development in the children and youth of the country, we must insist upon obedience to these same laws.

A large part, and perhaps the largest part, of man's intellectual and moral blindness and depravity, and his evil tendencies in any direction, arises from the blunders made in the child's early education, leaving so much of man unprovided for in his actual growth.

The kindergarten in its purity seems to have struck the keynote in the harmony of the child's thought and act; and the training here given is the opening chapter to the harmonious development of all his faculties, without which there can not be a healthy moral development. But there does not seem to be any valid reason why this same scientific and orderly method should not be generalized and extended throughout the entire educational career of man.

The course of study should be planned to suit the child instead of bending and warping the child to suit the course. Moral degeneracies and social and political obliquities and deformities arise as frequently from the neglect or perversion of this natural order of studies as from any known inherent cause.

But the whole force of this matter does not lie exclusively either in the particular branches of science, nor in the particular order in which they are taught and

dent, and original thinking. The first is merely borrowed capital; the second is individual stock in trade. The first is reflected light and heat; the second is native, original, vital, forceful; and the moral distinctions are equally apparent. Clear, effective thinking elevates the entire man, and gives stability to all his movements.

5. *In a purely moral sense, however, systematic study, or vigorous, effective thinking, touches man at every available point.* It quickens the moral preceptions, enlarges the views of life, enlightens and develops conscience, strengthens the will and refines and intensifies all the sensibilities. It opens up all the avenues to refined taste, good judgment, pure affection and æsthetic culture; and it is death to superstition and bigotry.

The intellect thus becomes a wholesome guard or check upon supersensibility and a trusty informer of conscience. Without this wholesome check, the moral sense—the basis of conscience—is liable continually to a process of dwarfing, on the one hand, by neglect, or to be made morbidly sensitive, on the other, by a superstitious dread of impending evil. Sound, healthy study or thinking, therefore, becomes a regulator and a safeguard to moral conduct.

Independent thinking, wisely directed, will do more to break up habits of superstition, narrowness and unholy prejudices which have filled the world with sin and consequent suffering, and at the same time to establish a broad catholic spirit among the people, than all the creeds and catechisms invented by man. When people begin to think for themselves the true light soon begins to shine. They may be a little awkward about it at first, but, since “we learn to think by *thinking*,” man soon learns to think in the right channel, and this sounds the death-knell both to social disorder and political oppression.

6. *Study, wisely directed, so occupies and absorbs men-*

tal energy as to leave no vacant or idle moments to be taken advantage of by evil influences.

It thus subdues the passions, inordinate appetite and evil desires, that are often only inflamed by mere precept or preaching; since even to point them out (not to say paint them) by ill-timed, though well intended rebuke is only to awaken their slumbering fires. But to so employ the mind in wholesome thinking, even upon the ordinary topics of science, art and literature, that all these latent energies are aroused and utilized in thought is to close all the avenues of vice, since temptations to evil practices are greatly diminished and at the same time the moral powers are strengthened to resist the encroachments of vice. This usually gives complete victory, while the good affections and moral sentiments are all refined and improved; and this ranks among the strongest moral forces. Let it be used!

7. *Patient and continuous study, wisely directed, is a powerful promoter of self-control.* It gives one the mastery of his own powers by exercising them in accordance with their evident designs. Man was most evidently made for study and thinking; and a failure to employ his thinking powers in accordance with the laws of their growth and perpetuity defeats their very purpose and entails decrepitude and weakness upon them and upon all associated with them. The moral powers usually suffer most, under these circumstances.

The ability to order one's own thoughts and emotions, sayings and doings, ranks among the highest excellencies of scholarship. It is the culmination of *all* excellencies in *moral culture*. It gives the main advantage in personal conflict, and, in every contest where virtue and vice are at issue: it enables one to escape danger, to rescue the perishing and to triumph in every conflict where the odds are

not *too* great; and, even then, he who governs himself not only uses all his strength to the best advantage, but he is really the victor, *since he overcomes himself by patient endurance*. This is the greatest possible moral triumph and can be practiced by any one who, by patient study and will, has learned the great lesson of self-control.

8. *Consistent study harmonizes man's faculties, soul and body, since it fulfills the laws of growth and maturity*. There is strength in harmony; and the vigorous exercise given man's higher nature by thus grappling with the great problems of science and the sterner problems of life, gives the ascendancy to his better nature. It gives the strongest and best moral fibre and prepares for right living.

The inharmony or discord among the human faculties constitutes one of the prime sources of weakness and consequent immorality; since the friction, so to speak, is so great as to impair the faculties themselves, and thus to mar their work.

If we wish to secure the best fruits from the growing vine, all the elements of growth must be furnished, and all the lawful conditions of such growth must be complied with. If we wish to secure the best fabrics from the factory, the best articles from the mill or foundry, the best coloring and proportions and shadings in painting, we must furnish the materials in just measure, and fulfill all the conditions of harmony.

So in moral culture. But some seem to think that that will come even against lawful provision; that it is brought about by some miraculous transformation, and that the laws of the universe are set aside in this transformation. But such can not be the case, since these laws are all perfect from the beginning, every possible contingency having been provided from the beginning, which

precludes the possibility of change. Reformations may take place suddenly or gradually; but whatever transformations are wrought in human character and life must conform strictly to these laws. There can be no healthy product, no permanent growth, without complying with these lawful conditions. All the faculties of the child or youth must be exercised in obedience to law, or we destroy this beautiful balance, and derangement ensues.

No healthy moral growth can be secured from one whose faculties are weak, deranged or out of repair. Therefore, since growth and harmony demand activity, the faculties of the mind and body must be duly exercised in order to secure them. Harmony is a necessary condition to healthy growth and permanent fruitage. Hence, *to teach morals well means to teach everything else well*. There can be no other way, since morals touch all and include all. If we strive alone for fruit, thereby forcing it, we shall neglect and spoil the vine. The vine is greater than the fruit; so the child is greater than his work. Make the tree good and the fruit will be good. Make the fountain pure and the waters will be pure. Make the boy good and healthy and strong by exercising him in all lawful ways, and you secure him against wrong and weakness and vice. But if we strive alone for morals we shall miss our mark, impair the faculties, and defeat the best aims of education, because we antagonize the laws of harmony.

But before proceeding further in this subject it will be necessary to glance at some of the moral sentiments and qualities in human nature, the cultivation of which constitutes the leading characteristics in a work like this.

These faculties or sentiments will be more conveniently treated in a separate chapter, where we shall attempt a close classification of them, both for study and practice in schools and families. Their application to life affairs will

be shown as we proceed to notice the "obligations and duties" arising out of human relations. [See chapters XIII, XIV, XV.]

CHAPTER VI.

ETHICAL ATTRIBUTES.

The Ethical Attributes include all those sentiments and qualities of human nature that in any way and manner enter into man's moral feelings, and that in any way contribute subjective incentives to conduct. For convenience of study and application they may be classified under the following general heads:

I. Moral Sentiments.

II. Moral Qualities and Habits.

III. Social Qualities and Habits.

They are intimately associated and blended in all that relates to man's moral nature and conduct, and so similar in character and purpose that it is difficult to distinguish them, one from the other, in their ordinary applications to human conduct.

First. The Moral Sentiments.

The moral sentiments are those feelings and dispositions of the human mind that prompt to moral actions, or that serve as subjective incentives to these actions. They may be classified as follows:

1. Those implying a species of equality and reciprocal feeling existing between the active agent and the recipient of the act, as,

- (a.) *Respect* for a worthy object, founded upon a recognition of commendable qualities; for authority, for law, when these are recognized as right. Thus, I may respect my neighbor, teacher and associate, if I discover those

worthy qualities in them that shall call forth this sentiment of respect. So I may respect the laws and institutions of my country or any country, if the first are founded in justice, and the second have merits that commend them to my judgment and taste.

(b.) *Esteem* for the more excellent qualities in person, in character, in deeds, in value: thus, I may esteem highly or moderately the excellent qualities of either a friend or an enemy; I esteem such favors as he may bestow; I esteem the friendship of the wise and good; but I respect or love the persons themselves, *i. e.*, I hold in high favor and regard all those qualities, sentiments and their products that commend themselves to my judgment and taste; but I respect and love the agencies that possess these qualities, and that produce these results.

(c.) *Love*, or the supreme regard and desire for those persons and qualities that please us most, or that have the strongest claims for such regard and desire, is the supreme affection of the human heart. Thus, we may love our parents, children, husbands, wives, friends and benefactors, and even an enemy may be loved with compassion and pity. We may also love our country, the cause of the oppressed, learning, literature and progress, but not in the sense in which we regard and desire persons of our own species. We may love the beautiful, the true, the good, wisdom, virtue, justice, mercy, honesty and the like; but we usually admire the beautiful in form, color, proportion, as flowers, birds, pictures, statuary and scenery. But we can not love deformity, vice or crime, injustice, impurity, wrong, however much we may be addicted to them. These things do not and can not call forth that supreme regard which is the necessary element in love; and this shows the inherent nature of these moral sentiments and the moral sense. Neither can we really love

articles of food, clothing, machinery, brute animals and the like, though these may all possess really worthy qualities in a high degree. We may relish, fancy, admire and really desire many of these objects; but *Love* is too exalted a feeling to be called forth and applied to any thing gross or sensual.

Love is the crowning grace of human character and life. It exalts every virtue, sweetens every trial, assuages every sorrow, brightens every joy, binds tighter every bond of true friendship, conquers even a enemy, and lights the pathway of the world's true progress; and with all the evil that may surround it, true love can never be tainted. It is one of those qualities or sentiments of the human heart, so to speak, that escaped the contaminations of the fall, or ruin that comes from disobedience of law. If it exists at all, it exists in its purity, though it may be ever so feeble.

2. Those moral sentiments and qualities implying some real or supposed superiority on the part of the recipient of the sentiment or act; and, on the part of the agent or actor, a feeling akin to awe, combined with respect and love: as,

(a). *Veneration* for age, when it is associated with excellent wisdom or virtue: Thus, we may venerate the hoary hairs of the aged, if they are not dishonored by vice or crime. We also venerate the objects of antiquity, if associated with eminent historic events.

Children and youth, therefore, should be taught to reverence and venerate their parents and the aged. It is a virtue likely to become extinct unless measures are soon taken to revive and perpetuate this ancient virtue.

(b.) *Reverence* for superior qualities and beings, or qualities combined with a species of severe goodness, or that which inspires awe and manly fear or great respect and esteem, as distinguished from a slavish fear on the

one hand, or cowardice and a too great familiarity, on the other. Thus, we reverence the great and good beings that may have a fatherly care and protection over us, as a parent or ruler, or a supreme being, or the source of all good.

(c.) *Adoration* for a supreme power and goodness, intelligence and wisdom. Thus, we adore that which is most exalted in character, virtue, power, goodness; that upon which we are most dependent for the higher enjoyments, and for which we are willing to make the greatest sacrifices; that which we love, not as an equal, but as a superior, and from which we derive the greatest enjoyment—the supreme in justice, mercy, purity, power and goodness, God himself. Like love, nothing short of the infinite in all perfections will call forth this sentiment in all its strength and purity. It may, however, exist in various degrees of perfection.

3. Those moral sentiments of a more general character, relating to home, country, people and race.

(a.) *Patriotism*, or love of country, government and institutions, or loyalty from choice. Thus, we are attached to our native land, or the land of our choice, her laws and institutions, if they are founded in truth and justice; we may even *love* liberty because it is the birthright of all intelligent creatures, and the highest expression of manhood. And we are disposed to defend the rights and privileges of the government, because they are supposed to embody the principles of liberty and the highest good of the governed.

(b.) *Philanthropy*, or the love of mankind in general. It is patriotism generalized and broadened, a general expansion of human sympathies, covering the entire human species. Thus, we love the race of man, because he is the highest expression of earthly intelligence, wisdom and

virtue. We love man because he is a part of the great body of which we ourselves are some of the constituent elements. This leads us to espouse the cause of the oppressed in all lands, the cause of the people against their oppressors; and we rejoice in the freedom of our own land, because it is a part of the great family whose sympathies are the common heritage of all.

(c.) *Benevolence*, or general well-wishing or good-will to all beings, brute or human. It is based upon generosity and kindness. It is one of the crowning graces or virtues among its group of moral sentiments, as love and adoration are among *their* respective groups. It is the origin of true beneficence and all charitable movements for benefiting the race. Thus, we bear general good-will to all the families of the earth and to all things associated therewith, unless, indeed, we are actuated by the opposite of this sentiment, general malevolence; and this should be avoided.

These sentiments all exist inherently in the child, in some form and in various degrees of prominence and activity; and it is the especial province and duty of education and instruction in their truest and broadest sense to appeal to them as occasion offers, and to exercise them in the ordinary school work. Indeed, true education or growth can not go on in the child nature without appealing to these sentiments at every stage of such growth. These moral sentiments lie in wait at every point, and it is impossible to avoid them without doing violence to the child nature and to every principle of true philosophy. They embody themselves in every virtue, mingle with every duty and every trial, entwine themselves about every joy and every sorrow; they are a part of every lesson in every branch of learning; and to avoid them is simply to shirk duty and to stultify common sense.

No especial lessons or exercises are to be devised for the

proper appeals to these sentiments, or those that are to follow, since the best teaching of other things calls for just the right measure of these sentiments, in order to render such teaching the most effective. This reveals the true economy of all right methods, since what aids the one aids the other, and what hinders the one hinders the other.

Take the first in the list of these moral sentiments, for instance—common *respect*. All will agree that the teacher must secure this from the pupil. Without it, there can be no effective teaching of any kind. The teacher, in the first place, must possess those qualities that awaken and command this sentiment or feeling on the part of the pupil; and it is yielded without an order and almost without an effort, in response to duties well performed.

Suppose, then, the lesson is in reading or arithmetic: the teacher is reasonably supposed to know more about these subjects than the pupil, and to be able to give masterly illustrations of the same. This fact alone will win a degree of respect from the pupil, making him more or less dependent and deferential. But suppose she add other excellent qualities, as she goes on from point to point, “from the known to the unknown” in learning, unfolding the hidden mysteries and latent beauties of these branches, and showing their specific applications to human needs and human enjoyments; this sentiment of common respect grows and expands till it overleaps the mere bounds of respect and fills the little heart with genuine joy, which may change the respect to esteem and even love. ’Tis thus these sentiments grow. Is there lack of *moral growth* here? If so, then we have mistaken our theme.

But, suppose the teacher fails to enlist the sympathy and confidence of the pupil, the loss is irreparable, first to

the teacher in the loss of self-respect, and to the pupil, in that he loses confidence in and respect for the teacher, in about the same ratio. This alone shows that the true method of moral teaching resides not in "ordering" the sentiment, but in *winning* it by the proper discharge of ordinary duty. The other sentiments are awakened and won in a similar manner. Indeed, they will be found more powerful in their manifestations and more fruitful in their results, since these sentiments are higher as we advance, and more powerful in their impressions; and every branch of science and its proper unfolding furnish the just occasion for the exercise of these sentiments and qualities; so that with what moral force the sciences themselves possess, combined with those of the teacher and the methods employed, we shall have a system of moral instruction far surpassing any and all merely perfunctory moral teaching. [See moral incentives and moral duties further on.]

Our next general list of *ethical attributes* are included under what we have called,

II. Moral Habits and Qualities.

The moral habits are those acquired dispositions and traits inclining the human being to acts and practices more or less the result of repetition of the act or thing involved in the habit itself. And the moral qualities are the properties and conditions of the human mind that prompt to moral acts. They are:

1. Impressions or inclinations of a personal character, since they relate to the person alone in whom they reside, generally causing both the habit and an increased inclination; as,

- (a.) *Industry*, or that disposition or inclination that prompts to constant employment, both of body and mind. This is the great conservator of human energies and of the

human faculties. Without industry or labor there can be no real merit and no real progress. Every faculty of man was made for exercise; and industry is both an inclination and a habit prompting to the exercises necessary for their proper development. Laziness is also largely a habit and a vice, whose insidious encroachments destroy more virtue than war or intemperance, and it is a sure accompaniment of the latter. Strike that foe to human progress and human happiness down and the field is cleared of more than one-half the opposing forces. Allow it to linger, and the contest is prolonged indefinitely. Systematic work is the true preventive of crime, and the cure for laziness. Morality is therefore promoted by work, much in the same manner that legitimate exercise promotes health. The conditions are the same, and the law of compensation is the same.

(b.) *Sobriety and Temperance* or those dispositions and tendencies that prompt to sound judgment and staidness of character, to moderation in the use of all the necessities of life, temperate in expectations and in pleasures, in enjoyments and labor, in food and raiment, not only avoiding that which is hurtful, but the excess of that which is really necessary. This is true temperance.

These are powerful moral forces, chiefly as restraints against excesses of all kinds, and are largely the results of cultivation. Numberless opportunities will present themselves in the ordinary school work for the exercise of these virtues.

(c.) *Economy* or judicious in the use of time, opportunity, money and goods; neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but a just balance in the affairs of life; a companion of industry, a promoter of thrift, and an aid to virtue. Economy can be taught in schools both by a judicious use of property, and a proper division of time, labor and

amusements, and a strict observance of the duties assigned to these. Industry in the preparation of lessons, moderation in plays and pleasures, and economy in the use of all are virtues that should be practiced every day, and in every lesson.

Here we have an epitome of life, a school of preparation for its duties, its trials, its pleasures and responsibilities; and the teacher that can not utilize these opportunities for this purpose has not yet learned how to teach, and should be retired until suitable preparation is made. This brings us to the consideration of the

2 **Relative Qualities**, or those states and conditions of the human mind that prompt to actions relating to intercourse between man and his fellow-man, both in business and pleasure. They may be stated as follows :

(a.) *Integrity*, or moral soundness, trustworthiness. It has reference to a balance, or an entirety of motive and purpose; the exercise of the whole group of sentiments, unbiased by any unworthy aims; stanchness in the maintenance of the right. Moral integrity gives character and force to every virtuous act. It is the rounding out of moral character; and the school and family are the agencies for its healthy development.

(b.) *Fidelity*, or faithfulness in the discharge of duties. This is a soldierly quality, and an active element in integrity. It is carefulness in the performance of work assigned, truthfulness applied to trusts, and loyalty in carrying out the details of business. Like integrity, it is subject to cultivation. It is improved by the exercise of those faculties that are employed in ordinary school work.

(c.) *Honesty*, or uprightness in dealings; ingenuousness, frankness, open-heartedness, transparent goodness, that which does not advertise *itself*. It embodies both the preceding qualities and many shades of kindred sen-

timents. It is universal trustworthiness not only in business, but in thought, purpose and will. Hence a person may be faithful and just in all commercial dealings, and in social relations, and yet a hypocrite at heart. He may be dishonest at heart, since motive determines the merit of the act. [See Prop. III, and Cors. 1 and 2.]

The last group of moral qualities mentioned under this general head may be presented as follows:

8. The absolute moral qualities, or those inhering independently in man, and in his acts, and that stand forth as the true elements and exponents of his moral character. They are of binding force, and their excellence determines the quality of all moral thinking, speaking and acting. We introduce a few leading ones as

(a.) *Truthfulness in thought, word and act.* This quality is absolute, admitting of no admixture of error, though often associated with it. It covers the widest range of human actions and moral character. Its cultivation consists largely in its expansion or application to human duties. Being absolute in its essence, it admits of no increase in its essential elements, but enters into every relation in life, where it is invited and honored. Its cultivation, therefore, consists in guarding it against any admixture or association with error or falsity.

It is approached on the objective side through the relative in form, color, number and proportion, involving similarity and contrast; and on the subjective side, through abstract thought and the observance of those promptings of the moral sense, and of those rules of conduct that conform strictly to the *Standard of truth*, as revealed in judgment. Human actions may, therefore, be conformed to the absolute, through comparisons of the relative. [See also Modes of Culture, Chapter XI, pp. 111.]

(b.) *Purity in thought, word and act.* This also is an

absolute quality, closely allied to truthfulness, but deriving its excellence chiefly from the motive prompting the act. It represents many qualities in excellence and enters into every good motive to human action, giving characteristic shades and tints to all thought, feeling and purpose. It admits of no degrees in actual quality, but invites all comparisons in word, act and conduct. It is a perfect standard of right, as far as quality is concerned. It commences in thought, and rejects all impurity, and approaches nearer and nearer the perfect in form, color, harmony and number which are but the outer symbols of moral purity. Its cultivation is subject to the same rules given for the development of the preceding. It is strict truthfulness applied to motive, and should be the ruling motive in the development of all scientific and moral truth.

(c.) *Goodness*, another general quality, absolute in character and universal in its applications. It may exist in various degrees of perfection in all human actions, covering all other qualities, composed of all others, and representing the best in all that pertains to moral sentiment, moral qualities and moral habits. Applied to individuals, it expresses the same ideas and thoughts.

Simple goodness is not opposed to greatness; but, on the contrary, it is an essential element in all true greatness. It is not a weak quality, nor a negative one. It is positive, implying both strength and aggressiveness. It implies the exercise of all those sentiments and qualities that purify, exalt and embellish human life and character.

To say that goodness can be taught and cultivated in the young, through the judicious application of all school duties, is only to say that every desirable quality may be cultivated, that every gift and grace may be improved; and that life and its duties afford the full measure of

exercise desirable for such culture. The manner of cultivation is, therefore, the same as in all other qualities.

We forbear further comment on these qualities here, believing that their importance in a course of moral training will be readily seen and sufficiently appreciated by the thoughtful teacher and student. Their modes of culture are the principal things to be considered. But, like the preceding qualities, they demand no special time set apart for their formal consideration, nor special means employed for enforcing their claims. They grow as a necessary part of and a result from that culture which gives greatest strength, activity and durability to all the powers of mind and body.

Their further importance and modes of culture will be seen, when we come to the direct teaching of the common branches of science in the schools.

THE SOCIAL SENTIMENTS AND QUALITIES.

The social sentiments and qualities of human nature, so-called, because they can best be exercised in a community of interests, are those ethical attributes that arise partly from those innate promptings that dispose to virtue and partly from man's social relations. They are purely benevolent in their origin and purpose and are excited mainly by objects more or less needy or unfortunate, indicating man's mutual dependence in a social way.

They will be readily understood, both as to their nature and importance, without individual descriptions; and their cultivation is not different from others already named. They are given here both to show the position they occupy in a course of moral training and to complete the list of attributes in such a course. They must be studied, however, and woven into the web of common school duties, where they rightfully belong and where they will add

strength and beauty to the great fabric of human culture and human life. They may be named in pairs for convenience, both from contrasts and similarities. Let them all be compared and discussed in the school lessons from day to day, pointing out cases or examples where they individually apply.

1. *Generosity and Justice.*
2. *Compassion and Pity.*
3. *Kindness and Mercy.*
4. *Gratitude and Thankfulness.*
5. *Sympathy and Friendship, etc.*

Other subordinate qualities may be added to this list, as:

(a.) *Magnanimity and Rectitude.*

(b.) *Tenderness and Politeness.*

(c.) *Commiseration and Condolence, etc.*, but they are readily derived from the foregoing. They all occupy important places in the curricula of school duties. They constitute a family of refined graces in social life without which it would be reft of more than half its pleasures, to say nothing of its usefulness.

The cultivation of these qualities consists in exercising them in connection with the ordinary duties of school life, to which they add its chief charm. No day, no hour should pass without calling some or all of them into practical exercise. Indeed, no good teaching can proceed, in a course of instruction, that does not exercise these graces. That is what the course of study should be planned to secure. Without it, it becomes a burden, and sometimes an absolute hindrance to the development of the best that is possible in man. And then the opposites of these qualities and graces are sure to grow unless the former are called into active use.

This is what constitutes the depravity of man. His moral nature is like a fertile soil. It has possibilities alike

for good and evil; if the first is neglected the second is sure to usurp its place. If the good seed is not sown early and well, the weeds will surely occupy the soil; and no such preoccupation of this soil will ever dispose it to virtue, but to the opposite. And then there is a necessity for constant culture, that the evil may be repressed, and the good encouraged. But the conquest of the former adds strength and endurance to the latter.

Take for example the qualities kindness and mercy, justice and generosity, gratitude and thankfulness, and what day or even what lesson does not afford opportunities for the exercise of some or all these qualities? Kindness is universal in its elements of tenderness and compassion. The same is true of justice and generosity, in their relations to property or privileges: and

"The quality of mercy is not strained,"

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven

Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest;

It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes:

'Tis mightiest in the mighty;"

and it does not require a court at Venice nor a Portia to make mercy felt in a school.

The quality of kindness as opposed to cruelty may often be rendered effective as a lesson, or in many lessons, by calling attention to the treatment of dumb animals and of little children. Incidents may be named or read, and the children questioned on real kindness as opposed to or distinguished from mere indulgence. Kindness never appears more beautiful and lovely than when exercised in the relief of suffering, or in the defense of the weak and helpless. And cruelty never appears more odious than when exercised upon dumb animals or little children. It is not only cruel but cowardly and mean to treat a poor horse, or cow, or even a pig, to kicks and blows because it may have

offended by even so much and by no more than the exercise of a natural propensity. Is it less cruel and cowardly to treat a child in a similar manner because, forsooth, it may have offended from a like cause, and is helpless in the hands of a teacher, parent, or a tyrant?

It is a question whether, under any circumstances, except in cases of defense, we are justifiable in inflicting pain as a punishment, upon defenseless dumb animals. They scarcely have reason sufficient to apply it as a means of reformation, or in vindication of a broken law. And little children are but slightly removed from the sphere of dumb animals. [See Incentives to Obedience, Chapter VIII. See also the customs among Arabs and some other nations, in the treatment of their horses and other animals; also, the Japanese in the treatment of young children.]


The teacher, if a good one, is the best text-book and best interpreter of lessons involving these qualities and doctrines, in and by his own acts and words, as indeed, he should be in all doctrines and practices relating to morality, all ethical principles, and all practices in high moral duties. Without such helps, the formal teaching of ethical doctrines, and rules for conduct, fall lifeless to the ground. It is doubtful, indeed, whether any other than the truly moral and good can teach morality, since like produces like in all departments of culture.

This matter is of sufficient importance to warrant an outline of the whole subject, to enable the teacher and student of morals to study these sentiments, qualities and habits in an independent way, approaching them from whatever standpoint may suit them best. This will constitute the most effective study, since it liberates the mind from any and all trammels that may come from an attempt

to master the presentation of the subject in a course of formal lessons in a text-book.

Text-books, however, should always give this freedom to the student. The perfunctory lesson-getting and the recitation of these have often the effect to narrow the thought down to a small compass and to cut off further investigation of the subject under consideration.

Let the student or teacher copy the following scheme of ethical attributes, and others in this volume, and present them in a series of lessons and discussions in their classes, at such intervals as may seem most desirable and profitable.



CHAPTER VII.

OBEDIENCE AND THE WILL.—THEIR PROPER INCENTIVES
CONSIDERED.

Before entering upon a more thorough discussion of the moral forces in Science, Art, Literature and Learning, and of the special methods of teaching these, as the final crowning moral force, it will be necessary to state what is meant by *obedience*; how it is related to the voluntary powers, and what are some of the leading incentives that may be employed in cultivating moral power in man.

Most of the results anticipated from the study and practice of the principles discussed in the foregoing, as well as those anticipated in what follows, are secured through *obedience to rightfully constituted authority*. Let us, therefore, inquire into its nature and peculiarities, and the best means of securing it.

1. *Obedience*, considered from the standpoint of motive may be said to be of two kinds, viz., voluntary and involuntary. The latter should exist, however, only as a preliminary, or a temporary substitute for the former. It may be called mere submission under proper restraints. It possesses little, if any, disciplinary merit, until it is merged into the more genuine obedience, where the will and other moral influences are sufficiently strong to establish its moral character. This, also, establishes the true conditions of all the moral forces associated with true obedience. Hence:

2. *Obedience*, to be effective in the formation of high moral character, is the willing, loyal, loving acquiescence in, and acceptance of, the ordinary claims of rightly constituted authority, wrought in the higher departments of the soul's faculties; and it always produces the peaceable fruits of righteousness—(right living).

If it lack any of these conditions and qualities, it may at least be questioned as to its genuineness.

3. The incentives to acts of obedience must therefore be such as not to appeal to any base or unworthy motives, or desires, or to vitiate, in any manner, the claims of *moral sense*. (See definition Chap. I.) The fear of punishment or the hope of reward, both of which, without doubt, enter into all our moral acts, more or less remotely, must be so tempered by a sense of moral obligation and a love of duty, that all their slavish features on the one hand, and sordid propensities on the other, shall be entirely submerged and neutralized by the higher and holier incentives of love and good will. This is not only desirable, but possible to the fullest extent, in true obedience.

4. A clear distinction must also be made, and continually maintained between mere submission to the claims of authority, and a voluntary acceptance of its requirements, and obedience thereto. The first, if prolonged and practised, breeds cupidity and cowardice, the second, freedom and loyalty. The one degrades, the other ennobles. The one is false, the other is true; and yet they are often confounded, the one with the other; at least not sufficiently distinguished in practical life.

For instance: let us suppose it is a school of ordinary merit. An offender is ordered to desist from the act of offense, without appealing to any higher motive for doing so, than the mere convenience, caprice or pleasure of the teacher. Without any particular malicious intent the culprit conceals his mischievous acts and intentions, and continues them "on the sly." No one will question his disobedience coupled with the meanness of deception, and the teacher knows it not, until perchance he is again detected, and reprimanded or punished in the ordinary way: and matters again move on, and the mischief ceases; but *has the culprit obeyed*

or merely submitted? Has the teacher done all in this case that is required? (pupils should be required to answer).

Another is reprimanded or scolded; and ordered to desist from annoyance. He does so for the time without a resolution to reform, or with a mental reservation to resume his mischief when opportunity occurs. Has he obeyed? But suppose he ceases, though unwillingly, and without such mental reservation, has he obeyed? If so, his obedience, as a moral element, is weak and inefficient.

A third is ordered to perform an unpleasant or disagreeable duty. He acquiesces, or obeys (?) under protest. He fears the consequences of disobedience. Has he obeyed, or only submitted? What is the difference in these two conditions? Another is ordered to perform a similar duty, and he acquiesces or obeys (?) because he is offered a reward for so doing: has he obeyed or only submitted? What merit, and to whom? What is the difference in these cases, morally?

The merit in all the above cases of seeming obedience, or of quasi obedience is vitiated by a mean, or at least an unworthy motive, and therefore is without moral force, no reformation is wrought in the higher departments of the soul's faculties. But when such an one or any of the preceding cases, are brought, by any means, to acknowledge the wrong, and voluntarily to forsake the same, and as cheerfully to enter upon a course of strict and loyal obedience, he has then complied with the conditions of the law, and moral growth is a certain result.

Another still may be in active rebellion against the rightly constituted authority, and he is compelled by superior force, either physical or mental or both, to submit to control, though unwillingly. He does so, because he cannot do otherwise; and so is helpless in the hands of the law, or the authority. His obedience is mere sub-

mission, and the only merit it has is contained in the fact that he *has* submitted. It is, however, more hopeful than some of the preceding cases, since the culprit is placed in a position in reference to authority, where reformation may reach him by wise management on the part of the authority. Hence, forced submission may be better than unwilling or partial obedience (?), since the chances for reformation are usually greater. But this forced submission should be resorted to only in cases of willful and flagrant disobedience or active rebellion, and then the compelling force should be strong, severe and certain. Trifling with serious cases of this nature will never answer. It often does more hurt than good. It often prolongs the difficulty and prevents reformation. But the unnatural restraint should be removed as soon as the higher incentives can be brought to bear upon the case, and as soon as sufficient moral force can be aroused and strengthened in the offender, to enable him to command the voluntary movements, or until he acquire self-control, since all reformation is wrought through and by the voluntary powers. (Let these problems be discussed.)

This principle and this practice, in the main, hold good in families, in common schools, reform schools, penitentiaries, work-houses, and in all institutions where reformation of offenders is sought as one of the chief objects of punishments, or of the restraint of personal liberty, which is itself one form of punishment; while the maintenance of good order, and the protection and security of society, which are also prime objects of government, are most effectually secured by reforming the elements of society.

And we might be permitted to suggest that here is just where human laws and human (not humane) institutions are weak and inefficient. In the first place, sufficient care, wisdom and patience are not exercised, first, in

securing entire submission to the claims of justice, and second, in changing the submission into voluntary obedience; and again, sufficient watchfulness, and care to provide suitable employment for those who are incarcerated or in a condition to reform, to shield them from the temptations to fall into old vices, are usually wanting. The thorough reformation of offenders, as one of the prime objects of government, is not sought wisely and well: hence the almost universal tendency of criminals to relapse into former bad habits on being released from confinement.

In too many cases in prisons and in reformatory institutions, the objects of punishment are overlooked. They are made vindictive rather than reformative. The claims of justice, as we are disposed to call them, are pushed to an extreme, while those of the culprit, equally importunate and more important, are lightly put aside, notwithstanding these latter have the stronger claims upon the law. All punitive measures, therefore—municipal or state, public or private—should carry with them a large infusion of the reformative elements, or they fail in their best endeavors and intentions. Hence,

The objects and aims of all good governments are at least threefold, viz.:

(a.) *Protective*, in that the rights of person, property and reputation, and the peaceable pursuit of happiness and standing in community should be secured to all alike. These are the just awards of obedience, and their withdrawal is one of the punishments meted out to disobedience. Both may be regarded as incentives for obedience to law. They also act as restraints, whereby protection is secured to all loyal subjects of the government, while in their lawful pursuits.

Government should also act as a defense to the weak and

unprotected, both in body and in mind, and also in moral habits. It should instruct and strengthen the weak and protect the defenseless. But it often fails to do all this, and even seizes upon these unfortunates as its lawful victims, and punishes for offenses its own folly has prompted. Such governments need reforming.

(b.) *Reformative*, in that it assumes the right to punish for offenses, and to restrain from evil practices—or those detrimental to individual and public good—through hope of rewards and fear of punishments. The former comes chiefly in the way of protection to person, property, etc. But punishments should have the same objects in view, though the principal one is the reformation of the offender, whereby society is made doubly secure, both by warding off immediate danger, and by adding elements of strength and durability to it as future protection.

(c.) *Conservative*, in that its best elements should always be prominent in directing and conserving public affairs. It should always sympathize with the unfortunate, especially the criminal classes; not in the way of encouraging crime, but in provisions for the reformation of these classes, recognizing the fact that few, if any, resort to crime from choice.

The government should provide encouragements *to those undergoing punishment, so that it may not be lost as a reformatory measure. This encouragement should be in the form of a recognition of restored rights after reformation, and in suitable employments to those who have suffered penalties or reformatory measures of any kind.

By these means the best is conserved and perpetuated, both in individuals and in communities; and the best of opportunities are afforded for the cultivation of the higher moral qualities: for it must not be forgotten that, even among reformed criminals, we often find the strongest and

best working elements in society, since the weak and effeminate seldom are disturbers of the public peace. It is the strong and vigorous ones that are capable of doing much evil, and much good when reformed.

Of course, much depends upon the form of government, the choice of officers as means for carrying it forward, and the enactment of laws and their prompt execution—all these must be taken into consideration. Governments and Constitutions should be, as far as possible, for the people, of the people and by the people, so far at least as the people are wise and capable; for majorities should rule only when they are right. This is one of the grand tests of good governments; but the greatest difficulty is in determining the right. One of the weak points in most popular governments is that they are satisfied in exacting the demands of the law in civil suits, and inflicting penalties for crimes, by neither of which is the offender necessarily reformed, but often made worse. Governments of all sorts thus become vindictive; and, by antagonizing some of the independent elements in human nature, often make it weaker and worse. And by instituting barriers against wrongs that may happen, they often excite to temptations instead of removing them. The same is true of schools and families, where appeals are made to the lower motives first. The only relief exists in the thorough education of the man—soul and body.

[See Incentives, next chapter.]

(*d.*) The offender, or criminal, after punishment, properly inflicted, is supposed to be conquered. At least he has submitted to the claims of justice; and though it may be an unwilling submission, it is, nevertheless, a condition in which the authority can treat with him more on the terms of equality. As far as the claims of justice are concerned, he has paid the debt, or at least accepted its

conditions, though it may be unwillingly, and is now more like a free man. It is now the duty of the government to offer such encouragement as shall lead to a voluntary acceptance of the claims of justice and the exercise of the still higher motives to voluntary obedience and citizenship.

Punishment has, in the first place, reduced him to submission and a state of comparative helplessness, in order that the government or authority may step in, and, as in the case of young children, substitute and suggest the higher motives to obedience; for, when duly conquered, the rebellious nature ceases; but, unlike the case of a child, it leaves a certain weakness and a tendency to relapse; hence the greater need of care. In this blank or uncertain state, the moral powers are subject to easy control, yet equally subject to fall into ways of evil again.

Hence the subject or offender, thus reduced, becomes an object of human sympathy and human help, instead of an outcast, shunned by those whose help he needs, and thus driven again into ways of vice. Therefore abundance of suitable employment should always be furnished by the government, be it family, school or state; whereby the faculties that, unemployed, prompt to evil, may be otherwise employed, and thus restored, and conserved in their best estate.

II. THE WILL.

This power is an important factor in the exercise and production of moral qualities. Hence all appeals made to the moral nature, through or by means of this grand motor to human action, must be made with wise reference to its legitimate functions or natural characteristics, which may be stated, in brief, as follows :

1. *The mind has a passive nature* or susceptibility,

subject to soliciting motives : and these conditions constitute the initial steps in all volitional acts.

2. *The mind has elective power* : i. e., freedom to choose between alternatives. This power, of course, is influenced by the judgment and reason, as subjective forces.

3. The mind has, also, executive energy, or power to execute, or to carry into effect what has been decided by judgment and sanctioned by conscience, and even to do those things that conscience and judgment condemn ; but in all such cases it is swayed by overpowering soliciting motives. But the motives or incentives which constitute the objective forces should range so that the appeals to this faculty of the human mind shall be in harmony with the moral sense.

The will, therefore, is, 1st, that susceptibility the mind has to be effected by motives to acts of volition ; 2d, the power it has to elect, or choose or refuse the acts suggested, aided by judgment and reason ; 3d, the power it has, after choice is made, to execute the acts decided upon ; and in all this, the mind simply exercises its native freedom and volitional power.

The final determinations of the mind, in all volitional acts, are reached in somewhat the following order, the conditions being favorable:

1. *Intentions* to do or not to do may exist in the mind in various degrees of force. They may be so weak as to amount to nothing more than a mere inclination, in which case they correspond to the passive nature of the will; and then again, owing to the force of impressions, they may arise to something resembling resolutions; but if the matter end here, the ultimate decisions may never be reached; and the will, in such case, is nothing more than a mere passive instrument, subject to continual fluctuations, and governed by the soliciting motives alone. We

call this weakness of will, or want of will power. Hence, many well-meaning people fail to accomplish anything worthy in life—or unworthy either, for that matter—simply because they lack the power to come to conclusions of any kind, or to carry out their convictions, however clear. This failing is usually accompanied by a want of concentration of mind, which keeps them continually striving, but never able to come to a full knowledge of the truth.

2. *Resolution*.—This is a step in the moral scale, higher than mere intention, which latter may be both tame and passive. The resolution is more or less positive, and, rightly directed, reinforces the mere intention, which becomes, at once, more of an active agent. The mind, then, in its volitional state, corresponds to the elective power of the will. When a resolution is formed in the mind, it is generally understood that a choice is made between alternatives; and that it is ready to act, and yet, unless this, too, is reinforced and strengthened, invigorated and quickened by something more certain and determinate, the person may “resolve and re-resolve and die the same.” But let the resolution rise as high in the scale of moral force as,

3. *Determination* to act, corresponding to the executive energy of the will, then *stand aside!* Something will be done! A moral force is then let loose in the world, that “will find a way or make it.” The thing in question will be done, if it is not impossible, and seeming impossibilities melt before the determined force of will guided by intelligence and virtue.

There have been periods in the world’s history when this characteristic of the will has come to the rescue just at the right time, changing seeming defeat into victory, and deciding the fate of nations and countries. The same is true in the lives and fortunes of men. The critical

moment is when the decision is made between right and wrong, or between action and inaction; and the determinate power, with full force, pronounces Yes or No, which puts an end to all strife, forever. Temptations, however severe, yield before the magic of these words, pronounced from the heart.

This executive energy is, as it were, the electric shock of the faculties of the soul, that sets all in motion, each one rising to its maximum height in human energy, all following the leadership of this masterly faculty—*the will*, fulfilling the behests of the judgment and reason, while the moral sentiments have full play.

In all these cases, therefore, the appeals should be made in the order of the higher motives first, and should descend in the scale until the effective ones are reached. But it is not always best to make the appeals direct. The motive or incentive may be so well concealed or lost in the appeal itself, as not to excite either curiosity, or concern of any kind. But it should simply set in motion a group of mental powers whose exercise is principally designed to produce the moral effect. This will be shown more fully as we proceed.

How, then, may we cultivate the best faculties of man, and thereby give them the ascendancy in the affairs of life? Let this question be kept continually in mind; for its answer will not appear directly, nor in a few words. It must be gathered from the many conditions of human affairs, and from the continual strife to which these powers are subjected, and to the continual tests of loyalty to duty that beset the entire pathway of human existence.

To illustrate: when we wish to develop and strengthen any particular part of the human body, we direct the physical exercise to that particular part: So, if we wish to develop and strengthen generosity or justice, patriotism or

patience, honesty or benevolence, we put the child in a position where these faculties or sentiments shall be appealed to and exercised in a lawful way. They will not grow without lawful exercise any more than the intellectual faculties will grow without exercise. The modes of exercise will be determined largely by the conditions in life, and the employments pursued.

A few general directions may be given here, whereby the best faculties of the human soul may be improved.

1. *By actual practice of those virtues we would have appear prominent in the child, by the children themselves.* This is the surest, safest and most economical means of developing them, and of fitting them to bear the burdens of life. The school should be so planned and conducted, as to represent life work. This is its highest function. It is its declared object. Failing in this it fails in all other respects, and falls an easy prey to vice.

2. *The entire work of the school-room can be so arranged, and so practiced that every lesson and every study shall be a lesson in behavior and of high moral culture.* And so far from detracting from other objects, as the acquisition of knowledge, and the performance of other duties, as study and recitation, this will only enliven and strengthen, purify and beautify and utilize all others. This will also appear, further on.

3. *By personal example, as in the noble, ingenuous, frank, honest and unselfish acts and words of the teacher.* This, perhaps, is one of the most powerful incentives with most children. They are imitative beings, and example generally appeals to them with greater force than mere words. But even example needs practice, or, at least, practical illustration in the duties of the school-room. Noble example in the lives of living man and in literature may be

discussed and imitated in connection with the same duties: and

4. *Precept* is not without its merit, if it can be taught so as not to make it altogether a perfunctory matter. It then loses its greatest force, both as a stimulant and moral restraint. Indeed, it sometimes leads to its own violation, by calling attention to the evils it is intended to counteract. But, by instilling into the hearts and minds of the young those noble sentiments and maxims which are the inheritance of the wise and good of all ages, we not only fertilize the human heart, but plant and cultivate some of the purest sentiments of morality.

But the good we would develop in man is not forthcoming by simply calling for it; neither is it a spontaneous growth. It is a matter of careful and wise culture. The good that lasts is of slow and gradual growth. We can not command its instantaneous development, any more than we can command the growth of plant or animal. It, like other things of growth, has its infancy of weakness, its adolescence and growth, and a maturity of strength and endurance. Goodness is a plant of rare growth, and is often dwarfed and weakened by our awkward efforts to promote its growth. It has its laws of activity and lines of movement, that may not be turned aside. It is largely the product of self-activity and patient waiting.

"Heaven is not reached by a single bound.
We build the ladder by which we rise
From the lowly earth to the vaulted skies;
And we mount to its summit round by round."

Neither can we secure the desired results of moral instruction by presuming upon it, or by pointing out its excellencies. It were as inconsistent to expect to develop moral character by merely preceptive teaching, as to expect to develop scholarly qualities in a similar way. "Be

truthful," "Be honest," "Be industrious," "Be good," are about equivalent to saying "Be mathematical," "Be historical," "Be rhetorical," "Be learned," "Be wise." Precept will not produce scholarship without the required labor and practice. Neither will it produce moral qualities and habits without the necessary labor and practice. The pupil in learning must commence in an orderly way, and *work* and *study* and *grow* into these scholarly states; *so he must, in morals*. There is no law of development outside of labor. The common maxim, "We learn to do by doing," has its counterpart in morals. We learn to be what we desire to be, by *being* and *doing*; by doing the things involved in the conduct and lives of those who possess these virtues, and by *being* what we seem to be.

For instance, truth is developed by telling the truth, doing the truth, thinking the truth; for, as before stated, truth resides in science, in forms, colors, proportions or harmony. It is also one of the elements in true beauty, and resides in comparisons, contrasts and relations. The whole realm of nature and of true art abounds in elements of beauty and truth.

Harmony is truth as well as beauty, harmony of sounds, colors, forms, proportions, movements, etc., and true education simply liberates and develops and harmonizes man's moral nature to this world of truth and beauty.

There are also many phenomenal falsehoods in the disproportion and want of harmony of these elements, as well as in conduct and words. These must be guarded against, as demoralizing in their effects upon mind and character. They are apt to escape the notice of the uneducated, and even the ordinary observed, yet all the more mischievous on this account. They exist, not only in the too common exaggerations in language and expression, as in the hollow and insincere professions of regard, and the hypocritical

pretensions to friendship, so common among all classes, but also in overwrought ornamentation in person and attire, the furnishing of apartments, the choice and the hanging of pictures, inharmonious and exaggerated coloring in dress, and the wrong blending of them in drapery, etc.

The want of harmony anywhere is a phenomenal falsehood, which predisposes the mind to indulge it elsewhere than in dress, in forms, colors, proportions, etc. No wonder, then, that children go astray from birth, especially where their whole environment is one monstrous falsehood or distortion of these elements of beauty and truth; and where their, as yet, untaught ears and eyes are greeted with discord and their first prattlings are in lies.

Reform this environment; purify this much muddled pool of social disorder. Elevate the moral sentiments by educating them in simple honesty and refined purity, as the faculties of the mind are brought in daily contact with life and its duties; and the set rules and the precepts of morality will then become an easy task, if not an unnecessary one.

And what is said of the few moral sentiments that have been noticed, is true also of all of them, as patriotism, kindness, courtesy, modesty, etc., etc. Honesty, pure and untarnished, is perhaps one of the rarest gifts and graces that adorn human character. Few, if any, in all their social intercourse, or even in their commercial relations and dealings, are perfectly honest. Few would be willing to have all their conduct and dealings, their words and thoughts and motives exposed to the pure sunlight of truth, or even to the gaze of their fellow-men. And yet the simple teaching of these graces in connection with our ordinary school work will certainly make a vast difference in the conduct and habits of the coming man and woman. The experiment were, at least, worth a trial.

Much more could be said and written on this part of our present theme; but we leave it to the reader, the thinker and the *doer* of good deeds, to finish what is really only begun here.

We must now turn our attention to the consideration of those incentives that may be used in order to secure the results anticipated in the foregoing.

Much—yea, we may say *all* depends upon the spirit and purpose of the teacher. He must come down from his perch of professional pride, and mingle with the common herd—so to speak—if he would lift them up, and light them up with those glorious tints of intelligence and virtue, which are alike the heritage of all.

CHAPTER VIII.

INCENTIVES TO VOLUNTARY OBEDIENCE AND DUTY.

These incentives, as before stated, may be so adjusted to the child's understanding and educational want as to bring them to bear upon his nature, somewhat in the order of their excellence, estimated from a purely moral point of view.

The object is to induce, as far as possible, voluntary action on the part of the child, from the higher motives; and thereby to cultivate the higher moral qualities and sentiments, since the quality of the conduct, in a purely moral sense, is determined from the motive. [See Prop. III., Cor. 1, page 16.]

Obedience is the great central source and object in moral culture. Through it we reach all the moral sentiments and qualities. Obedience, not in outward act alone; but obedience in thought, spirit and purpose (intellect, sensibility and will)—the submissive blending of

all the incentives, in harmony with the laws of growth, and of the standard of right—the subordination of the will-power to the demands of conscience and enlightened judgment.

Obedience, as already stated, is of two kinds, viz., the voluntary, or the willing, loyal, loving acquiescence in and acceptance of the demands of rightly constituted authority: and the involuntary or the unwilling submission to these claims, forcibly presented, as a temporary means of securing the voluntary obedience with all its higher incentives, as a means of perpetuating it. We shall devote this chapter to the claims of voluntary obedience and the means of securing it.

The means or appeals made use of in order to secure this higher form of obedience, may be arranged in the following order, and their application to the ordinary pupil should follow the same order, as far as circumstances will permit.

1. The appeals to the purely benevolent impulses of the human mind: those that find their highest gratification outside of mere self or selfish desires. They arise from the home and home environment; hence their name. They may be subdivided in brief as follows:

(a.) *The Home or Domestic Impulses** are those that appeal to a disposition implanted in childhood to please, and to be profited by pleasure in the social circle. The object of the affection and the act may be parent, brother or sister, playmate, teacher or friend. This impulse is strong in childhood, both because of pleasure derived from conferring favors, and because of the dependent character of childhood. Parental and filial affection are based largely upon this feeling. Its existence in childhood

* It is thought by some, that unless these home benevolent feelings are duly exercised, hence cultivated, that the malevolent feelings are sure to usurp their places. The thought is worth considering.

in such a dependent state, offers the skillful teacher the desired opportunity to develop it into a purely moral principle, which not only includes many moral sentiments and qualities, as respect, esteem, love, etc., but gives rise, also, to other sentiments of a kindred character. The opposite of this disposition is a perversion of moral nature, and can not exist where these feelings are encouraged and cultivated. Hence its ingredients need not be named, much less cultivated.

(b.) Appeals to a disposition or willingness to suffer inconvenience, and to sacrifice self for the good of others: a spirit more of beneficence than benevolence, which rightly cultivated develops into patriotism or love of country, laws and institutions. This, too, is a natural impulse in childhood, existing in various degrees of activity. It lies very near the home feeling spoken of above, and it may be developed in the home, school and country. It is active benevolence. It is opposed to selfishness. Its cultivation leads directly to

(c.) A desire to do good to all mankind, or general benevolence. It exists in an embryonic state in early childhood; and its cultivation and development into this higher form of activity is but the legitimate outcome of right modes of culture or teaching, as will be shown further on. It also leads to a still more marked characteristic, not infrequently witnessed among men of high moral sentiment and culture; viz.:

(d.) A willingness to suffer, not only for friend and country, but for the cause of truth and justice, and for the oppressed of all lands and nations. This is not an uncommon exhibition of human sympathy, where the mind is broadened in the principles of the universal brotherhood of the races. History abounds in examples of this kind; and the exercise of this feeling gives us examples of the

most exalted love of truth and right. But its full exercise leads to a still higher, perhaps the highest and most unselfish, patriotic, and benevolent feeling of which the human heart is capable; viz.:

(e.) *A willingness to suffer for the good of enemies.* This accords with the highest conceptions of unselfish love. The highest precepts of morality can scarcely reach this point, it is divine and yet it is possible and compatible with man's moral nature spiritualized to the highest degree. Indeed it is the legitimate product of the human mind under right culture and must be sought only through the superior exercise of the moral and spiritual powers in harmony with the laws of their growth. To this may be added, lastly,

(f.) *A desire to do good or right for the sake of right,* or for the mere pleasure of it. This also is a legitimate outcome of the foregoing principles, fully tested in high culture. It perhaps does not rank as high in the scale of pure morality as some of those preceding it, since the pleasure derived from doing good may be regarded somewhat in the light of a reward. But it stands in striking contrast with that doubtful adage, "Honesty is the best policy," etc.

It should be the daily endeavor of the teacher or parent to keep the matter of mere policy as far in the background as possible. The common intercourse of teacher and pupil, of parent and child, of citizen and state or government, will usually afford just opportunity for the exercise and development of all these traits of human character. Where these are wanting, they should be supplied from some quarter. History abounds in examples. The following incentives are not entirely benevolent, but occupy an intermediate ground, as it were, between the purely benevolent and the selfish; or between those that look entirely beyond

self-interest for their gratification, and those that look mainly to personal gratification. They may be briefly stated as follows:

2. Appeals to the semi-social feelings and desires as distinguished from the purely benevolent moral impulses and desires, discernible in the preceding.

They afford ample opportunity for the cultivation of the moral character of the pupil. As intimated above, this class of appeals is not intended alone for the social qualities, but rather as a convenient transition from the home to the world outside; and for the exercises of those ethical attributes that belong chiefly to the school and to school etiquette—one remove from the family and kindergarten, and bordering upon the world life as represented in the school: among which may be named:

(a.) A desire for happiness through the exercise of such social qualities, and the performance of such duties as are usually required in school work and school recitations.

The motive is not entirely unselfish, since the gratification of the desire leads to personal enjoyment and improvement, and yet these objects are so commendable in themselves, as to redeem them entirely from any taint of unworthiness.

Happiness is the universal aim of the human family. No one exists, perhaps, that seeks misery and suffering. All our efforts may be said to be directed toward enjoyment. The difference in men in this regard is only in the manner of seeking it. The school and the refinements of education, rightly directed, open up directly upon these avenues of enjoyment. Hence the refinement and the means of attaining it, both conspire to the same end, the moral elevation of the pupil.

(b.) *A desire for mutual gains and benefits, or a desire to accommodate others as a means of promoting one's own*

interest and enjoyment. This, it will be seen, is a kind of semi-social quality bearing strongly upon the commercial side of society; and it corresponds to the period of culture in which that group of sciences, representing these interests, are brought into prominence.

In this age of the world, this feature of human activity is an important one. It has become a chief interest. It is business: but all business, and all pleasure, and all employments of whatever kind should cultivate, not kill. They should cultivate the better qualities of human nature, rather than to dwarf and deform them. Those that do not thus cultivate should be discontinued as soon as possible, either as needless or harmful. Society can never grow much better so long as these violations of its social and commercial laws are continued with such flagrant disregard.

No pains should be spared in the school and in the family, to chasten and refine these propensities, as a means of preparation for life duties, and as a means also of removing these desires as far as possible from the shameful abuse of them. Dishonest dealing has become, not only a habit, but a legalized trade, whereby a man may cheat his neighbor with impunity, provided he do it according to prescribed rules. Instances may be given further on.

This is a feature in our commercial relations upon which cupidity feeds, and dishonesty finds ready protection. [See Chapter XIV.]

(c.) *A desire for personal improvement*, or intellectual culture and refinement of manners. This is not only a commendable desire, but a source of mutual benefit; for it will not be difficult to impress all the members of a school, or of a community, with the belief that the improvement of one member is, by reflection, the improvement of every other member. This is a powerful impulse to scholarship

as well as conduct in school life, and everywhere, where this sentiment prevails.

The acquisition of knowledge, and the mutual improvement of the members of a school, are some of those latent forces, of which we can take but little account, but of whose moral influence there can be but little doubt. Once let this sentiment obtain a prominent place among incentives in a school, and moral growth is certain; unless, indeed, this sentiment is stimulated and kept alive by an impure and unholy desire to improve oneself or his condition at the expense of a rival. Political life offers the greatest temptations to abuse this sentiment, or desire.

(d.) *A desire for place and standing*, therefore, is closely allied to the foregoing. This desire in society and business has its origin and counterpart in school life, amid the strivings and struggles for mastery. But it is a legitimate feeling or desire, since no progress could be made without efforts that partake more or less of these peculiarities. It is not only allowable when properly tempered by a benevolent desire for others, but really a commendable trait, both because it urges to higher attainment, and enlarges our sphere of usefulness.

It is closely allied to all the preceding incentives and desires, and is therefore cultivated and refined by the same or similar means. A proper division and use of time and opportunities will be demanded here so that the waste of energies may be prevented, and that study and improvement may become a necessity from habit. But an overweening desire for place and power must be checked at every point, by all proper restraints, and all wholesome discipline. Abnormal growth is sometimes worse than no growth at all. And again—

(e) *The desire for material gain* may be utilized in moral culture, since it is one of the chief prompters to effort

and duty. It is at the foundation of all industries and all progress. When this desire is properly indulged, it closes the door against most of the prevailing vices of the age. And then there is nothing in the legitimate gratifications of this desire in any way antagonistic to the purest morals and soundest growth, both of individuals and communities.

Remark 1. The foregoing list of desires and their appropriate appeals may seem tedious to some ; but it must not be forgotten that moral growth is generally slow in its processes, and a product of common, unobtrusive, and, to a large extent *silent* influences, making their appeals in the ordinary affairs of life. But it is the silent forces of nature that work the most beneficent results. The tempest, the earthquake and the fire are mighty forces in their way, but they are mostly destructive in their energies ; and, fortunately, limited in their action. But the sunshine, the dews and the showers, are so common, universal and so quiet as scarcely to excite attention ; yet their results in the great ongoing changes in nature are always beneficent and beyond calculation, good.

Remark 2. Nothing in all the foregoing list of semi-selfish desires and appeals, must be used in any manner to stimulate unholy ambition of any kind, or to pamper selfishness. These incentives must, therefore, be used with great caution. They occupy a kind of intermediate ground, between the purely benevolent appeals, and those of a purely selfish character—which we now propose to consider—and therefore more liable to abuse, since they may be mistaken the one for the other.

(3) Appeals to Self-love, Pride, and to Personal Satisfaction.

This may be regarded as purely selfish ; but it must be remembered that enlightened selfishness is a commendable trait in human nature. It will lead every man to kind treatment of his fellow-man, because love begets love ; and a desire for the good opinion of others will lead a man to strive for it, and to be worthy of it, to earn it.

It will lead a man even to the practice of the "Golden Rule," since it measures that love which we owe to others by the love we bear to ourselves. Every man's interest, therefore, stands upon a common basis.

This group of appeals stands among the strongest of incentives to human action. This again, arises, probably, from their direct and personal character. They address one's enlightened selfishness in such a manner as to increase self-respect and worthy conduct. The characteristics of this group may be presented as follows:

(a) *Self-respect*, or a manly dignity based on merit: a desire to appear well in one's own estimation, as well as in that of others. Self-respect is the base of true gentility. It is the proper medium between self-importance or vanity on the one hand, and servility, cowardice, a morbid sense of inferiority and want of confidence, on the other. A man who has a too exalted opinion of himself, or one who lacks confidence in his own just ability, always appears at a disadvantage. He can never command the respect or esteem of his fellows.

(b) *Respect for others* is only an application of the same sentiment to others that we entertain for ourselves, with slight differences. It is reciprocal in most cases, and measured by merit. It leads to such treatment of equals or inferiors as shall best comport with their interests and happiness. And then it also implies a feeling of regard for the good opinion of our fellows, whether in the same, or in different stations. This feeling is subject to the same limitations as that of self-respect. It acts as a powerful restraint upon human conduct, and hence should have a place among all worthy objects. Its cultivation is secured by a proper regard for the rights of person and reputation of those with whom we associate.

(c) *Ambitious rivalry* in class, grade, or in society, is

another strong human incentive to duty or effort. It is somewhat dangerous, however, because a little too much is worse than none at all. It needs all those wise restraints which, while nourishing a healthy rivalry, shall prevent any undue advantage by those who strive for excellence. When men are moved by this ambition, and become heated in the eager pursuit, they are apt to overlook those nicer distinctions and deferences that should govern rivals. When this happens, the rivalry then becomes odious, and should be restrained or abandoned. The school is especially liable to this abuse, since it becomes necessary, sometimes, to appeal to the most available impulse. Great care, therefore, must be exercised in class and in grade, to the end that no unfair advantage be taken by contestants for places of distinction. The school should hold out no inducements to such distinctions that, when won, would either stimulate vanity on the part of the winner, or discouragement to the loser. If honors are offered they should be distributed to the most worthy and deserving, irrespective of any apparent success. In other words, "they should be placed where they will do the most good."

(d) *A love of approbation or praise* is another delicate desire in the human make-up, requiring the utmost care as to incentives, etc. This desire for praise exists abnormally in some natures, and hence needs wise restraints; and, in others, it is scarcely perceptible, and needs stimulating. The first condition is the more general. Judicious praise, judiciously administered, is a healthy stimulant to some natures, while to others, praise is but the food for vanity and self-importance. The former natures should be exalted, while the latter should be humbled. In both, a just meed of praise, or approbation, should be awarded for noble effort rather than for success, since the latter

may be either accidental or unworthy ; the former never can be either. And then again, success is usually its own reward, while failure, if following laudable effort, may need the stimulant of praise—not the failure—but the effort. This may also disappoint the morbid expectations of the proud—a wholesome rebuke—and encourage the modest desires of the weak and timid—a wholesome stimulant.

(e) *The use and abuse of percentages and periodical reports of scholarship and conduct.* There is, perhaps no school incentive, now in general use, about which there is greater diversity of opinion ; or one concerning which the moral effects are more doubtful, if not dangerous. And perhaps there is no motive or incentive held out to pupils in the school, subject to greater abuse, especially if the reports are based upon the self-reporting system, which in itself is all right if properly guarded. It is powerful both for good or evil. The objections to percentages and other similar devices arise chiefly from two sources. The one consists in the great difficulty, and in fact the impossibility of making fair and just estimates of merit, or indeed of whatever criterion upon which the report may be based. The other is the great danger of exciting animosity and ill will among the pupils. These, aside from the great temptations offered for deceit, fraud and falsehood in the reports, where these are depended upon for merit, or for grade, would be sufficient to warrant the rejection, or the discontinuance of an incentive so dangerous to the morals of the pupils. And yet, with some teachers—a very few—the self-reporting system, though not a necessary part of “the percentage and reporting system,” may be used for the cultivation of truthfulness and honesty. Let the teacher study this.

(f) *Rewards and prizes.* These are closely allied to

the foregoing, and are perhaps of still more doubtful propriety. They are usually given either for excellence in scholarship, or for conduct, and sometimes for both ; and both or all, are subject to great abuse.

In the first place it is offering a reward for doing that which ought to be considered a sufficient reward in and of itself. It is tantamount to paying a man for benefiting himself, or rewarding him for success. It is also placing a material value upon efforts whose real merits can never be known. This lowers it as a moral force, if it does not rob it completely of all merit in a moral sense.

In the second place the after-influences are usually bad, especially upon the successful candidate for prizes or honors. He is too apt, either from conceit, or from over-exertion, to cease from further effort or exertion and to relapse into indifference, relying for success upon his honors, which soon fade away. Hence, our first prize men, and first honor men are seldom heard of after their great effort. They sink out of sight, or are supplanted in business or scholarship by the plodders—the no honor men.

Therefore, unless prizes and honors, and such like incentives can be relieved from these dangerous features, and guarded against the above-named abuses, it were better never to resort to them. Rewards of merit are less objectionable, if indeed the merit can really be determined. There are other incentives, free from these objections, healthy in their tone, wise in their provisions, and of far greater moral and intellectual value, that may be used with safety.

But if excellence, intellectual, physical or moral, must be bought, it is vitiated in the very act, because of the impure motive. And if the candidate for scholarship or for excellence of any kind, cannot be induced to put forth

his best efforts (which by the way is not usually the case under the highest pressure), without resort to such doubtful and dangerous incentives, it is doubtful whether or not he is worth the trial. But if rewards can be given where they are most deserved, and where they are likely to be free from the objections above mentioned, then let the teacher be free to give, but not otherwise.

CHAPTER IX.

INCENTIVES TO INVOLUNTARY OBEDIENCE.

Involuntary obedience, or submission under restraints, requires a different class of incentives. It pre-supposes disobedience or offense on the part of the subject of it. It is that form requiring, or which has required, interference with personal rights, and liberty of a certain kind. These rights are, by virtue of disobedience or crime, supposed to be forfeited on the part of the offenders. They are naturally and rationally forfeited by supposed abuse of privileges, and a refusal to accept the terms upon which they are conferred in the first place, and upon which they may be regained when lost. They are the natural inheritance of all good citizens.

The first class of these incentives to this incipient obedience and duty may be stated under the following

1. Restraints.

These may be regarded the milder forms of interference with personal liberty, and those that possess a degree of leniency which allows the offender time and opportunity for reflection and reformation, usually removing him from associates, and the temptations that may have caused the disobedience in the first place. They may consist of

(a) *A denial of the natural rights and privileges*, or those that come to him by virtue of birth, society and education, such as home, friends, and the right to pursue the ordinary avocations of life.

With these may be classed the political rights, or the right to participate in the management of affairs. And while these conditions seem to point to a period in the life of the offender, when he has come into the full possession of rights, social, political and otherwise, or in the full enjoyment of citizenship; yet the school and the family contain all these conditions and elements of culture, necessary to bring him into the full exercise of these privileges. The child should take his first lessons in obedience, and industry, and citizenship, in the family and in the school, which constitute the community for practice. This is the great mission of these institutions. They are culpable if they fail in this matter.

Another class of restraints may be called

(b) *A denial or withdrawal of acquired rights and privileges*, such as those that come to good citizens by virtue of industry, good management, and by inheritance. And while, according to the laws of most countries, crimes do not work forfeiture of inheritance, yet the common sentiment of the people is such that the full enjoyment of these by the culprit is denied, in that he is usually cut off from ordinary pursuits. The law has a right to inflict fines and penalties for misdemeanors.

These conditions also exist in the school and in the family, though not precisely in the same form, and their proper improvement would greatly diminish the violations of common law in the subsequent life.

(c) *Confinement and separation* from all that can minister to the personal comfort of the offender, socially,

politically and otherwise, except the mere necessities of life and means of reformation.

On this principle the common or statutory law lays its hands upon criminals and places them in situations where they can at least face their crimes in a quiet way, and hold such self examination as may lead to reformation. This opportunity, however, is not always improved ; neither are the chances for such reformation always the most favorable, in consequence of the careless manner in which they are usually extended to the culprit. But if schools and families would more frequently resort to this mode of punishment or restraint, instead of the too common vindictive and retaliatory measures, it would offer both the offender and the offended more time to consider both the nature of the offense and the means of treatment. Coolness and consideration are always necessary to the ends of justice, and to carrying out any reformatory measures.

The last class of appeals to which attention will be called here, those looking directly towards the reformation of offenders, the protection of society, and the conservation and perpetuation of the best there is in government and people, may be classed under the following general heads, viz. :

2. Punishments, direct and personal.

These should conform both to the nature and enormity of the offense, and the objects to be attained by punishments. These objects are the chief considerations in all good government. They may include—

(a) *The protection to all good citizens, to which they are entitled.*

(b) *The conservation of the best elements in society, and*

(c) *The reformation of those elements, that for any cause, have become deranged.*

The last one of these objects is an important one, and is the prime object of all punishments. It also ranks high, since through reformation both protection and conservation are secured. Indeed the main purposes of punishments are merged in this one supreme object, viz., the reformation of offenders, since without such reformation, where offenses abound, no healthy government can exist. Hence, the safety and security of society, the vindication of authority and the conservation of all that is best in human nature, and in human compacts, are hereby most effectually met by the reformation of deranged elements. Its accomplishment is a guarantee for all others.

Again : All punishments should, as far as possible, conform to nature's laws : *i. e.*, the offender should be met by the natural consequences of his offense, as in the case of trespass upon property, restitution should be made in kind and measure proportionate to nature and enormity of the offense, *i. e.*, he should not only restore that which he has destroyed, or appropriated ; but he should add something for the breach of trust, and the damage sustained to society at large. But in cases of personal injury, or injury to reputation and opportunity, it is not always convenient, right or possible to inflict a similar injury upon the offender, as "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, etc., or to exchange a reputation for a reputation ; yet the law should exact an equivalent, either by depriving of personal liberty, or by the loss of property, the one to satisfy justice, the other to compensate. as far as possible, the injured party, and sometimes both should be exacted as a reformatory measure.

But that part of government relating to the administration of punishments may be treated under the following heads, viz.:

(a) *Reprimands*, public or private, according to the

nature of the offense. If the particular violation is mainly against the peace and good order of the school, or the community of which the offender is a member, it may be best to vindicate the authority that has been abused, which is a common interest and inheritance, by a public punishment of the offender, keeping in mind, however, the main objects of punishment, as heretofore explained. But if the offense is a private one, one in which personal habits or private interests and character are alone or chiefly concerned, the punishment should be private, or alone between the offender and the party offended, or the representative of such party.

The additional reasons for private punishment are, 1st: The offender is more susceptible to reformatory influences. He is more readily reached and subdued, since the sympathy and support of wicked companions are removed and his pride or stubbornness is more readily subdued. 2d. He is also saved the disgrace and mortification of suffering in the presence of companions, which often hardens more than it chastens and subdues; and 3d, in cases where counsel and advice, and even sympathy, are necessary, as it certainly will be in all cases, they are more easily given and more readily received.

The danger to be avoided in reprimands, public or private, is a querulous, fault-finding spirit on the part of the teacher or parent, which often amounts to scolding, threatening or gratuitous and vindictive abuse of the offender. No teacher or parent has any moral or even legal right to take advantage of his position to vent his spite or anger upon a comparatively defenseless child. It is both cowardly and mean, and, hence, devoid of all reformatory influence. Many a spirited child has been driven into ways of wickedness by this abuse of authority on the part of the minister of justice (?)

No indignities or insults, or base allusions to parentage or position in life, should be offered childhood; and the appeals should be made, as in all other cases, to the higher moral motives first. To insult a man under any circumstances, is mean and inexcusable; but to insult a child has a species of cowardly meanness about it which excels all ordinary offenses.

(b) *Corporal Punishment* may be resorted to in cases of willful stubbornness, or of active rebellion, and in cases where the milder measures seem to fail. The infliction of bodily pain for purposes of reform, or as a check upon the progress of social disorder, is justifiable; and when administered in the proper spirit, it involves no indignity that may not itself be used as a moral reformer. It should never be used, therefore, while either party is under the influence of anger or any undue excitement, unless in case of assault or active rebellion. Both parties should be as calm and considerate as possible. Neither should corporal or any other punishment be administered from motives of malice, revenge or in a spirit of retaliation. The same spirit should prevail in the performance of this duty that should govern us in any other serious matter. The greater the wisdom and patience the greater the success.

But many suppose that when the rod is invoked, reason and moral sense may be laid aside; and in the heat of passion that often prevails, both the voice of conscience and of common sense are stifled. It is practically a vulgar fight, in which the stronger party wins, and is permitted to glut his vengeance upon a helpless child—*shame!* This is fatal to all moral reform, and breeds either cringing cowardice, or a spirit of rebellion that sometimes takes vengeance upon the offending party after many days.

There is no duty the teacher or parent will ever be called upon to perform, that demands greater care, wisdom,

patience and self-control, than the infliction of corporal punishment. Talk about moral suasion, there is as much moral suasion in a switch wisely wielded, as in any other mere means of correction, and much more than in the poisonous vituperations of an unruly tongue, even though the former may not be "wisely wielded."

But the rod of correction should be used in the same spirit in which the skillful surgeon uses his knife in the amputation of a limb, or the removal of a tumor. The moral evils inflicted by the indiscriminate and promiscuous use of the rod, are greater by far than in a similar use of the surgeon's knife. The one may destroy animal tissue and human life, the other the moral sentiments and human character. The greatest consideration, candor and sympathy, as to time, place, amount and manner, in the use of the rod, must be exercised in order to make it effective as a moral reformer, and to guard it against abuse, or else let it be abandoned altogether.

There are other forms of corporal punishment that are resorted to by some who are anxious to escape the supposed odium of the use of the rod, that are far more objectionable. Some of these are full of indignity and others are both cruel and dangerous. They should all be avoided. Their moral influences are without merit; and some are absolutely hurtful both to mind and body.

Again, the infliction of pain as a means of moral reform can not be consistently controverted. It is nature's method, and is very ancient. It is simply following out the law of consequences, or cause and effect. Suffering is nature's penalty for infraction of her laws, that she guards so jealously. It is the result of disobedience everywhere, and its lessons are salutary, if heeded.

Pain is a natural reformer: it is also a moral reformer; and there are cases of natural disorder and of moral cor-

ruption so deep seated and dangerous, that nothing but the surgeon's knife—to use a figure—can remove them. The suffering therefore must be accepted, both as a penalty for violated law, and as a means of cure and reformation.

The infliction of pain as a means of moral reform and growth has the sanction not only of nature, but of custom and law. The whole scheme of government is based upon the theory of rewards for obedience, and punishments for disobedience; and no amount of tinkering can ever change the fixed principles upon which the custom is founded. The different kinds of punishments must, therefore, be studied, and their peculiarities adjusted to the nature and demands of the disorders to be removed, and the growth required.

The main objection to the use of the rod seems to be in the wrong spirit in which it is used; and we might add in the excess, or the deficiency. It should always be thorough and as infrequent as possible; but in cases of protracted and deep-seated evils, it may be continued at intervals from day to day, scientifically applied, not excessively, until the cure is effected.

The last class of punishments appropriate to school life considered in this connection, may be stated as follows:

(c.) *Dismissals*, including suspensions and expulsions. They are both doubtful as means of individual reformatory measures, and should be resorted to only when the danger or damage incurred by continuing the offender in his connection with the school, is greater than the separation would prove to either the offender or the school. The individual or member should be sacrificed rather than that the whole body perish. And when the danger of the offender's doing more injury to the school or himself is greater than would probably result from his separation

from it, then the safety of the community or the school and the sanctity of the law, all demand that the offending portion of said community be removed, on the same principle that a cancer or a gangrened limb should be removed, in order to preserve the body, and restore wonted soundness.

As for the reformation of the offender, in this case, the chances are not great; but no less perhaps than would exist were he left in undisturbed possession of his place and opportunities; but greater perhaps in suspension than in expulsion, since the opportunity to return is held out in the former, and denied in the latter. The return, of course, is dependent upon, at least, a promise of reformation. It amounts to a simple trial, in which the offender is put upon his good behavior for a time. But expulsion is considered final separation without a hope of return. The chances for reformation in such case are very much diminished. In some cases, however, the shock has been so great as to awaken manhood, and to start the offender on a career of reformation; but the general tendency is to drive him farther and farther from such a course.

The foregoing embody the main appeals that may be used for preserving order, and for reforming offenders. They may all be regarded as strictly moral if properly applied, *i. e.*, their influence upon the mind and heart is such as to improve the morals, unless, indeed, they are perverted and turned aside by awkwardness, or by wrong application of some kind.

There are other forms of punishments and other incentives, perhaps, but they partake more or less of the foregoing lists.

The moral effects of punishments must not be lost sight of, nor yet confounded with merely vindictive measures. They should be simple aids to what are termed milder

means, or those made use of for mere purposes of protection and conservation. If punishments are used in connection with other rational means for correction, reproof and reformation, their salutary effects will be more than doubled. But if used as mere retaliation or even to satisfy the demands of a broken law (but more frequently to gratify ill temper), they are not only useless as moral means, but hurtful. Let them be wisely considered.

The following are a few conclusions drawn from the foregoing, and may be helpful to the student of morals, especially to teachers who have not had time to study the whole subject.

1. Never give a command or make an order that will likely be disobeyed ; for the breaking of a law both weakens its force, and degrades the source of authority.

2. Say as little as possible about some particular vices, for often they would never be thought of, were they not mentioned either to condemn or to prohibit.

3. Let all orders be given in the form of requests ; for true politeness always wins respect, even against the will of an enemy. Every man can afford to be a gentleman.

4. Do not make a code of rules prohibiting certain vices, and attaching penalties for infraction, for there is a tendency in human nature to venture on forbidden ground, to test and experiment with vice, and to resist that which hampers it.

5. Treat every child as though he were honest, and pure, and good, until he proves himself otherwise, which is not likely to happen, unless his conditions are bad ; for children are apt to be what we take them to be, good or bad.

6. Improve the surroundings of children as much as

possible; for much of their early thought and act and habit arises from environment.

7. Win the confidence, respect, esteem and love of every child, if possible (and it is); for love wins where everything else fails; and instruction, however excellent, fails to find a healthy lodgment in a mind filled with hate, or closed to the impulses of kindness.

8. Do not openly suspect evil when good is possible; and then be slow to believe evil reports, or any evidences of evil. Look for good and it will come; search for evil, and it will be found—sometimes where least expected.

9. Always appeal to the higher motives first, and resort to punishments only when other appeals to moral sense have all failed.

10. Never punish in anger; for he who loses his temper, loses his moral force, and must needs re-inforce himself with doubtful expedients in order to win. It is base and cowardly to inflict pain to gratify resentment or to intimidate the weak.

11. Always have some employment planned to keep children busy—the pleasanter the better—for while “an empty head is the devil’s workshop, idle brains and idle fingers are the tools he works with.”

12. Cultivate the virtues, and the vices will die for want of nourishment. Fight them with hatred or malice, and they will grow from affinity to native forces.

13. Say but little, and let example tell the whole story of moral instruction; for example is stronger than precept, and the force of instruction is improved by loving works.

Hence little is said in the following pages concerning morals or immorals, directly or indirectly, outside the ordinary instruction and teaching; or about the vices and extravagances of human life and weakness, believing the

human mind can best be disposed to virtue by employing all its energies in the pursuit of good, and in the presentation and investigation of the truths of science and literature, the study of noble lives and labors, and in the doing of those things that go to make up the great book of human life.

Hence again, in the teaching of the sciences themselves, and in those intimate relations begotten between teacher and pupil while in the pursuit of a common object, and the enthusiasm arising therefrom, we shall seek for those strong and enduring moral forces that must elevate the human mind and heart.

To aid in the further study of the foregoing topics, or those treated in the last two chapters, we present a brief outline or analysis of the incentives to obedience. These may be taken up by the school, *seriatim*, and discussed by teacher and pupils, allowing the full play of thought and deduction to both.

The chief business of a book of instruction is not to do the thinking for the pupils, but to set them thinking for themselves. Original thoughts are always better for educational purposes than borrowed ones, even though they may not be quite so complete.

INCENTIVES TO OBEDIENCE.	Voluntary.	Appeals to purely Domestic Feelings and Impulses,....	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A disposition in children to please parents, teachers, etc. 2. A willingness to sacrifice self-interest for public good. 3. A desire to do good to all mankind. 4. A willingness to suffer for the good of enemies. 5. A desire to do right for right's sake. <p>NOTE.—While these reach out to the world, they all have their origin in the home.</p>
		Appeals to Social Feelings and Impulses.....	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A desire for happiness through intercourse and affection. 2. A desire for material advantages, gains, etc. 3. A desire for mutual improvement, refinement, culture, etc. 4. A desire for place and standing, usefulness. 5. A desire for mutual gains, possessions, etc.
		Appeals to Self-love —Personal Pride.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Self-respect, manly dignity, regard for character. 2. Respect for others; the good opinion of others. 3. Ambitious rivalry in class, grade or society. 4. A love of approbation or praise in school; in society. 5. The use and abuse of percentages and monthly reports, etc. 6. Rewards of merit and prizes.
	Involuntary.	Denials and Restraints.....	<p>Natural rights and privileges.</p> <p>Acquired rights and privileges.</p> <p>Confinement.</p> <p>Separation.</p>
		Direct Punishments	<p>Reprimands, private and public.</p> <p>Corporal punishments.</p> <p>Suspensions.</p> <p>Expulsions, etc.</p>

NOTE.—Let the list be extended by the learner.

CHAPTER X.

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE, ART, LITERATURE AND
LEARNING, AS INSTRUMENTS OF REFINEMENT AND MORAL POWER.

This subject has already been alluded to under "The Genesis and Classification of Sciences," Chapter II, and it only remains now to state a few propositions in support of the theories there advanced, and to point out some other relations in the *order* and manner in which these sciences may be used. The value of methods will be reserved for another chapter.

Proposition I.—In science itself, as a body of truth, there resides a refining and elevating power, which beyond doubt or question, is intended for the moral as well as intellectual elevation of man.

But we are met with this objection at the outset of this argument, namely, that neither individuals nor nations renowned for scientific research and intellectual refinement, have always excelled in moral elevation, and that morals have not uniformly kept pace with learning. This, doubtless, is true, but not to the extent claimed by some; and in all instances where the discrepancies between intellectual refinement and moral culture are great, they may be accounted for on the ground of derangement instead of harmony in the systems of instruction, and consequently in minds and in morals. Nothing different or better could be expected in accordance with the existing laws of cause and effect. Indeed, the greater wonder is that man has escaped as untarnished as he is. Imperfection or want of harmony and adaptation in the machinery—to use a figure—must produce imperfection in the product or result, however good and pure the raw material may be.

As far as ancient nations are concerned, the sciences themselves, many of them, and of the most important ones, too, were as yet imperfectly known; and those well known were pushed both in improper directions, and to an unwonted extent, as pure science, while their just applications to human needs, or as aids to man's moral elevation, either as supplying his common wants or higher culture, were neglected entirely; instance the science of astronomy as imperfectly known, and chemistry, geography and geology, botany, natural philosophy and the more useful laws of mechanics; and as sciences and arts comparatively useless, instance geometry as then known, and the art of embalming, etc.; and of misdirected sciences, as in architecture, sculpture, the one devoted to the erection of monstrous pyramids, the other to colossal images instead of railways and bridge building, and the more useful arts of agriculture and manufactures, etc.

Man, therefore, in his moral nature suffered, because of the neglect, or the perversion of his better nature, and that too, just in the ratio of his departure from the true purposes of knowledge; while, under the more rational applications of modern science and art, witness the many improvements in modes of living, the important discoveries and useful inventions of modern times compared with the boasted arts of the ancients.

And the individual discrepancies may be accounted for in a similar manner. Men's physical and intellectual natures were developed in a disproportionate way, as compared with his moral nature, hence the latter suffered in a corresponding degree. But this must not be attributed to the sciences themselves or to great learning, but to their improper use, from which use the nations, in this age, have hardly yet escaped. Nothing better can be expected where science is pursued for so unworthy purposes, even at the

present time. The purposes were not only misjudged, but misused.

To illustrate: (1) Great virtue may reside in medicine, rightly compounded and skillfully used; but, wrongly compounded and unskillfully applied, it becomes a curse instead of a blessing. (2) That great nourishment may reside in food, but that it may not only be lost, but rendered poisonous by improper preparations, or by injudicious eating; yet no one would condemn the medicine or eschew the food, because of wanton abuse. (3) Great fertility may reside in the soil; yet ignorance of this property, or want of skill to cultivate it to produce crops, must not be taken as evidence of utter poverty.

It is precisely so in the acquisition of useful knowledge. It may serve a grand and noble purpose, or it may prove a source of moral corruption and degeneracy. But the integrity of the proposition is still maintained, since we know that the legitimate use of knowledge, and the uniform tendency of science and learning, rightly applied, are to elevate the mind and body alike, and hence the moral nature, else why pursue these sciences at all?

Proposition II.—The functions of the mind are to *think*, to *feel*, to *will*, through its faculties. These are so balanced in man's normal state, that they mutually aid one another in all the departments of thinking, feeling and willing.

This scarcely needs a proposition, and certainly no demonstration, to make it apparent, since common experience and all processes of thinking attest its truthfulness. It is about equivalent to saying the function of the eye is to see, the ear to hear, or the wind to blow, the light to shine, etc. But this balance in the mind is, nevertheless, overlooked in our courses of study; and hence we realize but a partial result in the education of the child.

Proposition III.—Through functional activity the mind grows and acquires its greatest strength and purity.

This also is a generally accepted truth. Whatever exercises in a lawful way, strengthens and improves. This is a law of growth. But the question might arise, does it grow in all proper directions, unless special pains are taken in these several directions? We reply:

Proposition IV.—That the sciences themselves and the problems of life to which they all apply, furnish the subjects of thought and activity of body and mind in the proper degree and quality. The proper adjustment of these problems, with due opportunities, furnish man with the best conditions for his education.

Proposition V.—The higher, purer, and the more practical these problems to which the sciences apply, the more exalted, pure and practical become the mind and body of man. These sciences and problems of life are set for man's exaltation; and to attempt to exalt one part of man, to the neglect or at the expense of another, injures the whole man. Hence, to bring him to his best estate is to educate him as a unit, in unity; *and exercise educates.*

Proposition VI.—Whatever improves the mind intellectually in the highest degree healthily, also improves it morally in the same manner and degree. The connections are so close and inseparable in their natural relations, that the moral and intellectual powers grow as it were from sympathy with each other. The one can not grow lawfully, and to its best estate, without calling forth corresponding growth in the other; otherwise man becomes a contradiction in himself, and his true education is thwarted.

This may not be apparent until we take into consideration the kind or quality of the growth or improvement. The mind is created with susceptibilities and capacities.

These are capable of receiving certain impressions, and of acquiring certain growth and enlargement. These again become, as it were, secondary or acquired faculties, interchangeable in their relations. The mind thinks, feels and wills as a whole, not as parts. It is a unit making use of these faculties or powers, as the organist makes use of the several keys and stops, in order to produce harmony. A discord in one sets all ajar; while the harmony of the whole depends upon the strength and purity of each individual tone.

The three grand faculties of the mind, as a thinking, feeling and willing agent, must all be put in motion at the same time, but not necessarily in the same degree. Owing to the character of the united movement, sometimes thought, sometimes feeling or emotion, and sometimes volition prevails in force or activity. This produces the harmony required, with characteristic predominance of quality, both unity and variety, all of which produces the required growth.

These faculties and their appropriate functions exist as interdependent; and any derangement or lack of harmonious accord in the one is readily transmitted to all the others. Right education, which is the result of legitimate exercise of these powers, gives greatest tone and most perfect harmony to the whole. It may also restore lost harmony and power, since the growth of these powers may throw off temporary derangement, and develop strength. The moral powers therefore grow correspondingly, since they sympathize with the intellectual and physical, at every stage of growth.

Proposition VII.—Science or knowledge is that upon which the powers of the mind are legitimately exercised. It has all the elements of refinement and growth in its several departments; therefore, science in its broadest

sense, and art, literature and learning stand as the great instruments of culture, and for the elevation of mind and morals. The higher, therefore, the departments, the higher the mind ascends; and the broader the culture, the more unselfish the soul; and this process may go on until that broad charity which must eventually end all differences that now divide and distract mortals, shall cover all man's moral and spiritual defects with that great mantel of universal love.

Proposition VIII.—Education, therefore, in its broadest sense, includes all growth both of soul and body, the development of power from the capacities resident in man. [See Moral Sense, Chap. I, p. 13.]

This education must, therefore, necessarily reach man's moral nature, or it is defective in some of its phases, since this moral nature is an inseparable part of man, considered physically, organically and historically. All instruction and teaching, from the earliest period of man's growth until the latest, must conform to these laws of growth, or derangements of various kinds ensue at some or all these points of development.

Proposition IX.—All instances of failure to develop man's moral nature in harmony with his intellectual and physical nature, in this large and liberal sense, can be accounted for on the principle of some departure from these laws of growth, at some point in his present or past history. And the departure from this true course, or the infringement of the law in one department, involves all the others, directly or indirectly: and this is precisely the state in which we find man to day: *i. e.* Whatever weakness or derangement we find in him, and the consequent working out of evil of any kind, are all accounted for on the ground of *disobedience to law*; therefore,

Proposition X.—Harmonize man's educational pro-

cesses, conforming them strictly to law, and you counteract the evils from their sources, and secure the healthiest growth possible, in all his powers, intellectually, physically, morally. This gives the healthiest and highest culture possible to man in every relation in life, and is unparalleled in its moral force; *i. e.*,

Proposition XI.—Liberalize education ; make it broad enough to cover man all over, soul and body; make it deep enough to reach the uttermost depths of his depravity and derangement, and high enough to invite his loftiest aspirations, and you harmonize all antagonisms, and exalt him to his highest station in life as a MAN. Leave out any element or force, and you cripple him, and he MAY become a MONSTER that no merely moral or physical force can grapple with successfully. His destiny must then be determined by forces beyond mere human control. Hence, in conclusion.

Proposition XII.—This broad, true, thorough education, that implies all mental, moral, physical and spiritual growth, invokes all instruments of instruction and teaching (for teaching means more than mere instruction) all mental, moral and spiritual forces vouchsafed to man in his present state of existence.

Man has always suffered in his three-fold nature, from the abuse of either one or two, or all three of these departments of the great machinery of human life : At least this may be said of him as far back as we are acquainted with his history. And if we assume that his primal state was one of purity and perfection, and that he lost these by disobedience and sin, may we not assume with equal security, that this primal state, or its equivalent, may be restored by obedience and the helps vouchsafed man in his present state? Let us at least restore the original and intended order, as we understand it, in the working of this

complex machinery man, and we shall introduce health and harmony in all his movements, and growth in all his lawful directions. This a matter of experience and history as well as of learning and philosophy.

CHAPTER XI.

THE VALUE OF METHODS OF TEACHING AS INSTRUMENTS FOR REFINING AND ELEVATING MAN.

However much may be done in the way of moral culture, and moral elevation of man by scientific association, and the refinements growing out of knowledge and general culture, yet the strongest, safest and most economical methods for teaching morals in the schools, or for developing and strengthening moral qualities and sentiments in childhood and youth, in connection with the foregoing, are through the orderly and systematic teaching of the ordinary sciences, as we find them used in our best schools. It both saves much valuable time, and secures greater success. But why? The main reasons are the following:

1. *It is the spirit of the teacher that evokes those moral forces from the sciences, or branches of study, and makes them effective in building substantial moral character in the pupil.* Without this spirit of the teacher, it were impossible to reach the highest culture. Mr. Emerson must have had this truth in mind when he said: "The spirit only can teach. Not any profane man, not any sensual, not any liar, not any slave can teach: but only he can give who has; he only can create who is. The man on whom the soul descends, through whom the soul speaks, alone can teach. Courage, piety, love, wisdom can teach;

and every man may open door to these angels, and they shall bring him the gift of tongues. But the man who aims to speak as books enable, as synods use, as fashion guides, and as interest commands, babbles. *Let him hush.*"

Here we have the spirit of true teaching. It is no uncommon occurrence, in the experience of the learner, to be suddenly awakened to some remarkable facts, or extraordinary beauties in learning by the apt illustrations, or the great earnestness of the teacher while under the rapt influence of the spirit of prophecy or teaching—for they are much the same.

Aside from the constant companionship, and intimate communion with pupils while dealing with the truths of science, and thus opening up to their expanding minds, the wonders that lie hidden in them, and in the refinements of learning, which are like the gentle dews and warm sunshine to the opening flowers; the very fact that the teacher can watch this growth, and direct it, and shape it into proper forms, are considerations of the first importance. And then again, the process of imparting truth, as we find it recorded in scientific knowledge, is in itself a moral force of no mean proportions. In fact it can be made one of the strongest in the whole category of moral influences.

But mark: these truths must be so imparted as to be understood and felt by the learner. *They must address the understanding and sensibilities as well as the perception and memory*, or like seed scattered upon the unprepared soil, they fail to germinate and grow. Their moral, and much of their intellectual force are lost if they fail to be thoroughly comprehended and felt. [See Apprehension and Comprehension, p. 115.]

We venture the assertion—and it may appear a little

extravagant—that more deception, fraud, hypocrisy and absolute falsehood, distorted and inefficient thinking that breeds contempt for truth and authority, and indifference to the true, the beautiful and the good, are engendered in the minds of children by careless and inefficient teaching, superficial study and recitation than by any other influence that belongs to the mere school. Indeed the above faults constitute the main difference between good teaching, and that which distorts truth, belittles science and fills the world with inefficiency and fraud; and this applies to families and churches as well as to schools. In fact, it applies to teaching everywhere.

2. *There must be a clear and comprehensive understanding of the subject matter of the science taught, both by the teacher and pupil, and the teacher first, in order to derive all the moral forces from it.* Often this moral force is crippled or killed by awkwardness and inefficiency. Is it any wonder then, that we have awkward and inefficient scholarship, and inefficient morals? They exist, too, in about the same degree. They have a common origin and a common end: And we may add, a common cure: for he who teaches science well, because of the necessary, and inherent moral force in the clear and thorough comprehension of truth, teaches morals well. It feeds the moral nature as bread feeds the body. It revives the drooping plants of virtue, as sunlight and shower revive the face of nature.

But mark: both the nature of the truth, and the force with which it is applied, must be taken into the account. There are some truths that have comparatively slight bearing upon human conduct and life; and others again, of startling importance. Those that relate to our intercourse with our fellow men, and to our spiritual growth and well-fare, are among the latter: and the force with which their

obligations may be brought to bear upon the mind and heart of the learner, must be measured by their importance. An earnest belief in these truths by one's self, and a life conforming thereto, will add the greater force and value to them.

To illustrate: The real nourishment of the plant may reside in the soil, and yet the plant may wither and die for the want of it. It needs the moisture to dissolve, and the sunlight to absorb, before healthy growth can go on. The one represents sympathy, the other love. They are living, moral forces in and of themselves. It is the giving out of these, through the channels of truth, that warms and vivifies the moral nature. The living presence and soul of the teacher, filled with a knowledge of the truth, are the awakening forces.

The real nourishment of the soul may reside in the truth, undissolved (not understood in its special bearings), unprepared to give out its nourishment and strength, until dissolved by the understanding and skill of the teacher through sympathy, and absorbed by the love of the truth, and deposited in the body, intellectual and moral, of the pupil, as the plant appropriates *its* nourishment.

But many subjects of science are so superficially taught that both the moral and intellectual forces are lost; and the losing of the one implies, at least, the impairing of the other. Undigested food is certain, not only to be lost, as a means of growth, but actually to impair and weaken the organism, infect its surroundings, and produce disease instead of growth; so undigested knowledge, or that which is imperfectly understood, especially if left too long in that condition, is sure, not only to lose its vitalizing forces, its nourishment for building up sound moral character, but is also liable continually to impair the mechanism of the mind, and to infect other contiguous knowledge.

The memory acts with the greatest vigor and tenacity upon those things that are well understood, since they make the deepest impression upon the mind ; and to remember well, in most cases, is only to have understood well. The office of memory, therefore, is at least twofold ; first, to receive and retain those things that are well understood, or, to receive them by understanding them ; and, second, to hold in trust those things that are imperfectly understood, until the understanding has had time to master them thoroughly and the mind to absorb them ; but if still not understood, still undigested, unappropriated, then they are removed, like other encumbrances, as useless matter ; they are forgotten, that room may exist for things that may receive better treatment from this digestive and assimilating apparatus—the memory, understanding and judgment.

The difference between mere *apprehension*, as a mental act, and its more profound associate, *comprehension*, is simply this : the former merely sees a fact or principle more or less clearly ; while the latter understands it more or less perfectly. The one may glide into the other, the one is necessarily the complement of the other, in complete thinking.

To illustrate further : the former merely seizes (apprehends) the fact, or principle as the eagle seizes the prey, and conveys it to a convenient place of safety (the memory) ; the latter, after seizing it, and transporting it to its convenient place, proceeds at once to devour it (comprehends it), surrounds it, as it were, by himself, that it may enter into, and become a part of himself. So, the mind, when it thoroughly comprehends, not only receives and retains the impression, but proceeds to appropriate the facts and principles, making them a part of the intellectual furniture and moral power.

Now, many pupils are satisfied with mere apprehension—seizing the prey—and holding it, as it were on the claw of memory, without appropriating it to its intended uses, until the impression decays or fades away, and the thing is forgotten. No nourishment is derived therefrom till the mind devours it, comprehends it, assimilates it; and until it becomes a part of the intellectual and moral fibre.

Hence, let these two mental operations, apprehension and comprehension, proceed in their logical order, and the intellect, sensibility and will shall all be strengthened thereby, and this harmony will produce the strongest and safest moral growth; but the moral growth from mere apprehension as an act, and mere memory as an act, can never be sound and healthy.

3. *All learning begets pleasure in proportion to the quality and quantity of the knowledge acquired; provided always the mind and body are in a healthy condition.* The pleasure is also in the ratio of sound thinking and thorough comprehension; since these operations produce growth in a legitimate way, for growth of this kind is always accompanied by pleasure. Displeasure arises from derangement either in the faculties themselves, or in the conditions whereby action is induced; sometimes in over-action—though seldom—but more frequently in want of action—from misdirected study, from want of understanding, and sometimes from a confusion of thought incident upon a wrong presentation of facts; and again from a too great accumulation of facts without coherency. But it may always be assumed that sound study and sound acquisition go hand in hand, and are always sources of pleasure when rightly conducted.

This fact has been questioned by some who have confounded study or thinking with mere memorizing, or excessive apprehension without comprehension. This is

mere drudgery, both mental and physical, and the powers, without their proper stimuli, soon tire, and sometimes give out entirely. Sound thinking is always invigorating, since it involves the healthy activity and growth of the faculties. Hence all study and all acquisition that do not involve this harmonious and healthy activity, and consequent sound growth, may be set down as spurious, and it should be avoided.

4. *All true moral growth is accompanied by a pleasing elevation of thought and purpose, even though accompanied by physical suffering*; and it may be assumed that, no pleasure, no growth or elevation. The pleasure may not be immediate, however; neither is it always of an exhilarating character; and sometimes the growth is the result of deep affliction and sorrow. But these are the sources of growth, and not the growth itself; but the moral elevation is the same, and is sure to follow, and is sometimes of the purest and most exalted character. Virtue will prove its own reward, whether it require sacrifice and suffering, or prosperity and rejoicing.

5. Growth and elevation in all departments of nature, are accompanied by a degree of pleasure, proportionate to the nature of the object, and the kind of growth. Even vegetation shows signs of enjoyment, and even delight. *All true growth is upward and outward from a common center, where rest the life forces, and whence springs the pleasure.*

Witness the springing grass, the swelling bud and opening flower; they seem to laugh with delight, as they lift themselves to the sunlight, and shed their sweet odors to the breeze. And the nodding grain and bending boughs lift their great glad burdens of wealth to man, with a pleasing joy.

Much more, then, does animal life and growth give

evidences of pleasure. Witness the joy and delight of the animal world, in its gambols over the meadows and through the vales, the merry song of birds, and the still more hilarious shout of childhood. And the higher we ascend in the scale of being, the greater the manifestations of pleasure accompanying the growth. Hence, mental enjoyments are greater than the merely animal, and the moral more than the merely intellectual and physical. "All growth is upward," and approximates the perfect in form, proportion, strength, utility and beauty.

But some will doubtless remind us here, as in the cases of deep affliction alluded to, that "There is no excellence without great labor." True, but does it follow that labor is not a pleasure? On the contrary, it is one of the highest enjoyments to all, except to the sick, feeble, or incorrigibly lazy; and even to such it may become a remedy for the disease.

Man was made to labor, intellectually, physically, morally; and his highest happiness depends upon his following in the line of his appointed work. But we must distinguish, as before hinted, between legitimate work for man and mere drudgery. And then there is a just balance to be observed between the merely physical labor and the purely mental and moral. If these distinctions are properly observed, the pleasure is proportionately enhanced and the growth correspondingly great.

But the true excellence spoken of in our maxim usually comes after the labor, and as a reward for labor; and this comes also more surely as the result of growth. It is the ripening of the grain, the full fruitage preparatory to the harvest. It may be the ingathering after a life of toil and thought, the full exercise of all the united powers of body and mind.

Many of us can testify that the pleasures of the pursuit

of knowledge are as great, if not greater, than the possession of it. The excellence and exalted pleasure of developing power sometimes even exceeds the mere joy of possession.

But human knowledge has not fulfilled its earthly mission, and teaching or imparting it, its full cup of pleasure, until it is applied to its wonted uses, in the arts and industries of the human family. This use is in perfect harmony with its mission as a refiner of the affections and sentiments of the human heart. The one is utilitarian, the other æsthetic; and for all human purposes the one is incomplete without the other.

Man himself is elevated and refined even while intelligently supplying his own personal wants, since this also is more fully done by working for the good of others. This, too, is a law of nature that always compensates her intelligent laborers; and the chief reason that neither the purely utilitarian idea of knowledge, nor yet the purely æsthetic, accomplishes its entire mission in elevating man, is because these two uses have been hitherto so widely separated.

But just how much of the utilitarian features of knowledge can be illustrated and practiced in the schools depends upon the opportunities, and upon the wisdom and skill of the teacher. Most schools, however, are supplied with a sufficient amount of apparatus and other appliances, to show how knowledge of the physical sciences and many of the mechanic arts, may be applied to the industries of the age. But the main thing is the skill and tact of the teacher. These will do more than mere apparatus and laboratories, in supplying this need. If the teacher's heart is really imbued with a genuine love for his work, his hand will soon acquire skill; and if he have even an ordinary genius he will soon arouse a corresponding

enthusiasm among his pupils. And this is the sum of all excellence in teaching, or in any work. He who believes in his work is most likely to succeed; and he who sets the world a-thinking is greater than a king: for mind once awakened, once disenthralled and put upon the highway of thought, is sure to throttle some ancient error or to develop some new truth, whereby the world is helped on in its moral and intellectual progress.

Here is moral elevation that will last. It is a natural growth. It gives strength and durability. It stops not with mere precepts, creeds and catechisms, leaving the heart and life untouched, unaltered, unimproved. It enters into the very feeling and fibre of human nature and human conduct, growing with their growth, broadening, deepening, refining and sublimating them, instead of narrowing them down to the mere formulæ of human doctrines.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MORAL FORCE OF INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION.

But one of the most direct and practical ways in which to illustrate and enforce the uses of human knowledge as a means of moral elevation, and to conserve the wasting energies of human nature, and at the same time to acquire a practical acquaintance with the arts and common industries, is through the "*Manual Training Schools*" that have recently grown up to meet this evident want in our present system of popular education. And although this feature has but recently been brought into prominence, and consequently has not yet had time to find its true form and place in our schools, it nevertheless has acquired such

a firm hold upon the good sense of the people that we may safely predict that "it has come to stay," in some form.

Its clear logical necessity, and its evident adaptability to the present condition of our industrial affairs, give clear and indubitable indications of final success: and I look upon it as a highly probable solution to the much vexed problem of labor and capital. Their true relations have never yet been practically and satisfactorily determined and maintained, probably never will be until we reorganize our entire system of popular education. They certainly never can be until we educate both on the same plane, and from the same basis of social standing, looking to the mutual benefits of each. Educate labor, and you not only make it more efficient, but more honorable. Neglect this, and you not only weaken and degrade it, but place it at such evident disadvantage that capital will impose upon it, making such demands upon it, that it cannot comply with, and live. Educate * capital, and you take away its arrogant and dishonest characteristics, and reveal to it its true mission, which is, as far as possible, to distribute labor and its just rewards, among the entire population, without regard to cast or any condition whatever, except as a matter of fitness and probable choice.

Labor of different kinds, as has been shown, is a clear necessity, not only that one class of man's wants may be supplied, but that all may be better supplied, and not only that all these wants may be better supplied, but that man may grow into the very image and being of what he was intended to be in the first place; and into that relation to environment, most favorable to growth and perfection.

* What we mean by the word "Educate" in this connection is not mere enlightenment and enlargement of its scope, but the turning of it in its proper channels.

These things he can not do without the exercise of all the native powers he possesses, physical and mental.

The reasons for these conclusions are founded in the very nature of things. Man was evidently planned for labor with hand, head and heart. These representing his three distinct natures : and in this he most assuredly finds his highest development and greatest happiness. All conspire to this end. Labor is the grand conservator of all human energy and human progress. The neglect of it as certainly entails decrepitude and deterioration and final destruction, as obedience to the laws of labor produces strength and refinement ; and these blessings or curses fall first upon those particular parts of man's nature neglected: *i. e.* physical neglect begets physical weakness, and intellectual neglect begets intellectual weakness and imbecility, and moral neglect, moral weakness and degeneracy; but the neglect and consequent degeneracy of any one reflects upon both the others, and aggravates all the evils of the whole.

This is also a law of Nature; and she is ever jealous of the rights of her children, and of the good things they inherit at her hands. If they are abused, they are either taken from them or allowed to perish with them. She does her best to remove all obstructions from the path of progress. If the hand or foot is injured slightly, for instance, she immediately sets about repairing the damage, if permanently, or if so confined as to prevent legitimate use, nature not only mercifully withholds nourishment from these parts, but does her best to remove the useless member, little by little, because it is in the way. She tolerates no nuisances, but encourages all useful growth. Her forces are all friendly, permanent and true to the best interests of the individual and the race. When either vegetable or animal matter has served its purposes, it decays and crumbles back to its original form or condi-

tion, as food for the oncoming life of other growth. As soon as it ceases to work in its appointed way, it ceases to live and grow, and when it ceases to live and grow, it is kindly removed to another sphere of existence.

The same is true of the human species in all relations of life. When man ceases to work, he ceases to be useful as a member of the body politic and social, and he at once commences a series of downward steps, that land him e'er long, at the bottom of the scale where his substance, if he have any, is absorbed by a new and better growth. Nature, true to her best instincts, removes him as an incumbrance or common nuisance, that others may have his room and opportunities. The world is one vast cycle; but every movement is generated by force and governed by law, and the tendency is always to a higher and better life. But nothing is accomplished without labor, or produced without an adequate force, or cause.

The same law prevails in man's commercial relations, and in the accumulation of wealth. When he or his posterity ceases to use his accumulations, or when he commences to abuse them, they are generally removed. Fortunately for us, however, in this country, our laws of inheritance, or the descent of property from father to son, are such as to prevent large accumulations of property, to remain long in the same family, idle, where it naturally breeds laziness, vice and imbecility. But even these would soon remove it, for they open channels for its disintegration, and absorption somewhere else. Large fortunes are always detrimental to morals, not only because they afford so many avenues of indulgence, but because they relieve man from that active exertion, necessary to the proper developement, unless indeed, he is well fortified by moral character.

It is, therefore, clear that man was made to labor in all

those directions in which he should grow; and it is equally clear that without this labor, this exertion, he can not grow into that harmonious, well-balanced being that nature designed he should be, and to which his necessities call him. The very fact that man is now, and perhaps always has been disposed to shirk duty, and thus escape his allotted work in the world, may account largely, not only for his past degeneracy, but in large measure for his present dereliction to duty; and these, together with his ambition and natural cupidity, will account largely for the deranged state of affairs in respect to labor and capital, and the like. And the only remedy at hand seems to be the restoration of these wonted relations, whereby man himself may be restored. In other words, we must educate *by* labor as well as *for* labor, as a means of man's moral restoration. And for the upbuilding of a healthy social status. This is an important matter.

When man learns, practically, that he can not thus shirk duty and live a healthy, happy and successful life; that labor develops, and that the development of any one department of his being requires a corresponding activity and development of every other part; and that to neglect one injures all the others, he will then have placed himself, theoretically, at least, in a position to reap the benefits of an education in harmony with his present and prospective interest.

The question now arises, is the present effort to establish "manual Training Schools," and other industrial features of education, in connection with our present system, a practical one?

We have shown that this industrial feature is in harmony with the law of man's nature and growth, *aye*, with his largest and best growth, soul and body: but is the present popular movement in this direction a practical

one? One which with such changes from time to time as experience and wisdom may suggest, shall meet the growing demands for a larger scope of education—one that shall better fit man for the constantly enlarged sphere in which he is destined to move?

Without attempting a full discussion of these questions or of the main one—for we think the present awakening of the public mind and interest upon this subject is sufficient to warrant sound conclusions in the end, without such discussion here—we answer yes, the project is eminently practical with such modifications of our present system and practices, as they will most readily and profitably admit, and with such additional expenditure of money as shall provide the necessary improvements in our buildings and other conveniences, to enable our people to carry on the experiment on a liberal scale. And this additional expenditure is also in harmony with our present progress in almost all other departments of labor. Witness the millions now expended in enterprises that only required thousands but a few years ago. And if these enterprises pay so liberally for the increased expenditure, why not try education on a larger scale? There is no other human interest that demands as much, or that promises larger returns, and I was about to add, there is no other in which men are so penurious. If education is the principal thing, then give it a fair chance. Let it be on a scale at least as liberal as any other, and as *all* others combined, and then we shall begin to realize liberal returns, for if the ends proposed by such a system are such as are claimed, and such as clearly appear, both from the nature of the improvement, and from the results already obtained from the limited experiments thus far, the merely increased expenditure will be as nothing in comparison.

Some of the reasons for the introduction of this new feature into our present system may be stated as follows:

1. Our present system, with all its excellencies, is not yet perfect, but, on the contrary, it is "behind the times," so to speak. By many it is claimed to be radically defective and unsatisfactory in many of its features and results. It is not up with the demands of the age. It was good in its time, and has brought the people to the opening of a new era of improvements, demanding something more than it now offers.

2. Our present system is not "ironclad." It is susceptible of improvements, such as are offered in the foregoing. As we now find it, it is the result of much thought, countless experiments and many improvements, some of which were, at the time of their first introduction, considered unwise innovations, but which time has shown to be both wise and necessary. Others have been found unnecessary, and have disappeared altogether, as witness the efforts in ancient times to make certain languages the only means of communication, etc.

3. Because, true to the instincts and customs of progress, a remedy for many existing defects and shortcomings has been discovered, or rather, has grown up under the necessities thrust upon us, in the industrial features of education alluded to, and whose results, as already shown, by limited, yet somewhat liberal experience, have seemed to meet these defects in a manner clearly to indicate final success.

Other reasons might be adduced; but we think they will readily occur to the learner. It will be necessary here, however, to notice two leading points clearly, in order to avoid confusion and mistake.

1. The kinds of work that can be most conveniently and profitably associated with our present system, courses of

study and customs in the schools with such alterations as shall rather improve than impair them, must be carefully considered.

2. A clear understanding of the objects to be secured, and the real intent of what some are pleased to call "A modern innovation," must be secured at all hazards.

First, then, as to *the kinds of labor best adapted to the present and prospective wants of our people or of any people*. A slight difference, therefore, may be made to suit the varieties of nations and peoples.

It will be seen, by reference to Chapter II, "The Genesis and Purposes of Knowledge and Science," and the classifications following, that the departments of science there given, are admirably adapted to the development of corresponding mental and moral qualities and habits in human nature; and that these, again, readily adapt themselves to the various degrees of advancement, and other peculiarities of the human mind.

It will be found also, on comparison, that the several departments of the industries and arts, arising from man's necessities and from the pursuit of these several branches of science, that they are equally diversified, and well adapted to human needs at the present time, and that by a wise forecast, they may meet every emergency and every want in the line of popular industries, and at the same time serve as educators of the race.

Now the school, if it really fulfills its mission, affords just opportunity for life preparation. Failing to do this, it fails in its main object. The work of the school-room, under these just opportunities, should be such as to best prepare for this life work. This is but imperfectly done under present circumstances and opportunities, owing to the largely theoretical character of the instruction in these schools and colleges.

True, this instruction has answered the purposes thus far, by its constantly improving character, bringing, so far as the schools have been efficient, the race up to a fair degree of development, on the part of many. But this constantly improving condition of the people demands correspondingly improved opportunities and processes, that the people, in the present and in the future also may be accommodated in their demands.

- Now the continual complaint coming up from the people, on a survey of the ranks of school life, are that this life preparation is but meagre and impractical, under our present system; and that pupils are obliged not only to learn a business after leaving school, but, in many instances, to learn their school lessons over again, in order to make them serviceable in their business; *i. e.*, the practical application of them to their work. These are evidences of defects and weaknesses somewhere in their line of learning. And while it is sometimes true that these complaints are ill-founded, and not to be taken as indications of real distress, or of defect, yet the circumstances, and
- the well-attested facts in these complaints, are of sufficient importance to warrant a suspicion, and to justify an examination into them.

The kinds of labor, therefore, should be such as to meet, as far as possible, the present and prospective wants of the pupil, not necessarily in the way of a trade, profession or employment, to be sure, but such as shall best fit him for entering upon any trade or profession or employment that may with care and judgment be selected for life. Some of this special work in the way of applications of learning to life duties, may be named here, as merely illustrative, but not necessarily exhaustive nor in the order in which they should be taught.

1. The training of the eye and the hand in their

mutual relations and adaptedness, as in moulding, drawing, drafting, carving in wood, metals, etc.

2. Exercises in those employments that look more to the useful trades and mechanic arts, as sawing, boring, planing, morticing, matching, cutting, nailing, etc.

3. Those relating to textile fabrics, as the manufacture or mending of clothing, cutting, fitting, sewing, cleaning, ironing, pressing, etc.

4. Those relating to the preparation and cooking of foods, as dressing, mixing, baking, boiling, roasting, frying, broiling, etc.

5. Those that relate to agriculture and gardening, where grounds and other conveniences may be had for illustrations or otherwise, as the preparation of soils, planting and raising grains, grasses, fruits, flowers, trees, garden plants, etc.

6. The rearing of stock, as sheep, cattle, horses, mules, pigs and poultry, etc.

7. Those employments relating to lands and tenements, as surveying, plotting, building, railroading, etc.

8. Manufacturing in wood, as furniture; in iron, as farm and household utensils; in brass, as machinery, ornamentation, etc.; in silver and gold, the same; in leather, as shoes, harness, etc.

9. Commerce and the professions might also receive attention if opportunity and necessity required.

And so every industry might receive such attention as shall constitute a preparation for entering upon any department thereof, where taste, interest or inclination may lead; and no arbitrary distinctions should be made in favor of, or in disfavor of, any employment for women; believing their good sense of the fitness of things will always lead them to choose employments in which they

can at least succeed, if not excel. The whole field of employments should be open to all alike.

Second : as to *the objects and intent of the work*. Much misapprehension, and consequently much irrelevant talk and writing, have been expended on this part of our subject. Some maintain that the main object and intention of the industrial school are to enable the pupil to learn a trade, and to graduate as an expert in some art or profession ; some maintain that the object is to make money to enable the pupil to defray his expenses while attending school ; others, again, maintain that the only object is to develop muscle, and to maintain good physical health, etc.

Now, while all these objects may be secured to a limited extent, and this, too, as a natural result of right methods and of obedience to law ; yet they are not the main objects to be attained, nor the main intentions of the industrial school. *But the main objects are the intellectual, moral and physical development of the pupil, in harmony with the laws of sound growth*, which thing can not be done to the full extent, or even to a safe extent, without scientific attention to these same laws of health and growth. These laws demand a reasonable share of physical labor during the periods of study and school training : And to say that this demand is satisfied outside of school life is simply saying what has never yet been done in one case in five hundred, and probably never will be done until intelligent provisions are made for this work in the schools themselves. And we have already shown that physical health and growth, as well as moral and intellectual well-being, all depend upon *a united, harmonious and simultaneous* action of all the faculties of the human being ; and at a period or periods in the life of the child when his health is in the most delicate condition, and when his habits and character are forming.

This is the most critical time in all the life of the student; hence it should be subjected to the most careful surveillance and the most rigid discipline. A false step here, a little neglect, a wrong combination of forces, will as surely tell in the general make-up of character, as mistakes anywhere in the complications and combinations of forces.

To illustrate by the use of a common figure: All the parts of a machine must move in harmony, under a full head of power, in order that it may do the best work, may endure the heaviest strain and last the longest. So in this complex machine we call man: in order that the best results may be obtained, the heaviest strain endured, and the greatest longevity attained, each part must move in harmony with every other part. And this does not preclude intervals of rest, change and recreation. These also are necessary, and are subject to law. They may become a blessing or a curse. They are parts, and necessary parts, of these educational forces. But the working forces are the main ones, and the others are mere fertilizers. And the increased health and vigor, the sharpening up, as it were, of all the physical, intellectual and moral appetites and powers, by this mutual interchange of life forces, begotten of obedience to law, will be such as to more than compensate for the supposed loss of time, either from work or play, which time, under other circumstances, is often spent in absolute idleness, or in dawdling with lessons that have become a mental drudgery, irksome and tasteless, and correspondingly useless as moral or intellectual food or inspiration to thought; and all because of these violations of the laws of growth.

When man shall have learned how to WORK—to work advantageously, intellectually, physically, morally, his proper education will have begun; and when this becomes

a fixed habit—a law governing all his conduct—that education will be assured. It will be, not only a matter of pleasure, but one of absolute certainty; for there is just work enough in the world, and of the proper kind, too, to educate every man, woman and child in it, this being the evident intention of work. Beyond this, and less than this, work becomes odious, disproportionate, disreputable and a drudgery. Under the inspiration of *work*, associated with *thought*, both are exalted, and man's environment will improve in the same ratio of his faculties; whereby both man and his environment, or the whole face of nature, animate and inanimate, shall be continually approximating that state of absolute perfection mentioned in Chapter I, Proposition VII and Corollaries 3 and 4, also Proposition VIII and Corollaries.

Education by work is the true doctrine. . . Hence the *intention* of industrial education is not that labor shall usurp learning; but that it shall aid it; that it shall not degrade it, but exalt it, even to its own intelligent exaltation. In short, that the highest intellectual and moral development can be reached only through so much physical labor as shall give the soundest bodily health, and the safest industrial habits.

Experience has also demonstrated, according to papers and reports from the manual training schools, already established in this country and in Europe, which represent, for the most part, only a few forms of general industry, that the purely intellectual education of the pupil is promoted every way by judicious exercise of the physical powers, in a scientific way, while pursuing the ordinary course of study. And why should it not be so promoted? It is not necessary that the physical energies of the young should be either weakened or wasted in inanity, or dissipated in debauchery, while pursuing a course of study.

This increase of power, where studies are associated with manual labor, is the natural result of obedience to the laws governing all growth; while the neglect of such exercise is disobedience; and each has its reward, the one in lawful growth, the other in suffering, to say nothing about the entailed inferiority, and ultimate death of faculties.

These reports tell us, also, that the pupils, where tests have been fairly made, not only keep up with their companions—those who do not work in the shops or elsewhere—in the class work, but often excel them; while, in addition, they escape the many temptations to idleness and dissipation so common in schools where all the time is not farmed out to useful employments and recreations of some kind.

Now, the moral effects of manual labor associated with study must be apparent to all. If there were no other benefits arising from physical culture, as developed in the manual training schools, or from the introduction of the industrial features of education in all our schools, from the kindergarten to the high school and college, than the mere acquisition of manual skill, it would be a valid argument in its favor. But when we consider that it not only utilizes physical energies in the production of useful labor and skill, but it cuts off a large share of that mischief, to counteract which constitutes a still larger share of the drudgery of modern teaching, and also establishes habits of industry and sobriety, it would seem that no further argument were necessary to bring about this much needed reform.

And then again: much of the dissipation and crime in society at large results directly or indirectly from a want of power or habit among young people to employ their time and energies pleasantly and profitably, after leaving

school. They either fall into ways of idleness and dissipation, because they find most places of profitable employment closed against them; or else they are obliged to commence a course of preparation for business after leaving school. Both of these alternatives are discouraging. The industrial schools would remedy these defects.

But when we add to all these moral and intellectual advantages of a philosophical and profitable system of physical training of this sort, the fact that man's available capital as a factor in society is increased from 50 to 100 per cent. or more, by thus developing all his available power in the right direction, and that the public weal is thereby improved correspondingly, there would again seem to be no doubt of the propriety of such measures, even at a largely increased expenditure of money for public education. It would simply be rendering more available and profitable the present expenditure, to say nothing of the immense moral advantages accruing. In fact, the industrial feature of education seems to be the "missing link" in man's moral and intellectual education and elevation. Restore this "missing link," and we not only solve the whole intellectual problem, but many other social and political issues which now seem hopelessly stranded upon the shoals and rocks of our civil polity. Among these could be named the capital and labor issue, our whole revenue system, which, together with our political and commercial dishonesty, seem to pile up barriers to our national prosperity enough to appall any one.

And yet all these can be removed—removed peacefully and effectually. Educate man all over—hand, head and heart—and the thing is done. Does that seem too simple a solution? Try it. It will cost something, to be sure; but the expense will not be a tithe of that bitter loss

incurred from blindness to this solution and neglect of these simple claims of justice.

“Educate man all over,” and no part will go to waste—no part will be disposed to prey upon any other, personal or political. We simply restore the lost balance, and man is reconciled in himself and to himself as a unit of power; and society, being composed of these units, is itself also reconciled in its various social and political interests, and built into a stronger and more enduring superstructure.

But some will tell us, this is impossible. Man will not work with his hands so long as he can make a living by his wits; and that others are improvident and lazy, constantly disposed to shirk duty, and all that. This may all be true; and some one has wittily remarked, that “man is naturally a lazy animal.” But this is a mistake—a slander not only upon man, but upon his maker. The God of nature never made a mistake, and a lazy man is a woeful blunder; therefore, he never made a lazy man, nor a lazy animal of any kind. All the lower animals, as we *call* them, work in their appointed sphere, and to an extent commensurate to their natural wants, and, therefore, are not naturally lazy. They may have contracted some of man’s lazy habits, and this, too, by his unwarrantable interference with the laws of production and heredity. All this *may* be true, I say.

But some men are lazy. This we can not deny, and we can account for this only on the supposition of violation of law, somewhere in his past or present history. Laziness may also be inherited; and the disease, in some cases, we know is chronic. We know, also, that when habit is of long standing, it may be transmitted from generation to generation; and this will account for man’s laziness, and for the same trait in other animals, just as we know other diseases may be transmitted. But nature, which always

produces the best she can under the circumstances—often mending man's mistakes, where she is properly encouraged—must not be charged with such a monstrosity as aiding in making a lazy man or woman.

But laziness, like most other diseases, may be corrected and cured. I suppose it is safe to say that all diseases have their remedies somewhere within the range of possible discovery. Laziness certainly has; for the trial of cure has frequently been made, and succeeded. As well may we say that man is weak, and therefore can not be made strong; because he is sick, he can not be made well; because he is ignorant, he can never be made wise, as to say because he is lazy he can not be cured. The simple remedy lies in his training, in his education *by* work, education *to* work, and education *for* work; and this continued from generation to generation will work the soundest cure in the worst cases.

Everybody, therefore, must labor with hand, head and heart, as a means of education, until industrious habits and inclinations shall have become fixed. This shall act both as prevention and cure of laziness, and other bad habits. And there is no other cure. The law is inexorable. Obedience to its mandates will restore, in time, that which has been lost by disobedience. Let the experiment be made on a scale ample enough to meet the demands of the case, and improvement will be certain. Let work become a necessary, an indispensable part of man's education, and the cure is certain.

In order, therefore, to promote morality among men, this constitutional balance among all the faculties must be restored, and that balance maintained through life as nearly as circumstances will permit; for morality is nothing more nor less than the normal activity of man's native faculties.

Is this impossible? Then education is impossible, improvement impossible, and man a practical failure; a conclusion which no one in his wits is willing to grant.

CHAPTER XIII.

HUMAN OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES.

The foregoing statements show clearly, not only the nature and extent of man's true growth and probable destiny, but the necessity for a thorough revision of popular ideas and systems of education, basing them upon natural law as revealed in man's faculties; and enforcing strict obedience to these laws of learning and growth. And all this, in turn, demands obligations and duties covering a larger area than is usually assigned under our present system.

These arise from a just consideration of the conditions and responsibilities involved in the foregoing. And they may be regarded as the final issues in a work on morals: *i. e.*, the success of the system depends upon the enforcement of these laws respecting man's growth. They are fundamental as they relate to this subject, and give direction and stability and point to all the principles and maxims that have been developed in the preceding discussions.

These obligations and duties may be regarded as the summing up of all the relations and responsibilities of life. They cover all the ground out of which grow moral relations and moral acts, constituting a system of training that, at least, approximates perfection.

The exercise of the faculties of man in the discharge of these obligations and duties constitutes the functional, the

vital part of this system. The methods are the machinery by which the system is worked.

These duties and obligations may be classified under the following heads, as also shown in the summary at the close of this volume.

I. Domestic Obligations and Duties.

II. Social and Commercial Obligations and Duties.

III. Civil and Political Obligations and Duties.

These cover about all the moral relations among men. Each class will claim the prominence of a separate chapter; and each should be carefully studied, expanded, if need be, and studiously applied in the moral training of children and youth; for, while many of these obligations and duties relate to adults, they nevertheless have their incipency in childhood and youth. The last two chapters, especially, have reference to conduct among adults. The entire list may be studied in the following order:

I. The Domestic Obligations and Duties arising from them. These, as the name implies, relate to the home—the natural nurse of the virtues—and its immediate surroundings.

1. The *Home* or the *Family* is the *Foundation* of our social order. Mark "*The Foundation*," and not the superstructure of social order itself; but that upon which the social order is built, as the house is built upon its foundation. If, therefore, the foundation is broad, and firm, the house is comparatively commodious and safe. Or, to use a little different figure, the home and its influences are the soil or seed bed, out of which grow all those plants of virtue or vice, which go to make up the great harvest of human life. The home is also the source of nearly all those social and incipient political relations that constitute the bond of human brotherhood, industrial enterprises, and

human governments; and the influences surrounding this home are the sunshine or the shadows, that nourish and invigorate, or the frosts and mildew that blast and pollute the young plants that spring up by virtue of home and family.

Again; the home is a fountain whose purity or impurity affects all those other streams that flow from its sources. Its influence is largely in the ratio of the freedom and force in which these relations are established, and its duties enforced.

The origin of the home and family with all their obligations and duties, as well as the foundation elements composing them,

(a.) Are found *first* in the *conjugal or marital* relations, and the obligations and duties arising therefrom.

The family implies the union of two important elements or factors, and *only two*, viz., the man and the woman; and, we may add, but one of each. This is evidently nature's law; and its violation always breeds disorder of some kind. The relation itself implies the unity of hitherto independent elements of equal force and importance, the increase or diminution of either of which not only destroys the nature of the compound, but multiplies perplexities beyond human control.

The *twain* in original condition become one in new condition, one in sentiment, purpose and act, if the union is a perfect one. Each original element or factor changes its natural and premarital relations, entering into a new compound, thereby assuming new obligations and duties, which give rise to the *Home*. The parties become husband and wife, with all that these terms imply; and they are no more "*twain*," but "*one flesh*." And whether this union is regarded sacred or secular, whether indissoluble or merely conventional and thereby subject to dissolution

for any just cause—but not, certainly, for any slight one—the “obligations” assumed and the “duties” arising therefrom *are the same*. . They, at least, are sacred, and the infidelity of either party should be regarded equally reprehensible.

There can be no more sacred relations established among human creatures, and the results are, in strict conformity to the manner in which these relations are observed. No penalty or opprobrium attaching to one party of this union, for violation of obligation, should fail to attach to the other. And this is equally true and binding with the parties before the union takes place. Virtue is virtue, and vice is vice, wherever it appears, and by whomsoever the act is performed; and the rewards and penalties should be the same in all cases.

Marriage among all civilized nations, in all ages of the world, has been regarded more or less sacred or binding; and the purity of the relation, when properly guarded, is such as to leave no question as to its rightfulness. But no one can fail to see that it involves some of the gravest responsibilities and the most sacred obligations that can possibly arise in all man's career. It stands at the natural and legitimate gateway to the perpetuation of the human species, and the perpetual guard to social purity. I say natural, because unperturbed nature protests and even rebels against any other means of perpetuating the species. And yet, even this relation is often abused in the spirit of it, if not in the letter, both because of ignorance and inattention—more frequently—to the laws of mutual adaptation. The parties, therefore, seeking this relation should be so well mated as to age and temperament, as to produce the best, and, I may say, an improved progeny, from generation to generation, until human weakness, in all forms, shall be reduced to the minimum; while the

best qualities of the race shall be constantly improved, and brought to their maximum strength and purity.

But it is doubtful, I think, whether or not the human species shall ever reap the whole benefits of the marriage relation, until either by a vastly improved education, or by legislative enactments, the proper checks shall have been placed upon the choice of marital companionship. The laws of heredity must be consulted in preference to those of animal affinity; and not only consulted, but obeyed, before the human race shall reap the full benefits of the marriage relation.

This subject should receive careful attention and study in a system of morals looking to the fullest benefits of social reform. But its further consideration here would, perhaps, be irrelevant, since so much has already been said and written on this subject by medical men and social reformers; and since it is one of those reforms that must come through general intelligence, which requires time.

This brings us to notice, in the next place

(b.) *The Parental Relations and Duties.* These, of course, have their origin in the *marital relation*, and assume additional importance therefrom. The parties to this relation now become father and mother, out of which new relations spring, and new duties arise.

Before assuming these responsible relations and duties, due preparation should be made, not only in the way of general knowledge and culture, but in special information, and an abounding fund of practical wisdom; so that the offspring may reap the full benefit of this parental culture and wisdom.

By virtue of his being and relations, every child has a natural right, not only "to be born well," but to be well cared for afterwards. The training of the infant and child should be such as to secure the very best results,

physically and mentally, since the early impressions and habits are those that weigh most in the subsequent career. [See chapter on Obedience and Will.]

In discussing the obligations and duties of the parental relation, it will not be expected that we attempt an exhaustive list, since they are both so numerous and popular that most persons can study them in connection with the ordinary affairs of life, and from the much that has been both said and written in our common literature. Among the many and most important, the following may be named:

(a.) *The Proper Exercise of Parental Affection and Parental Authority.* These two things have a peculiar bearing upon each other. They may serve both as mutual checks and mutual prompters to vigorous and healthy growth; or they may lead to directly the opposite of these. The affection is necessary to prompt protection on the part of the parent; and this gives him a right not only to protect, but to control, to protect the innocence and helplessness of the child, and to direct it in the untried paths of duty. Under this wise protection, the innocence is preserved, the helplessness changed to helpfulness, and the right of authority conferred and perpetuated. [See Blackstone on Nat. Law.]

The love of offspring is a natural impulse or affection, and strong in human beings, and in all animals. This, as has been intimated above, is necessary for the protection of the young, during their periods of helplessness. In the lower animal, this feeling is classed with the instincts; but in man, it is clear, this instinctive feeling must be controlled, and directed by human reason; so that a consistent family government may be established and maintained for the proper training of the young, whose natural condi-

tion and inclinations are those of dependence, rendering them favorable to ready cultivation.

This natural affection, without such restraints as reason and culture may institute, like most other strong impulses, is also one of the most dangerous elements in family government. Without proper judgment this feeling is apt to blind the eyes of the parent to the faults and weaknesses of the offspring. It is also subject to great abuse from an opposite direction, as when a parent, by virtue of inherent right to govern the acts of the child, loses all self-control, and gives full vent to passion and cruel treatment. And, to show that this is only perverted affection, we often see this unholy exercise of it followed by the keenest remorse.

But as this subject has been treated at some length under "Incentives," etc. [see Chapters VIII and IX], we forbear any further notice of it here, more than to say that this matter should receive the most careful study in this connection also. The strongest force in family government is self-control. It prepares the way for a judicious exercise of all other gifts and graces. Without it, the most brilliant talents are not only rendered helpless, but often hurtful. And this brings us to notice

(b.) *Patience and Forbearance* in the management of children, virtues of kindred significance and importance to the foregoing, and necessary in all the affairs of life, especially in school life.

The natural inclinations of childhood, both in the home and in the school, lead to many outbreaks of passion, peevishness, petulance, and perversities of various sorts; and not unfrequently laziness and stupidity are superadded. But patience and forbearance, coupled with wise management in other respects, are the sure antidotes for these ills, and a "thousand others that flesh is heir to."

"Let patience have her perfect work," not alone in

waiting—though this were a queenly grace—but in devising ways and means for managing these pervading evils.

One of the great secrets in the management of children is in the prompt employment of ready means for engaging all their spare energies, that otherwise take the form of mischief. There is, or ought to be, no natural waste about a child. Every impulse has its meaning; and, if teachers only have the wisdom and patience to give proper direction to all this superabundance of unregulated force, it may all be utilized. It is usually the natural fertility of the soil which becomes fruitful for evil, if not employed in good.

Example and precept, of course, are all necessary, but nothing tones down the untamed nature of childhood like work of some kind; and the more inviting it can be made, the better. Much of this untamed force of youth will be found, upon close inspection, to be the breaking away from the natural channels of life, of that which is inherently good, but only evil because wrongly applied.

It, therefore, is the legitimate result of mistaken management. The moral nature in particular is often perverted and poisoned by these ebullitions and overflowing of a fertile nature. These ebullitions, otherwise harmless, become hurtful simply from the direction they may have taken. Out of these natural impulses, as from the natural fertility of the soil, when under proper cultivation, will grow the healthiest plants of virtue and wisdom, if time, patience and perseverance are allowed to do their wonted work in early childhood.

To patience and perseverance let kindness and firmness, sympathy and justice be joined, with judgment and discretion as helmsmen, and the little bark of infancy and childhood, freighted with so much of human concern, may be safely moored in the harbor of security, and at least a measure of success.

Again: the proper exercise of parental affection gives rise to a corresponding feeling on the part of the child as,

(c.) *Filial affections*, which, in time, give rise to still another class of obligations and duties. These affections include the impulses and desires in the heart of childhood to respond to the parental affection, or to reach towards the parent or supporters for natural protection and support. These latter arise both from brother and sister alike, called fraternal affection in the first; but, unfortunately, we have no generic word in English by which to express the latter. But *sisterly* is a good household word, strong and loving: for a sister's love or hate, may make or mar a brother's peace, when won or lost in the family's sacred precincts.

These filial affections constitute the basis of voluntary obedience; since the affectionate regard of the child for the parent, leads to the voluntary acceptance of the just claims of authority, as wrought in the higher departments of the soul's faculties. [See definition of obedience, Chap. VIII.]

And then again, the home affections may be so broadened, as in the case of the fraternal affections, as to embrace the whole human family—a universal brotherhood; and the latter assumes the same, and even stronger benevolent characteristics, when subjected to the world influences.

The obligations and duties arising from the development of these home affections, are diversified and important; among which may be named obedience to parents, respect to rightly constituted authority, love of home and country, and kindred, general benevolence, thankfulness, gratitude, and indeed, the exercise, under proper restraints, of all the moral sentiments treated under the first and second divisions of ethical attributes [see outline, p. 63] except adora-

tion ; and the duties of the parent are such as to give rise to these sentiments, also.

(d) THE SACREDNESS OF MOTHERHOOD can scarcely be estimated, much less over-estimated. It is safe to say that no more solemn and responsible relation or duty exists among human beings than that of ushering into world life, and caring for little children, freighted with the immense interests and responsibilities attaching to them. Men and women may be excused for many of the mistakes that they make in life, on the ground of mere ignorance ; but, with the vast experience of the human family staring them in the face, it would seem that ignorance here is a feeble excuse. Judgment and wisdom should be heeded ; but such is not the case as yet, and it is presumable, at least, that this state of things will continue until measures are adopted to check this reckless disregard of the teachings of natural law. And since this matter seems to be beyond the ordinary limits of legal enactments, there seems to be no safer or more direct way of reaching this end than to early instruct the young respecting the operations of these laws.

To say nothing of the future destiny of the child, his present life is one of such importance, not to say doubt and uncertainty, as to naturally make one hesitate and tremble for the issues of human existence. But then, the immense moral influence the mother, by reason of her relations, exerts on the child, has no parallel in all the life career. The very first impressions are made by her. The very first impulse to voluntary activity, the first feeble flutter of thought, the dawning of intelligence, and the first lisping in language or expression, are all more or less shaped by the mother's act, or look, or word.

Take from the world a mother's influence for good, and the whole face of nature is changed. Remove her delicate

hand from the trembling, tottering superstructure of morality, and the whole fabric will tumble into promiscuous ruin. But let her stand firm, and our temple is safe. Let her be true to her sacred trusts, and our hope in the future is strong and abiding.

But the further discussion of the home influences, obligations and duties are reserved for another part of this volume. Our second topic under *Domestic Obligations and Duties* refers to the

2. *School*, as the one nearest the home. The school has a wide, an almost limitless influence, especially in our own country. Standing, as it does, next the home, it should be planned as nearly as possible after the similitude of a good home. The kindergarten, however, where established, forms the connecting link between the home and the school proper, and makes the latter a welcome companion and adjunct, provided it is organized on a similar scientific plan: *i. e.*, all its exercises and duties based upon, and adjusted to, the evident wants of childhood and youth.

The primary school, therefore, should be a home for the little ones, fresh from the mother home. As stated above, it should be planned and conducted, as far as possible, after the manner of a real home, provided with as many things as possible to remind the child of his real home, if that home is a worthy one; so that the transition from the one to the other shall not be so great as to jar upon the tender sensibilities of the child, or make him long and fret for his real mother and home; and if the child's real home is not what it should be, the primary school should supply the missing parts as far as possible.

Here, then, appears the great moral influence of the good school. At this, the very gateway of childhood into a miniature world, he should be met by another mother—not necessarily a step-mother—but a teacher mother, having

all the tender sympathies, affections and tastes of the wise, refined and affectionate mother of his real home. Allowance, of course, must be made for those homes that are not homes, but merely lodging places for destitute childhood and youth. But even for such, the home influences of the good school will be all the more grateful to the outcasts from the real home. No other moral influence like the home; and no other intellectual stimulus like this; and let me add that *this is the one great moral influence which our schools need*. It is better than all books; and better than all precepts and preaching. Let the world awake to the importance of this, and the major part of our moral teaching is done, and effectually done.

This the child finds or should find in his

(a.) *Teacher*. She* is the ruling spirit of the school-house, as the real mother is of the home. In her large heart of sympathy and love, she—if a true teacher—has room for every urchin, however unkempt, every waif wandering for the first time away from his mother and his first home.

The teacher's influence is thus second only to the mother's; but when these motherly instincts have been dulled or dwarfed, or left even in an undeveloped state in the real home, then the teacher's moral influence may far transcend that of the mother. In such case the teacher becomes the real mother to the mind and morals of the child, imparting that genuine moral nourishment for which the pupil may be perishing at home: and these are not always the homes of poverty either. More frequently the homes of opulence, of fashion and folly, homes where the mother has relegated the duties she owes her children to ignorant and careless servants and nurses;

* We use this form of the pronoun here to indicate the real teacher of young children.

homes where all the holier ties of motherhood and fatherhood have been smothered by fashionable folly, or by the unnatural greed for gain, or merely sensual pleasure. These are more distressing than the homes of poverty and want; for often in these humbler abodes dwell the true hearts and true virtues..

Let the teacher, therefore, be faithful to all those higher instincts of maternity, that she may supply what is lacking at the homes. Let her be true to all those sacred obligations and duties; and the school will be only a second home to the child from the loving home, and the real home to the unfortunates, whether from wealth or poverty (two extremes about equally disastrous to true morals), that have never known a true home.

But another strong moral influence resides in the associations of the school. These must not be overlooked. I mean the moral influences arising from

(b.) *The Pupils and Associates.* It is a well-established fact that childhood and youth are greatly influenced by associates of like habits, kindred studies and employments. Aside from "the esprit de corps" of associates in school or in class, the moral influence arising from numbers, from the popular thought, belief, custom and general sentiment and talk is very great. This is necessary as a preparatory step from the home to the business and pleasures of the world. Children are imitative and formative; and many of their moral and intellectual traits are more or less the results of early associates.

The pupils' obligations and duties to the teacher and to each other, are much the same as those of the children of a family. The brotherly and sisterly affections of the family are only broadened, and generalized in the school. It therefore affords, through these channels, its appointments and duties—the best opportunities for the cultiva-

tion of good manners, politeness and gentility, which are the charm of good society; and these virtues and moral sentiments find ample room for exercise in the ordinary intercourse of school work. And this gives rise to another moral force, viz.:

(c.) *The General Coöperation* of teacher and pupils, and teacher and parent. This is only typical of the duties and responsibilities of the world life, further on; but it bears with great weight upon the general success of all plans for moral progress. Without this general coöperation, both in school and business, the best projects may be defeated. A question frequently arises in schools, as to the extent of parental influence and authority in the management of school affairs. It is partially answered by citing the legal relations of teacher and parent, and child and teacher. The "*in loco parentis*" of the teacher is only temporary; but it should cease only when the pupil is beyond the teacher's immediate control; and it may be assumed that where the teacher's control ends, after ordinary school hours, be it gradual or sudden, there the parent's begins, and vice versa, before such hours commence.

But the greater moral influence arises from the hearty coöperation of parents and teachers in the joint management of the child. Let it be understood that the wise measures of the teacher are heartily seconded by the parent; and that there is a general coöperation in all school matters, and the moral effects are manifold greater. But let these measures be disputed, and the general management discredited by open force, or by silent neglect, and the very flood-gates of vice are wide open.

This coöperation must also be mutual. The teacher should consult the parent's wishes in matters relating to the child, but only so far as they are not personal or selfish; for the parent has no more right legally, or other-

wise, to interfere with the special affairs of the school, than the teacher has to interfere with similar affairs of the family. The fact that the parent is represented in the school by his child, and therefore has a greater interest, and right to interfere with the management of the school, is offset by this other fact, that the teacher has almost an identical interest and right in every family of the neighborhood; and the additional fact that the order and success of the school depend almost entirely upon non-interference of parents in the special management of the school. Each party to the school compact has its sphere of action; and when these spheres seem to cut into each other, both must alike be guarded.

The parent, therefore, should be free and candid in accepting the advice of the teacher, and both should yield so much of private opinion and preference, as to make all lawful measures for the management of the school the most popular and the most binding. And from the home and the school, which are largely preparatory in their influence and character, there arises another relation, looking largely to the world life, which may be considered fairly opened in our next chapter, viz.: The obligations and duties arising from certain necessary conditions which may be called

3. *Neighborhood Acquaintance.* This is stated as a necessary relation in all communities where the members are more or less dependent upon one another for society and support. This relation has its peculiar laws and duties, and therefore maybe made peculiarly useful in bettering the condition of the parties concerned.

Man is a social being, dependent upon his environment for both happiness and for full development. As a social being, he has native desires that reach beyond the mere boundary of home. The neighbor, therefore, is a necessary

factor in completing and rounding out his relations; and therefore these must be reckoned among those out of which grow moral obligations and duties in all civilized communities. Among these we find the

(a.) *Social intercourse, not included in the family and the home.* If the members of a community are such as we usually find in ordinary society, the refinements arising from this source are very great, and very desirable. The whole social compact, outside the family and school, rest upon this neighborly relation, out of which just occasions arise for the exercise of those social amenities named in our list, as integrity and honesty, fidelity and truthfulness, justice and generosity, compassion and kindness, gratitude and thankfulness, sympathy and friendship, mercy and forgiving patience, without all of which, the world would present one great barren waste, where not a single plant of virtue might safely abide.

To show the eminent need of these relations, and their great force in forming the character of society, and to show the salutary influences arising from neighborly refinement, and the consequent moral culture thereby begotten, we have only to compare the rough, uncouth, and often criminal tendencies of children reared away from the refinements of polite society, with those having all the advantages of the best society. And by polite society we do not mean necessarily the most luxuriant nor the most learned, but that healthy product that comes alike from labor and learning. And then, again, nearly all the duties of life pass this intermediate point, between the home on the one side, and the world beyond the mere neighborhood, on the other. Hence, let these beneficent influences enter largely into our account of means for the cultivation of morals in childhood and youth, bearing in mind always that the silent influences are the greater.

The foregoing feeling and sentiments indulged in a legitimate way, give rise to what we may call

(b.) *Friendly Confidences.* Here we have a still higher and stronger sentiment, and a greater moral incentive. True friendship is one of the strongest ties that bind human hearts and human interests. It is one of the world's greatest blessings. It calls forth and develops some of the loveliest traits of human character. It rests upon a just appreciation of those nobler qualities in human nature that win our regard, esteem and confidence, and that constitute a ready passport to the more refined enjoyments of social life. Its chief characteristic is a mutual confidence and trust in the recipients; and where the feelings are genuine, they grow stronger and stronger, and time, and suffering and trial only increase the strength of the bond. It refines and cultivates, enriches and ennobles whatever it embraces, and enables its possessor to endure hardship, to suffer privations and to overcome difficulties, where the unaided efforts might perish in oblivion. It sacrifices self for the good of its objects, and builds up a lofty sentiment of moral worth. It may, therefore, enter into all business and pleasure, and should give shape and character to all of that part of our social intercourse where mutual obligations and relationships arise, And then again, the proper exercise of these higher qualities of human nature will lead to the establishment of

(c.) *True Business Relations*, the most desirable object in life. Indeed there is scarcely a relation in life that suffers so much, to-day, as these same business relations. The reason is, they are usually based entirely upon self-interest, which, unrelieved by the higher sentiments, is sure to lead to misunderstandings and a corruption of morals. It eats like a canker into the very vitals of business, and poisons and corrupts the entire social circula-

tion; because children themselves readily imbibe the loose sentiments on this subject, so common among merely business relations, from their elders; and because it is so common it is all the more dangerous. It calls policy, honesty; selfishness, human right; deceit and lying, shrewdness; oppression of the poor, prosperity to the oppressor; and even open fraud and secret theft, excusable thrift. It calls loudly for redress.

Business enterprises established upon purely selfish principles are unworthy the name they bear. But those established upon the higher claims of mutual benefit, guaranteed and guarded by the higher principles of morality and pure friendship will go far toward checking these evil tendencies; for friendship leads not only to honest dealing, but even to self-sacrifice; and it discourages all self-seeking that interferes with the rights and welfare of our fellow-men.

The home, school and neighborhood, therefore, stand as the open doors to the larger space for the exercise of man's faculties, or that which we call his world life, into which he enters, and carries with him whatever habits and character these domestic and semi-domestic relations and duties have cultivated. The buds and blossoms that clothe the plants and trees are no surer prophesies of the coming harvest and fruits, than the opening of these early characteristics are of the coming man or woman. And what the warm sunshine and showers are to the springing grass and opening flowers, these healthy home influences, tempered by the wisdom and patience of mothers, fathers and teachers, of neighbors and friends, are to the moral sentiments and to the life of coming society.

Cause and effect are just as intimately related here, and as sure in their results, as in any other department of nature. And when education as a system shall have been

reduced to that exact science, which its principles and methods demand, and of which it is eminently susceptible, we shall then begin to realize something of the grand results treasured in them, and thus made possible and potential in our modes of culture.

This open door leads directly to the practical recognition of these possibilities, and paves the way to their realization, by the adoption of such measures as shall ultimately exercise all man's better faculties in all those life relations and duties. Nothing short of a full and complete recognition of them will ever meet a tithe of the demands of a community whose controlling interests pass through these intermediate stages of growth and refinement. But, like most common things and opportunities, they are apt to be overlooked.

Here, too, appear the workings of the great natural law, which is nothing more nor less than the moral law, or law applied to moral growth, that runs through every department of the world life and relations, viz., the proper discharge of the various duties and responsibilities of any and of all stations man is required to occupy; even these will educate him to the highest degree of his nature, intellectual, physical and moral.

Man is not required to turn aside from his necessary work, in order to educate himself. His work educates him; and the school is work; and that system of morals that adds or superadds anything outside of these, simply burdens him with tasks whose tedious performance rather weakens than strengthens his moral nature. Let him simply walk in the plain path of duty; and, like the healthy plant in the fertile soil, he fulfills his mission; he grows to his full measure of manhood; and in no other way can it be done in this world.

Here, then, is the secret of moral culture. Its sim-

plicity is almost sublime; and yet men will seek it in doctrines and schemes whose operations are complex and complicated, and necessarily more or less defective, simply because they are unnatural.

CHAPTER XIV.

SOCIAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND DUTIES.

These may be considered a continuation of those relations and duties in the preceding chapter. Their differences are chiefly in their circumstances, and in their application.

The closing thought of the last chapter carried out on a somewhat larger scale, that it may enter into all the ramifications of business and pleasure, will give us a theme worthy the most profound thought and contemplation, and every way appropriate for completing a system of moral culture, covering all the relations in the entire period of human life. The pleasure, however, is not the direct object, but is more the result of the right application of true principles of education and business; since, in all right methods, the influences bearing upon education or growth, are reflected in all legitimate directions, in the exact ratio of social needs.

Among the first of these relations and duties may be mentioned the common matters of

1. **Contracts and Agreements.** These are of different varieties, arising out of the nature of the business and circumstances governing it, together with the circumstances and relations of the contracting parties, such as those existing between

(a.) *Employers and Laborers.*—This relation, and consequent obligations and duties, arise from the mutual de-

pendence of man upon his fellow, both for support and progress, each affording its modicum of needed opportunities for mutual benefits and pleasures, and for the exercise and cultivation of all those moral qualities and principles treated under "**Ethical Attributes**," Chapter VI, as honesty, truthfulness, fidelity, industry, integrity, etc.

On the part of the employer there must be a proper appreciation of merit and a just consideration for services rendered, which require a due exercise of generosity and justice; and on the part of the employed, a corresponding regard for the character and purposes of the employer, giving rise to faithfulness in the discharge of duty, honesty, industry, integrity, and a proper regard for the interests of the employer, all of which, on the part of both parties, would be a complete guard against selfishness or neglect.

These conditions and principles, properly observed, forever excludes the possibility of human slavery as it existed in the United States, a few years since. This system of labor is such a gross violation of the laws of labor, and of equality among men and nations, as to render a discussion of it entirely unnecessary here. An attempt to justify it in any form would be looked upon, among enlightened people, in about the same light as an attempt to justify theft or homicide.

Of course the obligations existing between the employer and the employed, are mutual and interchangeable in their relations, and self-perpetuating in their nature since what is for the benefit of the one party, must, from necessity, reflect a similar benefit upon the other. But often, owing to undue selfishness, associated with short-sightedness—its usual accompaniment—this mutual relationship, or balance of benefits, is not seen, much less is it acted upon.

It must, therefore, be taught in the schools and in the practical affairs of life; for, where these considerations have due weight with contracting parties, it is a practical ending of all strife, where it may exist; and it is impossible for business troubles to arise, except in cases of mere misunderstanding. And even in all such cases the difficulties are all the more readily adjusted, since the parties are more easily brought to view such misunderstandings from the same standpoint; especially is this true where strict integrity and a due allowance for casual errors prevail.

But to show that man is naturally disposed to look after self first, which may be, after all, only a slight perversion of commendable traits,—self-interest and self-protection.—we have only to refer to the many misunderstandings and contentions among men, all arising out of real or supposed violations of contracts, and these again always having, at least, one selfish side, and more frequently two.

To be sure, it is but natural and right, that each party to a contract should look after his own interest. But if each party can only be led to see—which we think can be done, if proper care and pains are taken in training the children—that the true interest of one party always involves that of the other, the trouble will usually be of short duration: for when one's own interest, or even supposed interest, is invaded, or when it encroaches upon that of one's neighbor, then the law of mutual interest, the law of labor, the law of the *universe* is assailed, as well as that of moral rectitude; and trouble is sure to ensue. There is no release from the dominion of this law, and its penalties are sure to follow, sooner or later.

But where the interests of contracting parties are shown and believed to be identical, these troubles and contentions end from the natural want of nourishment from both sides.

The man who takes advantage of his neighbor is always the injured party in the end. Moral rectitude is a law whose demands are always exacted, to the utmost farthing, somewhere in the history of every individual who violates it. As well expect to evade the penalties of bruises and burns, as to escape the possibly remotest penalties of a broken moral law.

All contentions, therefore, are not only selfish but shortsighted and silly, since they injure no one so much as the offending party or parties. Seldom, indeed, do we find trouble or contention between neighbors, arising from an attempt of either party to confer favors upon the other. This would virtually be an error in benevolence, but it would make a better showing than its opposite. It would most likely put an end to all contentions and strifes among men, greatly to the peace and harmony of neighborhoods and states : and yet all contentions among men, all litigations and personal quarrels, all wars and national disagreements are subject to these same laws. How much more easily and economically could they be settled, if men would only consent to be ruled by reason and common-sense, rather than by selfishness, and unholy ambition ! and how much of this selfishness and this unholy ambition could be checked, if taken in time, and if only the early opportunities in families and schools were improved for the cultivation of these moral sentiments, and for confirming them, ere children are thrust out into society, to become an easy prey to these infirmities ! And that they can and will be thus improved and confirmed, are surely within the possible and highly probable scope of human progress, else education is a failure, and morals and religion mere myths.

But the trouble usually arises from an attempt of one party, and sometimes both, to take advantage of the other in a bargain or contract ; and this too is taught by exam-

ple at a very early age, showing not only great ignorance of this law of righteous compensation, but a total disregard of the equally righteous laws of heredity. As the fathers do, so do the children; showing also that natural selfishness, however commendable as a basis of culture, in most natures, needs the common restraints arising from well ordered schools and society. National and international difficulties usually have the same origin as those of the family and school, and the same remedies for their cure, though often much more expensive. But the broad mantle of charity must, under present circumstances, cover a multitude of national as well as individual sins.

But the law of contracts requires a large admixture of benevolence. The employer, for instance, should not only be willing and ready to meet all legal obligations, but willing and ready, at all proper times, to transcend them in some slight degree, to grant favors to the employed, as for instance, an occasional holiday—often a much-needed respite from continuous toil—and even additional pay, in case of faithful service, though never as a bribe, or to impose additional obligation upon the laborer.

True, there may be no business rules authorizing this, not even a moral obligation; but it should be simply an act of kindness, an overflow of generous sentiment, which acts like oil upon machinery, which would soon consume itself—much in the same way human obligations do—without the lubricating oil of kindness. Like begets like here, as in all cases of cause and effect. So, on the part of the employed, an occasional extra hour, a voluntary “helping hand” in a pinch, a stroke or two quietly given in secret, would affect both laborer and employer—chiefly the former—as nothing else can or will. “Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth” is the briefest and best expression of this law, on record. It is an illus-

tration of the law of kindness exemplified in the common intercourse of life. It lifts the giver and receiver into an atmosphere of higher moral sentiment by the mere pleasure of conferring secret favors. It is the holy oil of "alms in secret" whose promised rewards are "not of the earth earthy." How different this from the selfish desire to publish our benevolences to the world! And how different from the continual effort of both parties, in most cases, to take advantage of the most trivial circumstances, either to impose additional duties, or to shirk or avoid duty, to slight the work, to use inferior material in manufactured articles, to conceal defects, to make the most of the failures of others, and the least of our own! In a word, *to be dishonest*. This is a human weakness for which there is no remedy outside the simple requirement of the law of "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you."

Again : "*The grinding of the poor*" by those employers who have them in their power, as we find it in many large manufacturing establishments, and by wholesale merchants and others, whose wealth is coined, as it were, from the lives of the laborer, is the prevailing sin of the age. The exacting of the most labor for the least pay on the plea of "supply and demand," a law as vicious in its tendencies as it is false in theory, is crushing the life, moral and physical, out of thousands of our laborers. Poor women, for instance, by reason of misfortune and pressing needs, are either compelled to ceaseless toil, day and night, in order to live, on wages the most meagre, or else resort to the most debasing crimes. . . . And this is the practical outgrowth of the law of "supply and demand." All this is no better, morally, than open robbery and secret murder. And yet, to such a low state is the public conscience reduced by this unnatural strain for wealth, that no one in particular feels

called upon to expose this refined meanness. How long shall the people groan under this worse, in some respects, than African slavery, so recently abolished? Yet there is a remedy at hand, if we have the courage and consistency to apply it. A high degree of moral culture, such as can most readily be incorporated in our present system—yea, for which this very system is showing marked defects—will in the end accomplish it all. Our families and schools are suffering, and require it in order to meet the public demands of the age. Let it be enforced in these elementary institutions and it will soon sound a death-knell to these grosser abuses in social and commercial life.

For instance, let these things be frequently brought to the notice of the pupils, both in a formal and an informal way. Let topics be assigned certain members for discussion and composition. Let problems in arithmetic like the following be given at certain intervals:

1. A widow lady had five children to support, aged fourteen, twelve, ten, six, and four years. She found by hiring the first two out to a paper manufacturer for 20c. and 15c. per day, respectively; and, working ten hours per day herself, making shirts at 12c. apiece, and buying fuel and provisions at 52c. per day, she was able to save \$1.10 per week for rent and clothing for herself and the three younger children: how many shirts did she make per week of six days? How many per day? The elder children gave 16c. per day of their earnings to help clothe the family: what did they save per week? Could this mother send her children to school? Why? What do you suppose these two elder children did with their savings?

2. How much does the merchant make on these shirts, who furnished the material for them and sold them for 75c. apiece? What per cent? Is this a right distribution

of the profits of labor and material? How can we prevent this abuse, etc., etc.

Or let some such problems as the following be given, to be worked out and reported a week hence:

Forty laborers are employed in a flouring mill at \$1.50 per day; but they find that the business of their employer will be very much embarrassed by closing the mill. They therefore quit work, or strike for \$1.75 per day. They remain out of work twenty working days, and then are re-employed at \$1.60 per day. The employer's net income during the first contract averaged \$12 per day. Who were the greater losers during this strike? How much, and why? Suppose the workmen return to work after twenty days at the same wages, how will the matter stand all round? Suppose new men are employed after ten days at \$1.30 per day, and the old hands remain without work for three months, of twenty-four days each, how much do they lose? Can you calculate the loss in character and morals of these men? Who is chiefly to blame in any and all these cases?

Let other business and other conditions be substituted for these, and encourage pupils to make original questions involving moral and financial interests, until they learn to think and act for themselves. Let the whole range of business be subjected to these practical inquiries, and you not only relieve the exercises of the school from stupid uniformity, but you make your children practical thinkers, which goes, in itself, a great way in cultivating morals.

Again, it is doubtful whether or not there is any moral elevation of sentiment or character, in simply living up to the letter of the law, in matters of contracts, etc. The simple payment of a debt, for instance, when due, benefits neither the creditor nor debtor, in a moral sense. It simply leaves both parties just where they were before the

contract and its fulfillment were entered into, save that it is the exercise of honesty and fidelity. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" may have a species of rude justice in it, but it is far below the law of kindness and mercy, or even "Forgive as ye would be forgiven." And "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you," while it is purely ethical doctrine, is far surpassed in moral beauty and grandeur by that other injunction, "If a man sue thee at the law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also; or, if he compel thee to go a mile with him, to go with him twain." This is that simple overflow of goodness that becomes aggressive; but it effects more in moral elevation than simple justice and fidelity.

It is the law of kindness practically illustrated. It is above justice; and it teaches a lesson that merely human understanding can scarcely fathom; for it is the spirit that quickeneth, and the life that elevates human character. It is the "altar that sanctifieth the gift," and not the gift the altar. [See Proposition III., Corollaries 1, 2 and 3, Chapter I.]

The moral law is founded upon principles as unalterable as the throne of truth itself; and man's happiness and highest development consist in strict obedience thereto. Its requirements are all benevolent and far-reaching in their results; but some of these requirements concern simple justice, while others look more to kindness and mercy and forgiveness; while no one of these requirements, nor the laws embodying them, interfere in the least with man's highest development, and greatest prosperity, real or supposed.

In all man's obligations and duties the motto should be, "Not how little may be done to fulfill the requirements, but how much. Not how slightly, but how well can

I do my work." This would prevent a thousand mistakes, and would end a thousand strifes; yea, and would add immeasurably to the real enjoyments of both employer and employed, by elevating the moral sentiments of both.

Another relation of kindred character and significance is that involved in the intercourse of the

(b.) *Seller and buyer.* This, also, is a relation growing out of man's conventional necessities. It is a matter of mutual benefit if rightly understood and practiced, one that is based upon the laws of the division of labor and profits, *i. e.*: one man's labor can be more profitably employed in the production of a certain commodity, in certain localities, as in mining or manufacturing; and his neighbor can do the same with some other commodity in another locality, as in agriculture, lumbering or herding. Hence the laws of trade or barter are invoked; and both are alike benefited, if these laws are rightly interpreted and wisely followed. This is a lawful relation, and as such, not only confers mutual benefits, but when carried out in the spirit of economy and kindness, is a powerful means of man's moral elevation; since it offers just opportunity for the practice of moral precepts; and since it is "practice that makes perfect."

But when any of these relations and employments are sought merely for purposes of selfish gain, or without regard to other and higher obligations, the highest and best ends of these relations are defeated. When the seller is disposed to take advantage of the necessities of the buyer, and *vice versa*; and when the necessities and even the distress of either party are invoked to gratify the greed of the other, then this relation is degraded, and the parties both suffer the natural consequences; for he who takes advantage of his neighbor in such matters not only inflicts a personal injury upon him but a moral injury

upon himself, which his blind selfishness will not permit him to see. But he is nevertheless the greater sufferer, since moral degradation is a greater injury than personal inconvenience or even suffering. But the world says not, since it only judges from outward appearance, even if any notice at all is taken of it. The offender is usually commended for his shrewd business (?) qualities by this same world. But the world is wrong here, as in most other cases of this nature; and the moral law, however just and right and good, is left to take care of itself. But it will surely right itself some day, and in some manner. Its penalties are always exacted, though the prosperity of the wicked blinds the eyes of worldly judgment; for when Justice lingers long, her reckonings are most fearful when they are finally exacted. There is no release from these penalties. They fall somewhere, and on some one, or many; so that even-handed justice is never slackened, but falls where the greatest good can be wrought by it. It punishes the perpetrator of wrong by destroying his moral sentiments and lowering his moral standing and self-respect. And there can scarcely be a greater penalty. The great world of injustice and wrong is a standing illustration of this truth; and the great world of suffering and want and degradation is the penalty. When the former ceases, the latter will also; and the long suffering of the moral law is a standing rebuke to both. The existence of evil in this world can probably never be satisfactorily accounted for to human reason; but the study of these righteous laws will probably lead to a better understanding of this perplexing problem. The injured party, in the eyes of the world, may suffer the inconvenience of the other party's wrong; and this may seem severe. But even this, when received in the spirit of meekness and submission, may work a good, since it is better to suffer wrong

than to inflict wrong. The latter degrades; the former may elevate and refine through discipline.

Another form of dishonesty is practiced by the seller and buyer. It is a common, a little thing, to be sure, in human eyes; but, like a cancer in the human body, it eats into the very heart of private and public morals. Its ordinary indulgence simply prepares the way for higher crimes.

(c.) *Concealing the Truth.*—We allude to the common practice between sellers and buyers, the former to magnify the excellencies of his wares, and to conceal their defects; and the latter to depreciate these excellencies, and to magnify the defects. Both practices are dishonest, and amounts to downright lying, on a small scale, to be sure, but all the meaner on that account.

“ ‘Tis naught, ‘tis naught, saith the buyer, but when he goeth his way, he boasteth himself.” And the same rebuke is applicable to the seller, since his efforts to overreach, generally excel those of the buyer. Both are equally reprehensible, and are equally destructive to the moral sentiments and the peace of society. Both may be corrected; or, what is still better, both may be prevented by a proper care for the lessons of morality, contained in ordinary school work, and in all learning and relations in early life. Indeed, all forms of dishonesty have a cure. The main object is to find these cures, and to be able to apply them. But by a careful inculcation of the moral precepts and practices involved in the ordinary teaching and study of the common branches of learning, coupled with a frequent application of these to the common duties of school life, as it proceeds over the path of preparation for world life, as in the practice of truthfulness, honesty and strict integrity in study and recitation, with justice and generosity in such business transactions as may be intro-

duced into school life, with patience and politeness in social intercourse, and much, if not all, of this moral elevation of sentiment and character may be effected. Mathematics, Language, History, Geography, Astronomy and every other branch of learning abounds both in moral truth, and the teaching of it in opportunities for its inculcation. Why not use them thus?

The family, the school, and the community of interests into which these earliest institutions lead, are the three distinct factors of relation, requiring the exercise of the best qualities and faculties of human nature—all necessary, all convenient, all leading to the highest expression of manhood and womanhood, all combining to build the soundest and most enduring moral character.

(d.) *Ignorance, and Inability of Seller or Buyer.*—The question might also arise here: Is it strictly honest for either the seller or buyer, under any circumstances, to take advantage of the ignorance or inability of the other party in trade, as in the case of a "corner" in grain, stocks, or commodities of any kind in the market? or to conceal anything pertaining to values, as in the case of hidden treasures, or undiscovered wealth, as minerals, unknown to the seller, or of any sudden change in market prices, or great scarcity, or unusual demands for commodities of any kind, as the buying and selling of lands or other property known by either party to possess values not known to the other?

We answer, unhesitatingly and emphatically, that all transactions in which either party is greatly profited by a corresponding loss of the other, are wrong, and consequently immoral in their tendencies, hence should be discountenanced in teaching, and prohibited, if possible—not so much, probably, by legal enactments (except in cases of absolute fraud), for legal enactments are proverbially

weak, when applied to pure morals, frequently leading to violating, instead of obeying the law, and suggesting vice and crime, rather than deterring from their commission—but by a careful inculcation of strict honesty and fairness on the part of buyer and seller; by an elevation of moral sentiment in school and family life, that shall scorn to take advantage in trade, or in any dealings, that would violate the spirit of that rule which all moralists accept, and which so happily accords with all true moral sense, viz.: “Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you” in the same or similar circumstances.

This would put an end, not only to all stock and real-estate gambling, but gambling of every kind—to all lotteries and mere games of chance or cheating, where money or property exchanges hands without an equivalent, not in risks, but in real values. No other exchanges should be tolerated, or even winked at, which latter is often the most effectual way of inculcating dishonesty. This open fair-dealing would be simply placing strict justice on the throne of equity and conscience as guardian of conduct, subordinating selfishness to the higher claims of judgment and reason.

And it is doubtful whether or not the present system of insurance, in all its phases, would stand this test of strict equity and fair dealing, even if it would that of moral honesty. The declared objects of insurance, however, are benevolent—systematized benevolence, for instance—but whether these boasted benevolences fall where they are usually most needed, may be a question. Indeed, we think they do not, even in a majority of cases. True, we have instances—a few—where, it would seem, a real benefit is bestowed—for a consideration—upon worthy and deserving objects. And these are the cases that are usually published—with some extra flourishes, to be sure—but still

published; for the public eye should not be blind to those benefices, whose heralding will certainly be no detriment to a business that lives largely by advertising. But this same heralding, according to Prop. III, Cor. 2, vitiates the act of benevolence, as such, even if the heralding is thorough and generally true; for hundreds of cases occur, doubtless, in which the insurance is an absolute financial loss, instead of a benefit, to the insured.

Take, for instance, the few cases in which the sum of the premiums, with ordinary interest from date of payment, would exceed the amount of insurance, and the many, in which the insured, by reason of inability to pay the dues, lose both the premiums paid, and the amount of the policy; and the losses will equal, if not exceed, the financial gains. The writer happens to know a case of life insurance in which the policy—\$5,000—was cancelled because the holder went, by order of his commanding officer in the army, beyond the parallel of 33° South Latitude, though in defense of the rights and liberties of his country; and this company who insured this party, realized about \$600 in premiums from this soldier, who lost both premiums and policy by defending his country, and with it, the insurance companies thereof. And this case was *not* published, as the writer ever knew. And the writer happens to know, that the same person insured again for the same amount in another company, after losing in the first, and lost a second time, because of reverses he could not avoid, being reduced in means, and unable to pay dues. And this was *not* published in the insurance reports, as he is aware of. Thus, many cases, I suppose, might be cited both of life and property insurance, which, if reported, would not add anything to the credit of insurance, as then conducted, at least. It may be better now.

And then the beneficences, when they do occur, are

neither uniform nor fair, if measured by the actual needs of the insured. They fall mostly to the fortunate, and of these not always to the most needy. I mean by "fortunate," those who have been able to pay the required dues. The most unfortunate are left without help. But pure benevolence falls only where the needs are greatest. It does not ask, "have you paid your dues, but are you needy?" It does not make misfortune an occasion for withholding help, nor patriotism an excuse for robbery.

Again, it requires an army of well-paid agents to carry on this business, whose united salaries would go far towards relieving want and suffering, if they were so applied. This sum is simply enormous; and then the companies themselves grow rich and plot against the poor; for, who pays these immense salaries of agents? Whence arises this vast accumulation of property by which the individual members of insurance and trust companies enrich themselves? Does the increase come from original sources, or does it not rather arise from a tax—voluntary, to be sure—upon the earnings of other employments? In a word, are not these immense fortunes, in most instances, built from the broken fragments of despoiled labor, and from the hard earnings of the poor?

We are told that it arises from the legitimate profits of the business—from the premiums of the insured. But let it be remembered that these very insured often deny themselves even the necessities and comforts of life, defrauding their own children of an education sometimes, at a period in their lives when help is most needed, that their small earnings may be added to the sum necessary to meet payments on premiums, etc., and that they may reap the spoils when death or accident occurs, all for a simple risk, which may or may not be necessary in the case; and you, my friend, may be sure that this policy will not be paid, however

needy you may be from loss, if a possible loop-hole can be found in your contract.

And then again, the temptations to crime, or at least to criminal neglect, both in life insurance and property, are such as to form a serious objection to the present methods of insurance. The same amount invested in some safe bank or legitimate business is a surer provision against coming want than the building up of monopolies in trusts and insurance. Nevertheless, for the present necessities, or until some system of active benevolence can be started that shall look only after the needy, and not after the building up of immense fortunes from the hard earnings of the poor, or well-to-do, or even from the speculations of the rich, it may be suffered to continue as a means of suggesting a better; for it is not always the fault of the system. It is in the manner in which it is carried out—the advantage that is taken of it. And it is doubtful whether or not any legalized system of benevolence can be instituted that may not be abused. Therefore all moral reforms should seek to make men better in heart and character; to suppress selfishness in the hearts of men rather than in measures or business relations. Insurance then and many other similar organizations, may become a real blessing to mankind—to the many and not the few, to the needy, indeed, and not to the millionaire.

This brings us to consider in the next place,

Productions and Laborers.

The former, of course, relates to both what is raised from the earth, dug from the mines, manufactured in the mills, or gathered from the ocean, forests and streams; the latter to those who manage or manipulate these industries. The productions, therefore, concern both

(a.) *The Producer and the Consumer.* The relations and

obligations inhering in these parties are much the same as those of the seller and buyer; and the same principles and laws prevail here as in the former relations. They are mutually dependent, the one upon the other, except in cases where the producer and consumer are identical. This denotes an independent condition, and obtains largely in the simplest forms of society, as in an original or unorganized state; or before the arts of civilization multiplied man's wants to such an extent as to make him more dependent upon his fellow-creatures. This phase of our subject has important lessons for the student of sociology. The history of civilization should be studied far enough, at least, to enable him to form safe conclusions as to the true relations of the several elements of refined society.

But without attempting a strict analysis of these relations, we wish to say that pure economy would teach that within given limits, determined largely by experiment, the more intimate these relations the better for both parties. But it is seldom that the producers either of agricultural products, or those of the mines, forests or fisheries, or of shops, mills or factories, can make direct sales of their several commodities. And this gives rise to another, or second class of laborers, whose services can not well be dispensed with, called

(b.) *Middle Men or Merchants.* As just stated, this relation seems to be a necessary one in all advanced stages of society; but like many other necessary and even good things, it is liable to great abuse. As in the case of employer and employed, when it comes to be a sub-contract and a sub-sub-contract, and even this last reduplicated, the profits to sub-contractors and actual laborers grow less and less: so when we multiply middle men and agents and sub-agents, the profits to actual producers are reduced to the minimum, while to consumers the expense

is correspondingly great. Hence attempts have been made, from time to time, to dispense with some of the middle men in business, making the exchange more direct; but from some cause, the efforts have not proved entirely satisfactory, notwithstanding the true policy is evidently in the direction of reducing the agents and sub-agents to the minimum in number or quantity—while it might be worth while to attempt an improvement in quality, also—so that profits might be mutual and fair to all parties. This would be upon the same principle as an economical division of labor, in the department of manufacturing.

But competition, arising from attempts to build up one's lawful business, as well as unnatural greed for gain, carrying that business into the confines of speculation, or beyond the limits of wholesome rivalry, have added much to the perplexities of these relations. It has called into the field a class of agents called

(c.) *Traveling men* for the various business houses, whose activity constitutes a large share of the exchange of commodities. And while this may be necessary in order to carry on trade on this somewhat unnatural high-pressure plan, yet it is fraught with so many evils that it is worthy of notice here. It savors too much of that species of robbery, in which every man in trade is permitted to take every possible advantage of his neighbor, especially if he happen to be engaged in the same or similar business. This is entirely opposed to the rules of morality, and to the greatest prosperity of a people. And it may be fairly presumed that the additional expense of keeping up such a system of agency — which expense is simply enormous — must be added to the cost price of the respective articles thus vended, thereby increasing their cost to the consumer. This, again, is in direct conflict with the laws of strict economy in business, and unfair to both the pro-

ducer and the consumer, since it lessens the profits of the one, and increases the expense to the other, in order to support in luxury and high living, a class of men that neither produce, on the one hand, nor encourage production on the other, since the profits of the commodities are consumed, or appropriated by the middlemen. The only class of persons that seem to realize financial benefits from this feature of trade is the first-class hotel keeper; but even this, it must be remembered, is somewhat prejudicial to the ordinary laborer, since it fosters a select class at the expense of some of the most worthy elements of society, to say nothing about the increase in the price of goods thus burdened with an amount equal to the enormous expenses of these traveling agents.

All this seems to be a needless burden on trade, since, with the present facilities for communication and commerce, an order sent direct from the merchant—which is really the only middle man needed in trade—to the manufacturer, or wholesale dealer, who is only another grade of merchant, could, and would be honored without the intervention of traveling men. The postoffice, the telegraph, and the conveniences in banking and exchange, readily supply the means for communication, and make the connections between merchant and manufacturer, between the producer of the raw material and the manufacturer, and back again to the consumer, etc., all that could be desired.

There is still another serious objection to the system of trade, as carried on by excessive agency, which is again repeated by the salesmen, both among retail and some wholesale dealers, viz., in order to make abundant sales, and thus to increase the business of their respective houses, and make themselves solid—as the term goes—with their employers, these agents often force their goods, by overper-

suasion and other mild stimulants (?) upon the retail merchants who, in turn, must use all their persuasive arts in order to find sale for their "splendid stock of goods, always the best in the market and the cheapest." (?) And thus families and other customers, and whole communities, by reason of this pampered desire to excel one another, are induced to purchase goods beyond their means, and many things they do not need. This to be sure is a voluntary matter on the part of the purchaser; but the temptation to purchase is great, and the sequel too often shows that it is too great for the unaided human power to resist.

Now all these things and many more that will readily occur to the thinking student, have a direct tendency not only to add unnecessary and expensive conditions to trade, but to corrupt public morals, weaken public confidence, and create public discontent, which finds ready complaints against heavy taxes and hard times. This unnatural and unnecessary separation of the producer and the consumer, of the merchant and the manufacturer, also prevents and destroys that natural sympathy among parties so intimately dependent upon each other, so necessary also to successful business operations. It damages the body politic in a corresponding ratio. It is a source of perpetual annoyance that should be checked by such restraints as moral training can command in early life, and by the enforcement of such rules and regulations in civil society as strict economy in public affairs would suggest, and that strict honesty can justify.

There is still another feature of this general subject which we shall call

(d.) *The division of labor*, intimately associated with the foregoing, and leading to the consideration of labor and capital. It may be presented briefly thus:

In order to carry on the affairs of trade, on a larger scale

than usual, and to acquire wealth through labor, more rapidly (a thing not always desirable or safe), men have found it necessary to associate both labor and capital in such a way as to derive greater returns from both. It has been found that man's labor is more profitable when it is so distributed among persons, that each one shall have but a certain part to do, and to devote all his energies to this one thing from day to day. By so doing he acquires greater skill and speed; so that ordinarily, he can produce at least twenty per cent. more than he can by dividing his time and attention among many different parts of the same article, or on many different things. This is especially true when skilled labor is required, as in factories, mills, shops, etc.: so that in the manufacture of a certain article that has—say ten different parts or pieces—ten men, each one devoting his entire time and attention to one part, say in ten of these same articles, as a plow, a wagon, or an overcoat, he can make his ten parts, on an average, in about four-fifths of the time required, working alone, to make the whole of one article. This is a saving of one-fifth or twenty per cent. on every article manufactured; or, on ten of these articles at \$10 each, a saving of \$20 which usually goes to the firm, and not to the man or men who produce it.

This much, then, for what is known or called a "Division of Labor." And in some cases the gain per cent. is still greater, amounting, in some instances, to more than 50 per cent., *i. e.*, a man can double his usual amount of work by this division of labor. We may be permitted to say just here, however, that this division is not so good for the man, since his skill and energies are trained only in one channel, thus narrowing him down to a mere machine. But it enables the manufacturer, sometimes, to double his money invested in a very short time; and this has led to the founding of large establishments for the production,

and the varied manufacture of the necessaries and luxuries of life. And as the ordinary wealth of one man is not usually sufficient to carry on the business on a scale of magnificence sufficient to render it the most profitable; for—let it be borne in mind—the rate of profits to the establishment, up to a certain limit, are in a direct ratio to the extent of the business; *i. e.*, a larger per cent. is realized from an extensive trade, than from a more limited one; and this is by reason of a more extensive division of labor; so it becomes necessary, in order to carry on this business, to associate capital in a similar manner; and this, again, gives rise to what is known as

3. *Associated Capital, controlling labor and production:* for it is a fact beyond disputation, that it, in effect, does both. It assumes to regulate the price of labor on a larger scale, by fixing the rate of wages for those whom it employs,—the producer both of the raw material, as in the case of farm and mine products, dictating market values thereof—and also of manufactured articles produced both by labor by the day and also by what is called job work, or so much per piece. It also assumes to regulate the price of said articles, sold in the common market, so that the actual producer, and day laborer have but little, if anything at all to say, either in regulating the price of their own commodities, or of their labor. And to say that this is regulated by demand and supply, is only shifting the question, and the responsibility also, to another part of the same business; for it is this very feature of the business that enables capital to take advantage of the producer and laborer. By timely and extensive purchases it is able to control market prices to suit its own convenience; and millions of money is literally filched from the pockets of the poor, generally by what is known as a “corner on produce.”

Demand and supply, themselves, therefore, are largely the products of speculation. They are artificial to the extent that they are controlled by the money market. In cases where they are real they always regulate themselves, so that labor and capital shall be mutual sharers of gains and losses, especially if labor is not oppressed by capital, and if it is sufficiently enlightened to take care of itself. But of this, further on.

Let us now consider the main question. In order to make business on a large scale safer, and more convenient, and to enable it to conduct its affairs as a responsible party or as a person, having rights and privileges, powers and duties, as well as responsibilities, it is found necessary to secure them legal enactments, general and special. These we call

(a.) *Corporations*, authorized and protected by the government, conferring corporate powers. Thus the larger business establishments, almost without exception, have these advantages extended to them; and the gains of these establishments are so manifest and great, the facilities for production so improved, varied and extensive, through modern invention and machinery, that private or even smaller enterprises are unable to compete with them, either in quantity or quality, nor yet in price of goods; so that the government, protecting these institutions of industry is entitled, by virtue of advantages extended, to a tax from them, equal or nearly equal to the advantages conferred upon them.

This arrangement, therefore, with proper encouragements and restraints, either legal or otherwise, such as a strict regard for moral principles would suggest, would seem to be the wisest way of disposing both capital and labor, in that it economizes in the use of the former, and reduces the latter to the minimum in amount, thus giving

more time to the laborer for oft-needed recreation and improvement, instead of additional labor; and at the same time reducing the cost of the articles manufactured to the minimum price, both to the producer and all others. And in this, as in all other cases of labor, or invention, the laborer or inventor should be a sharer of the benefits arising from production and sale, equal to the intrinsic value of such labor and invention. This might be difficult to estimate, yet an approximate could be made and agreed upon, subject to such changes as circumstances should warrant.

Again, the employment of improved machinery has also had much to do in cheapening labor and the price of manufactured articles, but not always in the same ratio; since, as before stated, corporations and associated capital have combined, both to regulate labor and to control prices. And this is what constitutes monopoly, both in trade and in labor. It is wrong, as any one may see. It is a species of slavery. Man should not only own himself, but should be free to dispose of his labor and its products to the best advantage to himself and others. The monopoly prevents this. It grinds the poor, and breeds disturbance where harmony and good will should prevail. It gives too much power into the hands of irresponsible and often unscrupulous men, and soulless corporations whose greed for gain is practically without limit; and the power to control both the price of the labor and the commodity should never exist without due restraints. The temptations for the abuse of such power is greater than ordinary human nature can resist, especially so long as men are selfish, tyrannical, and unscrupulous.

Against this monopoly both the producer and the consumer alike rebel; especially when these two factors are one and the same, since it not only gives capital an undue

advantage, but puts this advantage into the hands of those who are not, in reality, producers themselves. And this is precisely the advantage that capital takes, of labor in its unprotected state, out of which advantage, or supposed advantage (for it is not, in every case, real oppression), grow our labor strikes and such like disorders, of which we have already spoken. And it is questionable whether or not any amount of legislation can reconcile these two seemingly antagonistic elements in our public industrial affairs, viz., Labor and Capital.

But these two indispensable factors in our civil polity are not necessarily antagonistic. Indeed, they are two natural allies, thrown into disorder by the unnatural greed of gain incident to unregulated human energy and enterprize. But legislation can scarcely reach that in our affairs which is even largely organic. At least it can not reconcile these friendly enemies without removing the cause; for, reconciled without removing the tendency to disorder, they are liable, at any moment, to rush to the renewed conflict with more vigor than ever. It is rather a social disorder, reached only by education. Educate both capital and labor, and you render the conflict practically impossible, since you make the interests identical. You show each its true sphere of operation, and their mutual dependence, whereby their relations become mutually helpful; and in the education of labor we do not mean simply informing it as to its rights and duties, but training it in its moral features: teaching it that the true dignity of manhood arises from labor. [See Industrial Education, Chap. XII.]

The moral issues here are not less apparent since the disorder, is more a social and commercial than a political affair. It is continually breeding lesser disorders in our body politic, which stand, to day, as the great barriers to any successful moral reforms. The social heart must

move, before political progress is possible. Any measures, therefore, that will check these evil tendencies, whose chief instigator is an inordinate desire for *money getting*, and reconcile these contending parties; and above all, that will make it impossible for either capital or labor to become fractious, and thereby antagonistic to the true interests of the people, must be hailed with peculiar delight by every lover of "*law and order*." But I can see no solution to this vexed question outside of a consistent system of public education, backed by legal enactments, sanctioned by public sentiment, and conscientiously carried out in our daily affairs of life.

Let me repeat it! This truth is worthy a *thousand repetitions*. **Educate both labor and capital** and you make conflict between the two impossible. Neglect this, and you prolong their struggle indefinitely, and *imperial the national existence*. The interests of both parties—capital and labor—*must be made identical*. Labor must be educated, and thereby elevated to a respectable standing. It must stand side by side, socially and politically, with capital, however offensive it may appear to a foolish and false aristocracy. It must be educated at whatever cost, or we perish by this unnatural estrangement and contention of these two essential factors in the government. The urgency of this matter is our only apology for this oft-recurring sentiment.

This unnatural estrangement breeds a thousand other ills, all clamorous for the life and peace of society. Anarchy finds its ready tools in the ignorant and discontented laborer; and capital in its present greedy state, is ready to take advantage of any weakness it finds in ignorant labor. Capital is arrogant, and labor is stubborn. The one is sharp-sighted, the other is blind. The one is cool and calculating; the other is hot and impulsive. The

one would rob, the other would murder; and it is not difficult to see the end, if such a state of affairs is permitted to remain long, in a free country, especially where license is mistaken, oft times, for liberty.

Indeed the strongest monarchies are powerless in the grasp of this monster ignorance, enraged and clamoring for bread, or *blood*. Its ravages are most where the power to suppress seems strongest. Civil authority is set at defiance, and the wholesome restraints of law are as nought where the passions of evil men are set upon by oppression. Even the military are powerless to control, though fear may for a time prevent open rebellion. Revolution must eventually ensue, when the elements are beyond restraint; and blood and treasure are the price paid for unrestrained folly.

Let good men and governments look to this in time, for delays are dangerous, when the people cry for bread, or through oppression; and it may not be quieted in a day. Nothing but a change in the manner of men and measures can effect the needed reform. Legislation *has* tried, and failed. Standing armies may smother the flame in one country, but it will again burst forth in some new and unforeseen quarter; and woe to kings and crowns when the insulted people rise to set right their long and patiently endured wrongs.

But a remedy is at hand. Let it be applied. It is the ever recurring remedy, but stronger at each repetition. "*Educate labor and you elevate it.*" You make it not only equal to capital, but identical with it; because brain will soon win its way to wealth in a free country—and we want no other. The hand that represents labor must be in close partnership with the head that represents capital. There must be no schism. They must be wedded and welded by moral obligations taught in our schools. They must belong to the same person, and then they can not

rebel, the one against the other. And what is true of the individual is true of the mass.

This is the only possible solution to this question; and the sooner our people, and all peoples, and legislators, and rulers, learn the lesson, and set about proper reforms, the better. We may not defer these reforms until the elements are ripe for revolution. Let good men and true stand guard until these reforms are reached; for the cost of one revolution would educate every laborer and his children, and erect alms-houses for all the poor and disabled. Yea, in addition to all this, it would plant colonies in all the waste places on the earth, and build school houses with their needed work-shops and miniature farms, in every district in the land, and in all lands.

CHAPTER XV.

POLITICAL RELATIONS, OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES.

We finally approach what may be regarded the widest range of human relations, obligations and duties that belong to man in his present stage of existence. We mean those he owes to the state, government, nation and race. They are those for which all others should prepare him. They are the culmination, so to speak, of all that constitutes him a man, a neighbor and a citizen. These relations etc., we call political, since they involve

1. The obligations and duties of the citizen to the state and government, invoking the highest preparation, and the most loyal attachment.
2. The obligations, etc., of the state and government to the citizen, invoking a similar attachment and protection.
3. The obligations, etc., of the agents and officers of the

government to the citizen, the people, and the reciprocal of these : and lastly,

4. The obligations and duties that governments, officers and people of one country or nation owe those of another.

This latter feature of the subject approaches what is known as International Law, and may be more advantageously studied, in detail, from special treatises on this subject. An allusion to it in this connection is all that is necessary. These obligations, relations etc., may be discussed here in the same connection, and in connection with the ordinary branches of learning, since they all have the same moral bearing; and since the introduction of this feature of learning in the schools will not only enhance the interest attaching to common branches, but will render them much more practical.

Public Morals grow from private and personal sources. Indeed, all human relations and duties have their origin in the family, the school, and the contiguous range of social life. And political morality, while its reality, as to existence, may be questioned by some, and ignored in practice by others, has, nevertheless, a real existence, and a prominent place in history, and in all good governments. And while, at present, an honest politician may be regarded a "rara avis," in the estimation of some, it should be remembered that circumstances often give coloring to the characters of men and measures, that obscure the real truth. Actions are often misjudged, measured more from appearance than from reality. And then these same circumstances are often such as to try men's moral courage, beyond a point of ordinary endurance. Men, honest in their own eyes, and even honest in the eyes of their neighbors, when put to the severer tests of practical experience, and the still severer tests of party politics, have fallen an easy prey to

the wiles of the wicked. Such men should be pitied as well as censured.

Honesty, therefore, in the eyes of the world, is a relative term; and is too often a matter of custom and convenience. But to be honest in the face of opposition, and the severest temptations, means more than to be apparently good and honest, where there is no apparent evil to be combated. But real goodness is not merely a negative state; but it is intensely positive and aggressive. And it often appears in disguise, and in persons and measures, and in places where least expected. But if there is any one place in all the affairs of men, requiring stern integrity and severe honesty, it is where the people's interests seem to clash with personal opinion and personal welfare, and where the agent or representative is free to choose either. And if these interests are so sacred, and important, and trying, when viewed from the representative stand-point, it is equally important and incumbent upon the people to be careful in the selection of these representatives or agents of the government. And this brings us to notice in the next place.

I. Those Civil rights and privileges inhering in the relationship of the people to the Government and its institutions.

And first, those pertaining to

1. *The citizen.* To be a citizen of a good government is no mean privilege. Indeed it is in a certain sense the highest. It is that station in which all obligations and duties center: and the sacredness of this relation is increased when the responsibilities are increased: and the responsibilities are increased when the citizen is free to choose his own form of government, and the agencies for carrying it forward.

But the dangers that beset this relation are also very

great, and generally in a direct ratio to the responsibilities. A few of these might be named as

(a.) *Indifference to the claims of the government.* These claims are mainly set forth, not only in the general support of the government, required at the hands of the loyal citizen, as in obedience to the laws, the payment of taxes and other dues, but in the faithful discharge of the duties of the franchise, where the form of government requires this duty, as in the representative form. In this relation, or where people choose their rulers and law-makers, it is the duty as well as privilege of every citizen to vote; and a neglect of this duty is a reprehensible act, since an opportunity is here offered both for preventing or suppressing evil, and promoting virtue, and this offer is shunned or neglected. It is as though we saw our neighbors' property endangered, and failed to give the alarm; or, worse still, since his life and happiness are threatened and we are conspired to aid in the mischief.

Another, danger to be guarded against by the faithful citizen is

(b.) *Ignorance of the nature, and of the affairs of the government.* It is no uncommon thing for the people to excuse themselves from voting on the plea of a want of sufficient knowledge of the men and measures at issue. And another class, not so modest, insist upon the right to vote, chiefly because they are ignorant, or rather because of ignorance of men and measures. This is the more dangerous class, since they become the ready tools of unprincipled demagogues. But it is the duty of every citizen of a republic in particular—or of any form of government in which the voice of the citizen is required to enact laws, or to enforce them—to inform himself, not only as to the machinery of the government, but also as to its actual manner of working; so that when needed changes are to be

made, they may take place without danger, or interruption to the regularity of the movement. To be sure, evils may right themselves, if left to their natural forces, but it is generally much more expensive. Instances may be cited in the recent rebellion in the United States. They may have many parallels.

Another form of danger arises from

(c.) *Recklessness in the choice of officers.* This is a grievous offense, and a growing evil in most forms of representative governments, where every man is expected to do his best in the selection of the agents of the government. But the political management is too often intrusted to a few party leaders, who generally have the self-assurance to manipulate the machinery, and to direct all in their own interest, or that of their political friends. But political friendships are not usually of the highest order. They are usually based upon self interest alone, and therefore, not subject to any moral principles or restraints. They mean politically this, "You help me and then I will help you," but *me* first and *you* afterwards, or—not at all. But woe to the unfortunate helper, if he fail "in a pinch." *That* usually puts an end to all friendship, such as it is, and inaugurates a species of political warfare as bitter as the friendship may have been false and hollow; and these become great disturbers of the public peace. And lastly,

(d.) *Political parties themselves*, while probably necessary in the present management of most forms of governments, are, nevertheless, a source of immense corruption and abuse of power. And while the severe political contentions that ensue to distract the country from year to year, or at such times as may be agreed upon for choosing officers of the government, may serve as mutual checks upon the too ultra measures, or wrong policies that may be advocated by the opposing parties; and while these political contests

may also serve as a means of general information to the people; yet the party strifes are usually so intense and bitter, that the truth is more frequently distorted than expounded, and concealed than promulgated. And then, political demagogues are continually thrusting themselves forward for offices for which they are usually eminently unfitted; that it is seldom, indeed, that the humbler citizen has an opportunity to vote for the man of his choice, or for one honest and capable.

(e.) *Political conventions* are another source of evil, though in themselves necessary and intended for good. It is customary for political parties, in the choice of candidates for office in a representative form of government, and in order to concentrate their votes upon the same individual, to meet in convention at some convenient time before the political campaign opens, and put in nomination such persons as are most likely to command the votes of the people, and *to win*. Unfortunately this winning property generally has more weight with party delegates in convention than ability to discharge the duties of the office. This, however, is not always the case, for it is not an uncommon thing that good men and true are chosen.

Another custom, growing out of the latter feature of political conventions, and detrimental to good government deserves notice here. It is customary for delegates chosen professedly by the people, on assembling in convention, or even before, to enter into

(f.) *Combinations*, pledging themselves to certain measures and candidates, for the purpose of securing such help from other counties and districts as may be secured by these combinations—sometimes the strong combining with the weak—in order to bring otherwise weak candidates into prominent notice, and it seldom fails to effect the purpose; so that the sharpest management, however unworthy the

motive, often defeats the most worthy. This shrewd management obtains everywhere from the municipal to the state and national elections.

Any one may see that this policy carried out as it usually is, has a direct tendency to defeat the will of the people, and even of a majority of the delegates themselves; for they are not at liberty to exercise a free choice of candidates, but being literally handicapped and pledged, the most undesirable are thus foisted into places they are the least fitted to fill. Hence persons chosen at primary meetings, or at county and state conventions, should be pledged not to enter into any combinations whereby the will of the people shall be defeated, or their own convictions compromised.

This may sound a little Utopian, or at least impractical to the average politician; but these same persons are sometimes loudest in their complaints against political corruption, especially if this same corruption happens to be on the other side. They will admit, at least, that the most worthy men and measures are often defeated by mere trickery. Can these same complainers suggest any means by which this evil may be corrected? We shall be glad to join with them in any measures whereby corruption either in high or low places may be abated; but we suggest that the surest way to curb corruption is to remove the causes. Kill the roots of the tree and the branches will all die. Lop off but the evil branches, and others are apt to grow, and sometimes worse ones than the first.

This evil is chronic, and it threatens the peace and prosperity of our country. And like most evils of this nature, its effective remedy exists in the more thorough and consistent education of the children. *Patriotism*, pure and simple, should be taught in every family, in every school, yea, in every lesson. It must be ingrained in the very

life and habits of these children, or our boasted education, which consists too much in the mere acquisition of a little second-hand knowledge, and patent nostrums for money-making, will prove a lamentable failure. It must reach and renovate the very character and lives of our children, or these evils will continue as they have been, if indeed they do not grow worse and worse.

(g.) "*Measures rather than Men,*"—a dangerous fallacy.

Party measures, however plausible, are not more important than the men employed to carry them out. But party measures are usually magnified beyond their merits, by one party, while they are correspondingly disparaged by the other. The good of the country is too frequently lost sight of, in this unseemly rage for party measures, when, in fact, they may be of small importance, or may not be unlike those of the opposing party. It is often a distinction without a difference. Not men, but measures, has become a party watchword with some; but it should be reversed in most cases, especially if the men are such as they should be to represent the people. I will trust more to a good man, left to untrammelled choice, to carry out good measures, in government, than to a bad man to carry out good measures, though he pledge himself a thousand times. Good men should bear rule in government, is a far better and safer rule than "measures rather than men."

Again: as humiliating as the admission may seem, the fact nevertheless remains as a matter of history, that a republican form of government is subject to great abuse from the

(h.) *Corruption of the Ballot*, both in the election of officers, and in the enactment of laws. This, perhaps, will always remain so, until men and measures are made better, which latter is the great problem, not only of governments, but of peoples. It is susceptible of solution only

on the supposition that the means for refinement and moral elevation placed within the reach of man are adequate to the occasion. To argue that they are not, involves a monstrous absurdity, too gross to be tolerated where law reigns, and Divine beneficence is everywhere observable.

But too many, on the occasion of an election of any importance, are weak enough and wicked enough to sell their votes for a consideration more or less unworthy, and not infrequently for money itself. And there are not wanting those infinitely meaner, who, like harpies seeking their prey, stand ready to pounce upon any weakling, likely to serve their purposes. This were a charge too serious, were it not known to be true. So that "selling offices to the least deserving," has become a proverb, and is equalled in depravity only by that other satirical sentiment—"Every man has his price."

This form of corruption has scarcely a parallel in meanness, since it not only barter the liberties of a people, making crime a partner in government, but degrades the participants in this crime far below ordinary theft and robbery, since its detection is almost impossible, allowing criminals to go "unwhipped of justice," and to practice their infamy. But among all the offices, within the gift of the people, few are ever obtained without some departure from the principles of strict honor and morality; and among the many legal enactments, emanating from legislatures and other law-making bodies, few are not tainted with a bargain of some sort. And what is said of legislatures may apply with equal force to other seats of power. But woe to the man who accepts a bribe to pervert the ways of justice; and woe to the government that becomes a party to crime, that the innocent may fall, and the ignorant may be ensnared! . . . Again,

(i.) *The lobbyist* is looked upon, at least as a suspicious

character, and often his work and character are anything but honest. But the man who will sell his vote on important, or even unimportant political measures, discovers a littleness and a rottenness that deserve the execration of all honest people. There are no more fitting comparisons for these two, the lobbyist and his pliant tools, than the thief and his accomplice. But the buying and selling of patronage, the pledging to support certain personal measures at the expense of the government, the enacting of laws as mere party measures, without consulting the interests of the people, the receiving of bribes for supporting certain measures, or yielding to any faction for any consideration save that of conscientious convictions, are moral corruptions that should be pointed out and held up to public scorn by every teacher in our public schools, and by every man and woman, every lover of good honest government.

We all agree that these evils in the administration of our public affairs should not exist; but are we as ready to enter upon measures for their suppression? I see no remedy involving the thorough uprooting of these evils and vices, peculiar to every age and all forms of government, other than that which has already been urged for other evils of similar character—as those, for instance, in the improper relations of capital and labor, viz., a thorough, *consistent, practical education of all the people*; an education that not only informs, but trains and reforms that which is deformed. But formation is even better than reformation; therefore, let it not only be thorough and practical, bearing directly upon the great questions of life, but an education based upon the honest and scientific administration of home, school and social affairs; an education that affects men's hearts, their lives and habits, as well as their theories and beliefs—call this religion or morality, or both, it matters not—so that the child grows better and wiser

and happier, or at least capable of greater happiness as he grows in strength and years.

The citizen must therefore be intelligent, virtuous, vigilant, conscientious, faithful and independent—*free* in the choice of officers of the government; and if party affiliations and restraints interfere with the free exercise of these gifts and graces, they must be thrust aside. Our country is greater than any party: conscience is more than policy; and honest administration of the affairs of the government, greater than office or official emoluments.

II. The Purpose and Nature of Government briefly noticed.

Governments were instituted for man. They are *of* the people, *for* the people and therefore should be *by* the people; and when occasion offers and requires they may be changed *by* the people *for* the greater convenience and happiness *of* the people. And this leads us to remark,

2. That Political Government is the highest expression of human power. It should therefore be the highest human authority and the greatest conservator of human liberty and human rights.

(a.) *All Human Rights*, social, political and otherwise, are derived from and vested in the people. This derivation is either direct or indirect, either with or without the consent of the people; either by act or word, acknowledging this right, or by implication, as in the case of the family, or the tribe, or by the natural allegiance and dependence of the inferior upon the superior; and the investiture is correspondingly direct and sacred. As in the case of the producer and the consumer, in the relationship of capital and labor, the more direct the union, or source of control, within given limits, to be sure, the better both for people and government; *i. e.*, the nearer the people come to the source of control, the greater the

sympathy, and the stronger the government, other things being equal. Hence, to trace this feature of government to its ultimate human source, through all variety of agents, until, growing stronger and stronger, as we eliminate all agents, we shall find it centering in *self*, or self-control, the strongest and best of all governments: and to develop this quality or power in man, is also considered the highest function of government, whether family, school or state. This quality constitutes one of the leading elements in all good government, as it certainly is one of its principal objects. All governments, therefore, are based originally upon rights conferred by superior powers, the consent of the governed.

Tracing the analogy of the producer and the consumer still further, we find that, in order to carry out and to utilize the principle of the division of labor, middle men, or merchants, were instituted, in order to conduct the matters between the two sections, viz., the producer and the consumer; so, in matters of government, certain parts of these governmental affairs are committed, for convenience, to chosen classes.

In past ages these classes—for there were as many of them as there were main functions of government—were sometimes selected by the people themselves; sometimes it was a matter of common consent; sometimes by violence and usurpation. But, without attempting an exhaustive history, or an analysis of the origin of government, we may assume here that the division of the affairs of the government, in this and similar ways, was chiefly for convenience and greater thoroughness. Hence, the different forms of government, yet all possessing essentially its three great functions, viz., the legislative, the judicial, and the executive; sometimes all vested in the same person or body, sometimes in two or three. The latter would

certainly seem wisest and best; hence, the monarchy in different forms, the oligarchy, the aristocracy, and the various forms of democracy, pure and representative, in which latter, public affairs are committed to select agents or representatives. This may be called the republican form of government.

(b.) But the *object of all good governments* is the good of the governed. For this purpose they are, and were, created. They are human institutions, ordained for wise and benevolent purposes; and, as such, should be studied, honored and obeyed, except in cases where they are clearly wrong, and hurtful; in which cases they may be altered to suit human needs. The means resorted to in order to effect any needed changes should be peaceable, if possible.

(c.) *The divine right of kings to rule simply because they are kings, has no foundation in reason, and but little in the belief of the people, the true origin of power in governments.* Just as the highest objects of labor are *first* to benefit others (and this is the true view of labor), second, to benefit the laborer himself, so, good government seeks *first* to benefit the governed; second, to benefit the government itself. When these objects are reversed, selfishness is at the helm, and suffering ensues. But these objects, when pursued in their logical order are mutually beneficial: *i. e.*, what benefits the people most, reacts favorably upon the government that protects the rights of the people or the citizen; and it will always enhance its own interests in the highest degree possible, since this is the legitimate function of government. And this is the philosophical and practical view of both labor and government.

This may also be said to be the moral view of these subjects, which, if carried out in all departments of government, as in the industries, would soon put an end to all contention and strife among men, and erect a barrier

about the rights of the people and the principles of government, that time itself would not and could not break down. Hence, it may be inferred that that government is the best that comes nearest the people, and distributes the rights and duties, the emoluments and labors, most evenly, economically and justly among all the citizens, legislators, rulers and people.

This brings us to notice, in the next place

3. *The delegated obligations and duties:* for in this particular feature of government rest both the greater moral obligation and the greatest difficulties and dangers; since, upon the choice of delegates or representatives of the government, depends the entire responsibility for the right discharge of the duties.

These agents of the government assume different names, according to the nature of the duties entrusted to them in the different forms of government, differing also in the same form, according to the duties assigned. Thus, there are different departments of the same government, as the legislative, or law-making, department; the judicial, or law-expounding, department; and the executive, or law-enforcing, department: and these, in a republican form of government, are repeated in the several sub-divisions of the general government, as state, province, principality, canton, county, township, and even to the smaller sub-divisions.

In some forms of government, all the above-named functions are vested in one man, as in the case of the unlimited monarchy; but more frequently these powers are limited in various ways, sometimes to a select few, chosen to administer the same general powers, as in the oligarchy and the aristocracy; and in the republic, where it is sought to equalize and balance the powers in the several departments in such a way that any one or more shall act as

mutual checks upon any or all others, and that the responsibilities and duties of the government may also be distributed among the people and the governing agents, where we usually find the most popular government. No one department, therefore, may usurp the prerogatives, responsibilities and duties of another.

In this last form of government, the people are responsible for the choice of the agents or representatives; and the agent or representative, on the other hand, is responsible to the people: *i. e.*, he is responsible for the proper discharge of the duties assigned him by the laws, which are, in turn, the expressed will of the people, through similar agencies.

All agents or representatives are expected to carry out the expressed will of the principal or the people—for the people stand in lieu of the principal here—when such will or wish is expressed in a legalized form; provided, also, that these wishes do not, according to the best judgment of the agent, who is also one of the people to be consulted, interfere with or antagonize the public good. When this can not be done, the agent or representative should resign. Hence the supreme importance of choosing wise and honest legislators and rulers, since both are servants of the people, and *not their masters*.

But when the people are ignorant or indifferent, or when enslaved or impoverished by oppression or any other cause, it is scarcely possible for them to do this, especially when they become the mere tools of designing and unscrupulous party leaders: or where their deliberate choice is in any way interfered with. Hence the objects and aims of good popular government can be carried out only when the people are intelligent and virtuous. And the people can be intelligent and virtuous only when suitable provisions are made for instructing them in all matters pertaining to

good government. And again, this desirable state of the people can be realized only when the several departments of the government are filled by persons equally well informed, or better—if any difference—truly patriotic, wise and virtuous. But the dangers and difficulties of our form of government have been considered in another place. The usual mechanism has been presented here.

4. And as for the principles of *International Law* constituting any part of morality, or entering into a system of moral culture, we have only to say that the same rules of conduct should govern nations that govern states, communities and individuals; for what is right or wrong inherently in the individual, is right or wrong in the government, and nation composed of individuals, with this special difference, which is one of application, and not of principle; viz., that any wrong or violation of right by a government against a government, does not taint individual morality. It only affects the government, or the machinery: and it is difficult to say just in whom, or where the particular blame rests. If, indeed, upon any one or more individuals of the offending government, it must be upon that one or those who originated, or caused the wrong to exist: and yet the nation, not only in its individual capacity, but as individuals must suffer, because of connection or sympathy, just as in the case of a wound upon the human body, all the associated tissues sympathize and suffer with the part wounded. And so if an individual of one nation or government wrong one of another, the whole nation or government feels it and resents it, as a nation or government. And if the wrong is committed by the government against an individual of another government, not only the individual of the nation feels it, but the whole nation or government. Hence, every nation feels called upon by the laws of honor and of justice to

protect every individual or member of its own government, let the violation of right occur wheresoever it may.

The following condensed view of this subject may be serviceable to those who wish to study this matter still further.

I. The offense of one government against another of equal, superior or inferior standing.

II. The offense of an individual against another government.

III. The offense of the government against the individual of another government.

IV. The offense of one individual of a government against an individual of another government.

Of course, the individual in the above cases may represent any number of individuals not including the nationality. And the fact that the nationalities and allegiances may or may not be on equal standing, does not in the least affect the laws of obligation or justice. Let these be discussed in class.

These cases of national difficulties arising between governments are all provided for in what is known as "international law," or those common agreements that have been entered into by all enlightened nations, one with another. They are expressed usually in what are known as **treaties**; and these, again, are known under different names, according to the subjects treated, the principal of which are those of

1. *Reciprocity*, conferring equal privileges mutually upon the parties concerned, as regards duties, imports, customs, etc., concerning foreign commerce, regulating these by agreement.

2. *Extradition*, or the yielding up of criminal offenders by one government to the just demands of another.

3. *Citizenship*, or the general agreements that may be

entered into between different nations, as to political rights, duties, and treatment of foreigners, when coming and going into another country with intention of citizenship or trade.

4. *Special treaties* may also exist, relating to territories, boundaries, commerce, labor, finance, shipping, war, land and naval forces, etc., etc.; but all have about the same general object and bearing, viz., not only an adjustment of misunderstandings and other difficulties, but the peaceable enjoyment of those natural rights and privileges that belong to all nations and governments in common.

Those relating to "*War*" are of special importance, since they bear upon one of the great questions now agitating the minds of philanthropists and reformers of the present day, viz., the proposition to submit, for peaceable adjustment, all national and inter-national disputes and disagreements, to a national or international council of **arbitration**.

Without so much as offering an argument, either for or against this measure, we submit it to the candid consideration of all who are laboring for a more humane, rational and economical method of settling national and international disputes.

SUGGESTIONS IN CONCLUSION.

These questions may be submitted to the more advanced pupils and classes, and free discussion, both formal and informal, encouraged among them, and even among all the pupils where circumstances are favorable; thus training them to grapple with these questions before they are called upon to discharge the duties of citizens.

Moral training, therefore, to be effective must take hold of character and duty; must touch all points affecting man's life and labor. His education from the very first

must be shaped so as to embrace the largest range of human obligation and duty, for what can we reasonably expect of him if he is left in ignorance of these life-issues? From the earliest impressions and their feeble expression, to his profoundest thought and reasoning, both in private and in public, the whole tenor of his life must conform to the law of God, which is the highest expression of human liberty—the law as revealed by the Creator, and testified to in nature and science.

As child, citizen, law-maker and ruler, as individual or government, as laborer and capitalist, principal or factor, owner or agent, as producer or consumer; in all these, and in whatever station or grade, his highest ambition and greatest glory is **To be a Man**, rounded out in all his faculties, in all his relations a full-orbed man. There is no higher station, no higher honor in this life, and perhaps none in the next, more exalted or dignified. It expresses all that is just, benevolent, wise, truthful, **good**; all that is loving, pure, honest, brave, noble, **God-like**. To be more were unnecessary and impossible.

To recapitulate the last few thoughts

1. The *home and family* are the legitimate sources, both of life and its duties, its sympathies and sorrows, its privileges and its restraints, its Law of Liberty and its Liberty of Law.

2. **The school**, in all its departments and grades, must take up and carry forward these duties and sympathies, this liberty in law, while in actual scholastic work, adding the accomplishments of learning and discipline, necessary for encountering and conquering.

3. *The environment* with all its inequalities as the associated relations of neighborhood and incipient society, and those intermediate steps outside the school, into

4. *The business world* of thought, and purpose, and act—the social, commercial, and political world life—the

national and international relations, and all those industries and enterprises that so distinguish man from all other terrestrial beings.

The three stages preceding this last, viz., Business, are all more or less preparatory, ending in this higher, if not highest expression of manhood and womanhood (for they are generically identical and their rights and destiny, lie in the same plain) of responsibility and duty. And to determine which of these antecedent stages is most important, or whether or not the last is not equally so—as childhood, youth, early manhood, or maturity, where the struggle with the world life really begins, would be difficult. Enough that we know the responsibilities and duties of each. But to determine the one most fraught with determining causes, were not so difficult. The first and second in this regard, have no parallels in this life.

And to determine which department of this preparation period is most favorable for moral culture, it is only necessary to refer the reader to the impressible nature of childhood and youth, the seed time of human life, the certain precursor of the future career, and to the imperishable nature of these early impressions.


“The Child is Father to the Man.” The *home* is the birthplace of morality: the *school*, the foster mother to the home: the *neighborhood*, the stepping stone from the threshold of home and school, into the wider world—the battle-field for life and victory.


NOTE.—The following synopsis of the last three chapters may be useful in review, and for independent study. It is hoped also that frequent abstracts will be made by the learner, from time to time, and that many additions may be made to the topics named throughout the entire volume. Independent thought and study are the life and safeguard of learning; and the man who reads a good book and leaves it before he is able to reproduce it, in some form and always improved, and made practical, has read to a poor purpose. There-

fore, for the sake of convenience in study and application, the topics of the last two chapters are here briefly arranged in a somewhat logical order. Let them be carefully studied, from an independent standpoint.

SYNOPSIS.

HUMAN RELATIONS, OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES.	Domestic and Scholastic.	Home and Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marital..... { Man and Woman. Husband and Wife. Parental..... { Maternal. Paternal. Filial { Fraternal. Sisterly.
		Kindergarten and School.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Teacher - A mother in sympathy. Pupil - Child and associate. Parent - Provider and guardian.
		Neighborh'd and Society.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social intercourse. Friendly confidences, etc. Industries and business.
	Social and Commercial.	Contracts and Agreements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employer and Laborer. Labor and Capital. Sellers and Buyers.
		Productions and Commodities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Producers and Consumers. Merchants and Middlemen. Insurance and Games of chance.
		Associated Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corporations..... { Manufacturing, Banking, etc. Machinery..... { Kinds. Effects. Monopoly controlling. { Labor and prices. Commodities.
	Political and Governmental.	Inherent and Civil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> People—Citizen. State and Nation.
		General and National.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The origin of power. Ends of government. Kinds and departments.
		Representative and International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agents, Officers—Duties. Laws and Treaties. { Reciprocity. Extradition. Citizenship. War and Arbitration.






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